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What I became most familiar with however, was the realization that ev-
eryone was always criticizing workers' comp. Everyone! Or, at least it
seemed that way. It seemed that the workers' comp system was blamed for
the faltering economy, high unemployment, rising inflation rates, the birth
rate, divorce rate, death rate and the rise of juvenile delinquency. The
state of our workers' comp system has also been blamed for plant
closings, business leaving, new businesses locating elsewhere, workers
coming into the state, and workers leaving the state. It seemed that just
about anything that went wrong could be blamed, at least indirectly, on
our state's workers' compensation system. To my knowledge, however, the
system has not yet been blamed for prison overcrowding, Three Mile Is-
land, or the Great Flood.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation is undoubtedly the most controversial-and
most maligned-social insurance program in this country today.2 Num-
bers of claims, costs per claim, and premium rates paid by employers
have all increased dramatically in recent years Political confronta-
1. Patrick D. Cannon, Could You Be Paying Less for Workers' Compensation Insur-
ance, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES FOR LOWERING COSTS AND REDUCING
WORKERS' SUFFERING 91-92 (Edward M. Welch ed., 1989) (discussing Michigan's workers'
compensation system).
2. See, e.g., Peter Kerr, Vast Amount of Fraud Discovered in Workers' Compensation
System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at Al, A14; Peter Kerr, Profitably Policing Workers'
Comp., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1991, at Dl, D2; Colleen Johnson, Consultants Focus on
Pollution, Workers' Comp., Bus. INS., Mar 4, 1991, at 3; Elizabeth Ross, Spiraling Costs of
Workers' Compensation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 1, 1992, at 8.
3. Kerr, supra note 2 (reporting that nationally the cost of workers' compensation has
increased at a rate that exceeds by 50% the rise in cost of health care and that claims
frequency doubled in the 1980s); John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Costs in 1991,
JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, May/June 1992, at 1; John F. Burton,
Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle, Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates: National Averages Up,
Interstate Differences Widen, JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, Jan./Feb.
1992, at 1; John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Benefits and Costs: New Records,
JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, Mar./Apr. 1992, at 1. Nevertheless,
workers' compensation payments represent only a small fraction of expenditures on social
welfare disability programs. Robert J. Lampham & Robert M. Hutchens, The Future of
Workers' Compensation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 114-19 (John
F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1988); THEODORE R. MARMOR Er AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD
WELFARE STATE 32 (1990) (noting the total costs of social insurance in the United States
to be $360 billion and the costs of workers' compensation to be $24 billion, or less than
1992-93]
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tions have spread, pitting those who favor benefit reduction in order to
promote economic development against those who defend the need for
stable or increased benefits. Popular discourse focuses on the dangers
of abuse and manipulation.
The treatment of injured workers presents a societal dilemma. On
the one hand, there is increasing concern that workers' compensation
simply costs too much. Economic decline has legitimized political con-
cerns about the adverse impact on economic development of any sys-
tem which provides wage replacement benefits to non-working people.
On the other hand, the incidence of reported occupational injuries and
illnesses remains high.4 Moreover, most states, including West Virgin-
ia, have been legally and socially committed to the payment of ade-
quate benefits to disabled workers.
7%).
4. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (reported independently of claims
filed for workers' compensation benefits) shows that reports of workplace injuries and illness
in private industry increased by about 177,000 to 6.8 million in 1990. 9 LAB. REL. WK.
1099 (1991). The number of reported incidents dropped to 6.3 million in 1991. U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News USDL-92-731 (1992). The overall rate of
job-related injuries and illnesses reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics grew annually
from 1986 to 1990: 7.9 per 100 full-time workers in 1986; 8.3 in 1987; 8.6 in 1988; 8.6
in 1989; 8.8 in 1990. Results of Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey on U.S. Occupational
Injuries, Illness in 1990, O.S.H. Rep. (B.N.A.) 837-43 (Nov. 27, 1991); U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News USDL-90-582 (1990); U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, News USDL-89-548 (1989); WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS: ADEQUACY, EQU1TY, AND EFICIENCY 7-8 (John D. Worrall & David Appel eds.,
1985). This rate dropped to 8.4 cases per 100 full-time workers in 1991. U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News USDL-92-731 (1992).
5. Commitment to adequacy was in large part an outgrowth of concerns about inade-
quacy of state workers' compensation programs which surfaced in the decade before the
passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
Congress created the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Programs in
response to these concerns. The Report of this Commission, issued in 1972, made nineteen
essential recommendations for improving the adequacy of compensation. THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 45-52 (1972). If
these changes were not made by the states, the Commission recommended federalizing the
program. In response, many states increased the adequacy-and therefore the costs-of their
programs, although many failed to implement all of the recommendations; by July 1, 1990,
the average compliance with these nineteen recommendations was 12.5. Timothy P.
Schmidle, The State of the States: A Checkup, JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
MONITOR, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 1. The states' average compliance with the nineteen recom-
mendations rose to 12.7 in 1992. John F. Burton, Jr., Observations: The Twentieth Anniver-
336
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The political debate regarding workers' compensation in West
Virginia mirrors the debates elsewhere. Employers complain bitterly
about the rising costs of workers' compensation in West Virginia:
claims-related disbursements by the Workers' Compensation Fund rose
by 280 percent from 1980 to 1990.6 Coal miners with work-related
disabilities file large numbers of claims.7 At the same time, the health
and safety record of our industry continues to be alarming. West Vir-
ginia is unfortunately renowned for its history of occupational disas-
ters.' According to federal statistics, this record is hardly improving:
sary of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws: A Symposium,
JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, Nov./Dec. 1992, at 1. Burton notes:
IThere is no doubt that state workers' compensation programs are in general bet-
ter now than they were twenty years ago in terms of coverage and benefits. How-
ever, one fundamental problem remains: the considerable disparity among the states
in the adequacy and equity of the program. This problem is still related to the
link between the costs of the program and the generosity of benefits in a state,
and as the average cost of the program has increased in the last twenty years,
interstate cost differences have also widened.
Xd at 9. Despite the failure of the states to achieve full compliance with the Commission's
recommendations, no effort was ever initiated to create an alternative federal workers' com-
pensation program or to develop minimum standards for state programs.
6. Not adjusted for inflation. WEST VIRGINIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FUND
ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT (FUND ANN. REP.) (1980-90). The cited in-
crease reflects costs to the Workers' Compensation Fund itself and excludes costs incurred
by self-insured employers.
7. In 1990, when 71,229 claims for compensation were filed, coal miners (from all
industrial classifications of coal mining, A-1, A-2, A-3) filed 10,726 claims for benefits, or
15% of claims. During this same year, coal mine employment averaged 29,900 out of a
total nonfarm employment of 627,800, or approximately 5% of total employment. This may,
of course, be a correct reflection of the relative rate of occupational injuries and illnesses in
this industry. The rate of filing does not appear to have increased over time in this indus-
try. In 1980, when coal mine employment averaged 59,700, the FUND ANN. REP. indicated
that 26,604 accidents were reported in these same industrial classifications. There is, howev-
er, no indication whether "accidents reported" equates to the report of number of claims
filed in the later reports. WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, BUREAU OF
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS TRENDS ANNUAL SUMMARY 1990
(1991); FUND ANN. REP. (1980); FUND ANN. REP. (1990).
8. Three particular historical disasters are mentioned often in occupational safety and
health literature. The 1907 explosion at the Monongah Mine south of Fairmont, W. Va. was
the worst mine disaster in United States history, killing 361 men. See BRIT HUME, DEATH
AND THE MINES 4 (1971). The excavation and building of the .tunnel at Hawks Nest in
Fayette County in the 1930s (in ,order to direct water for the creation of hydroelectric pow-
er) killed over 700 workers and disabled many more as a result of acute and chronic silico-
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the West Virginia rate of traumatic occupational fatalities exceeds that
of every neighboring state, every state in our region, and every state
with a similar economic base;9 the rate of fatalities in our under-
ground coal mines is considerably higher than the national norm. °
Workers' compensation programs were initially created to be the
primary legal response to workplace health and safety hazards. In
1913, when West Virginia first adopted a program for the compensa-
tion of people injured at work, there was no guarantee that workers
would have rights to either a safe workplace or to continued employ-
ment after an injury. Workers injured on the job received a guaranteed,
but minimal, level of compensation benefits; in return, they forfeited
any right to sue employers if their injury was the result of negli-
gence."
Since 1970, the rights of workers at work have expanded substan-
tially. Federal statutes regulate occupational safety and health exten-
sively. 2 In West Virginia, as in many states, the employment-at-will
sis; these deaths were probably preventable with readily available technology. See MARTIN
CHERNIAX, HAWKS NEST INCIDENT (1986); DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITz, DEAD-
LY DUST 96-98 (1991). The affected workers and surviving dependents were allowed to sue,
but ultimately collected very little. See Jones v. Rinehart & Dennis Co., 168 S.E. 482 (W.
Va. 1933); ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra at 98. Finally, the explosion at the Mannington
mine again brought West Virginia to national attention and is credited with giving Congress
the final impetus toward enactment of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (later superseded by the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 801 (1988)), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651-678 (1988).
9. The only states with higher rates of traumatic occupational fatalities are Alaska,
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. NATIONAL TRAUMATIC OCCUPATIONAL FATALITIES 1980-
1985 (1988); NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (unpublished
data provided by Herbert Linn, Division of Safety Research, Morgantown, W. Va.).
10. In 1991, West Virginia had twenty-two traumatic coal mining fatalities, more than
a third of the sixty-two deaths nationwide. While other major coal producing states had
reduced fatalities significantly, West Virginia's mining deaths continued to increase through
1991. O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 1, 1992). The rate of traumatic fatalities was approximately
5 per 10,000 nationally and 8 per 10,000 in West Virginia; that is, the rate of death for
West Virginia miners was about 160% of the national average in 1991. In 1992, seventeen
miners died in West Virginia mines, about 31% of the fifty-four deaths nationally. Tele-
phone Interview with Tom Brown and other representatives of the Office of Public Informa-
tion, Mine Safety and Health Administration (Nov. 14, 1992 & Feb. 3, 1993).
11. See 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.10 (1992).
12. See supra note 8.
[Vol. 95:333
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doctrine, which provided substantial protection for managerial autono-
my, has been eroded by both legislation and judicial decisions. 13 De-
spite the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation statute,
14
workers injured on the job can sometimes sue their employers in
tort. 5 Disabled workers are accorded rights to continued employment
under the state Human Rights Act, 6 federal civil rights laws, 7 and
specific provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.1
8
Despite this apparent expansion of rights for injured workers,
however, workers' compensation has remained the dominant mecha-
nism for addressing the problems of injury at work. Perhaps as a re-
sult, the political battles regarding injured workers continue to focus on
the provision of insurance and particularly on the costs to employers
of the provision of these disability benefits. As costs rise, the level of
political opposition to the continued provision of benefits at current
13. See, e.g., Hatless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978) (establishing common-law retaliatory discharge action for violations of public policy);
Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980) (retaliatory discharge
claim for filing workers' compensation claim); Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W.
Va. 1986) (implied contract from personnel handbook); Wiggins v. Eastern Assoc. Coal
Corp., 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987) (retaliatory discharge involving mine safety complaints); Col-
lins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1988) (retaliatory discharge involving
mine safety complaints); Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1990) (retaliatory
discharge for invasion of privacy involving random drug testing); Suter v. Harsco Corp., 403
S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1991) (recognizing implied contract of personnel handbooks but uphold-
ing employment application disclaimer of promises in handbook); Williamson v. Sharvest
Management Co., 415 S.E.2d 271 (W. Va. 1992) (implied lifetime employment contract may
be enforceable where employee furnishes sufficient consideration in addition to services
incident to employment or where intent is clear and unequivocal, holding no such contract
existed in this case, however); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redevel. Auth., 423
S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1992) (constructive discharge in common-law retaliatory discharge claim
arises when, because of unlawful discrimination, employer has created hostile working cli-
mate which is so intolerable that employee is forced to leave.); Robert M. Bastress, A Syn-
thesis and a Proposal for Reform of the Employment at Will Doctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REV.
319 (1987-88).
14. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-6, 23-4-2 (Supp. 1992).
15. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)-(Supp. 1992); Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,
246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978); Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).
16. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1992)
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988); Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. Il 1990).
18. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5A-1 to -3 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
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levels likewise grows. The raging political debates regarding compensa-
tion have been over how to design the benefit structure, not how to
promote safer employment.
These chronic political debates spawn irreconcilable views of the
appropriate societal treatment of disabled workers. It is therefore essen-
tial that we define more clearly the current crisis facing the West
Virginia workers' compensation program. Part II of this Article ex-
plores the historic political and economic roots of the current workers'
compensation debates in West Virginia. Three dominant issues emerge:
-The illegal thirty percent reduction in premium rates charged to
employers beginning in 1985 continues to be a primary cause for the
current financial problems facing the Fund.
-The decline in coal mine and manufacturing employment created
a further financial drain as the Fund is called upon to provide signifi-
cant benefits to older disabled and displaced workers.
-Resulting financial problems have fueled the political opposition
to the continuation of benefits and eligibility standards.
Part EII of this Article looks at the current legal and administrative
status of the Workers' Compensation Fund, concluding that:
-From a financial standpoint, the growth in permanent total dis-
ability benefits, primarily awarded to displaced older coal miners, is
the most serious source of current pressure on the Fund.
-Occupational injury and death rates in West Virginia continue to
surpass national averages and contribute to the problems facing the
Fund.
-With the exception of funding the inherited deficits and perma-
nent total disability awards, the current premium rates charged to em-
ployers are competitive and financially sound.
-Legal decisions rendered by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals focus on the award of compensation benefits; judicial deci-
sions under both the Workers' Compensation Act 9 and the Human
19. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to 23-5A-3 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 95:333
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Rights Act2 ° illustrate a judicial preference for awarding compensation
over intervention in the employment relationship on behalf of occu-
pationally injured workers.
-The Workers' Compensation Fund has failed administratively to
focus on assisting injured workers who desire to return to work which
has tended to prolong, rather than shorten, claims.
-The 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act were
intended to promote the rights of injured workers to return to work21
but have met with half-hearted administrative implementation.
Part IV advances some preliminary recommendations for ways to
approach the problems confronting the Workers' Compensation Fund.
First, I conclude that it is essential to separate the historically rooted
economic and fiscal problems from any attempts to design a prospec-
tively appropriate program. The historical problems of accumulated
deficit and growing numbers of permanent total disability awards,
which are primarily the result of shrinking employment in the mining
industry, must be addressed without limiting the availability of benefits
for future injured workers. Second, in looking to future programmatic
concerns, I propose that the focus should be on the areas that reduce
costs without eliminating available compensation for legitimately in-
jured workers. Specific programmatic redesign of benefit structure and
eligibility will not result in substantial cost savings for employers,
contribute to safer workplace practices, nor improve employment op-
portunities for injured workers.22 In order to create a program which
20. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
21. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-7b, 23-4-9, 23-5A-3 (Supp. 1992).
22. There are a variety of other serious problems confronting the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund that are, admittedly, ignored by these goals and which are not addressed in this
Article. For example, there are serious delays and errors in the administration and adjudica-
tion of claims. A backlog of over 30,000 "protests" (or appeals) of initial decisions made
on claims has not been eliminated; the implementation of a new administrative law judge
system, pursuant to the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, W. VA. CODE
§ 23-5-Ig to -1i (Supp. 1992), does not appear to have improved the situation. Authoriza-
tions for medical treatment are not provided to claimants in a timely manner, thereby delay-
ing claimants' recovery from injuries. New remand procedures for permanent total disability
claims, pursuant to 1991 statutory amendments, are also creating problems. W. VA. CODE
§ 23-5-lj (Supp. 1992). These administrative problems cry out for aggressive solutions. In
fact, the Supreme Court of Appeals has agreed to review the current procedures of the
1992-93]
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provides adequate benefits for workers without excessive costs to in-
dustry in the future, program design must include significant reemploy-
ment and rehabilitation rights for injured workers. These recommen-
dations are based upon the assumption, perhaps not shared by all read-
ers, that injured workers generally prefer to return to work; at a mini-
mum, we owe it to them, and to ourselves, to remove the barriers we
have constructed which prevent them from doing so.
II. ECONOMIC AND POITICAL ROOTS OF THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION DEBATE: THE PAST
Workers' compensation programs were established to provide
medical and indemnity benefits for people who became injured or ill
as a result of their work. In recent years, the total costs of these pro-
grams in the country as a whole have grown exponentially: $2.1 bil-
lion in 1960; $4.9 billion in 1970; $22.3 billion in 1980; $56 billion in
1990.23 Payroll costs from 1970 to 1989 costs grew from 1.11 per-
cent to 2.27 percent of total payroll; there has been a steep and steady
rise in payroll costs since 1984.24 Benefits as a percent of payroll
have also grown steadily, from 0.66 to 1.58 percent over the same
period.' Medical costs have surged and in 1989 represented 40.5 per-
cent of total expenditures for workers' compensation claims nation-
wide.26
Rising costs in West Virginia reflect these national trends. In West
Virginia, compensation is paid by the single state Workers' Compensa-
commissioner and the office of judges. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, filed Sept. 14, 1992,
Lyons v. Richardson, No. 21454 (W. Va.). In addition, as in most states, there are a variety
of specific idiosyncracies in the benefit structure which often elicit criticism. The elimination
of these quirks would not, however, contribute substantially to reaching the larger goals out-
lined in this Article.
23. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Costs in 1991, JOHN BURTON'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, May/June 1992, at 1.
24. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Benefits and Costs: New Records,
JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, Mar./Apr. 1992, at 1-2; Burton &
Schmidle, supra note 3, at 1-2.
25. Burton, Workers' Compensation Benefits and Costs: New Records, supra note 24,
at 2.
26. Id at 3.
[Vol. 95:333
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tion Fund (Fund)27 or directly by self-insured employers;2 the sys-
tem permits no private insurance of this risk. The system is funded by
premium rates paid by employers.29 Claims" are adjudicated by the
27. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (Supp. 1992). West Virginia is one of only six states to
prohibit private insurance. The advantages and disadvantages of an exclusive state fund
system are described in Robert Finger & Robert Briscoe, Workers' Compensation Insurance
Arrangements in West Virginia, JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR,
May/June 1991, at 3, 7-11.
28. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-9 (Supp. 1992). Employers may pay premiums for general
workers' compensation coverage to the Fund in which case all benefits are paid to claim-
ants from the Fund. Claims against self-insured employers are adjudicated by the Fund but
paid by the employer directly, with the following exceptions. First, all self-insured employ-
ers are required to contribute to the administrative costs of operating the Fund. Second, self-
insured employers who have not historically self-insured for second injury life award costs
are now required to buy coverage from the fund to cover the costs of these permanent total
disability awards. Third, self-insured employers may purchase catastrophic coverage; a catas-
trophe is defined as any single accident in which three or more employees are killed or re-
ceive statutorily-defined serious injuries. W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1(c) (Supp. 1992).
29. Subscribing employers are divided into ninety-one industrial classifications. These
classifications are grouped by type of industry and by risk. Premium rates are established
for the classification as a whole (the "manual" or base rate) based upon the full costs of
claims for the entire class incurred in that year divided by the total payroll in the class.
Individual employers are then generally experienced-rated and their own premium rates will
vary depending upon how the costs of claims arising from that employer compared with the
average in the class. Self-insured employers contribute proportionally to the administrative
costs of the Fund and pay premium for second injury fund coverage.
30. Claims are made for benefits which are divided into five primary categories: tem-
porary total, permanent partial, permanent total, fatal, and medical and vocational benefits.
Temporary total disability benefits for individuals who are unable to work as a result of an
occupational injury or disease are paid at the rate of 70% of the injured worker's pre-injury
wage with a maximum weekly benefit of 100% of the state average weekly wage and a
minimum of one-third of this average wage. Temporary total disability benefits terminate
when an individual achieves "maximum degree of medical improvement," returns to work,
or exhausts the maximum statutory length of 208 weeks for these benefits. W. VA. CODE
§§ 23-4-1(c), -6(b), -6(c), -7(a) (Supp. 1992). Permanent partial disability benefits are paid
for any permanent disability resulting from occupational injury or disease and will be paid
for disabilities that do not cause any absence from work (e.g. noise-induced hearing loss).
These benefits are calculated based upon the degree of "whole man impairment" and are
not based on specific calculations of wage loss. Each percentage point of disability is paid
at the rate of four weeks of compensation for each percent of disability determined; weekly
rates for permanent partial disability are paid at the rate of 70% of the injured worker's
wage at the time of injury not to exceed two-thirds of the state average weekly wage. W.
VA. CODE § 23-4-6(e) (Supp. 1992). A specified level of compensation is set for certain
scheduled injuries. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(f) (Supp. 1992) (setting minimum levels for
certain injuries); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(b) (Supp. 1992) (setting levels of compensation for
11
Spieler: Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspective
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:333
Fund or, more recently, by administrative law judges.31 In the past
decade, the claims-related cash disbursements of the Fund have risen
from $133 million in 1981 to $316 million in 1991.32 Incurred costs
have been rising steadily, reaching $446 million in 1991 according to
the Fund's Annual Report.33
noise-induced hearing loss). Permanent total disability benefits are paid to individuals who
are considered totally disabled as a result of a single injury or disease, or a combination of
disabilities which equal 85% or which render "the injured employee unable to engage in
substantial gainful activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful
activity in which he or she has previously engaged with some regularity and over a sub-
stantial period of time." W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(d), (n) (Supp. 1992). These benefits are
paid at the same rate as temporary total disability benefits but are paid for the life of the
worker. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(d) (Supp. 1992). A surviving dependent will also receive
104 weeks of additional benefits after the death of a permanently and totally disabled work-
er in a lump sum payment. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-10(e) (1985). Fatalities result in weekly
benefits which are paid to surviving dependents for the period of dependency and funeral
expenses for the deceased worker. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-4, -10 (1985 & Supp. 1992). Any
occupational injury or disease also entitles the claimant to medical benefits to cover the full
cost of necessary medical treatment for the injury or disease and, when necessary, to voca-
tional rehabilitation benefits (maximum disbursement is $10,000). W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-
1(c), -3, -9 (Supp. 1992).
31. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 to -6 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
32. FUND ANN. REP. 6 (1981) (includes Disabled Workers' Relief Fund); FUND ANN.
REP. 4 (1991).
33. FUND ANN. REP. 2 (1991). When insurance actuaries establish the cost of a claim,
they project the full future cost of a claim and charge that cost (adjusted to current value)
to the insurer (in this case the Fund) in the year that the claim is incurred. This is the
actuarial cost of a claim. In addition to the Annual Reports of the Fund, annual actuarial
audits are prepared by consulting actuaries. The last of these reports was issued for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1990. MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., STATE OF WEST VIRGIN-
IA, WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND, ESTIMATED LrABILIY FOR CLAIMS AND CLAIMS AD-
JUSTMENT EXPENSE AS OF JUNE 30, 1992 [hereinafter 1992 AUDIT]. The amount of incurred
costs, and the amount of surplus or deficit, which has been reported'in these audits reflects
an independent analysis of the incurred costs of reported and incurred but not reported
claims in the fiscal year. Due to differences in methodology, the numbers reported in these
audits do not correspond to the reports of incurred costs (called "charges") which appear in
the Fund's own annual reports. Notably, the Fund's annual reports do not consider incurred
but not reported claims. In addition, the current consulting actuary uses mortality and wage
tables in setting the incurred costs of permanent total disability and fatal claims; the Fund
uses a predetermined and fixed amount which is the basically the same for every permanent
total disability award. Unfortunately, the Fund changed consulting actuaries twice during the
decade 1981 to 1991. Due to differences in approach of the different actuaries, the audits
do not provide a reasonable basis for analysis of trends. Although the Fund's annual reports
may be somewhat less accurate in their specific assessment of incurred costs, the Fund has
applied substantially the same methodologies over time and therefore the numbers in the
12
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The West Virginia situation is not simply a reflection of national
trends, however; the problems of the West Virginia Workers' Compen-
sation Fund have particularly troubling and idiosyncratic roots.' In
1985, Governor Arch Moore announced a thirty percent reduction in
employer premium rates for workers' compensation. 35 Rates were then
frozen at this reduced level for the following four years. This reduc-
tion in premium costs was, at least publicly, justified as an attempt to
promote economic development.36 The premium levels charged to em-
ployers during this period were comparatively low and highly competi-
tive; West Virginia's adjusted manual premium rates ranked forty-first
lowest out of forty-four states in 1986 and forty-third in 1987 and
1988. This comparative advantage in costs did not invoke business
support for the economic competitiveness of the program s nor, of
course, did it herald a major economic boom for the state. During the
same period, while premium rates for West Virginia employers re-
annual reports provide a better picture of trend. The numbers relating to charges which ap-
pear in the annual reports are therefore utilized as a surrogate for actuarial data in this
Article. The trends described in this Article are confirmed by the analysis in the last actuar-
ial audit.
Total costs incurred by year, as reported in the Annual Reports of the Fund, are as
follows (in millions): 1985-$283.2, 1986-$320.5, 1987-$353.4, 1988-$362.3,
1989-$372.0, 1990-$388.1. FUND ANN. REP. (1990). Increases in costs appear primarily to
be attributable to increases in maximum and minimum benefits (reflecting increases in the
state average weekly wage), rising medical costs (which rose from $29.78 million in 1982
to $70.18 million in 1990), and increases in the number of permanent total disability
awards.
34. For a more in-depth discussion of the particular financial issues confronting the
West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund, see Finger & Briscoe, supra note 27; Emily A.
Spieler, Social Welfare Policy in the Context of Economic Restructuring, 30 URBAN STUDIES
(forthcoming Mar. 1993).
35. Chris Knap, Workers' Comp. Fund to Cut Premiums 30 Percent, CHARLEsToN
GAZETrE, July 2, 1985, at IA.
36. 1l
37. Burton & Schmidle, supra note 3, at 1, 5. Adjusted manual rates are the percent-
age of payroll actually expended on workers' compensation insurance by employers, and
take into account all of the variabilities of rating mechanisms, correcting for industrial mix
and insurance industry practices.
38. Business groups appear to have been silent regarding the remarkable savings to be
achieved by moving enterprises into West Virginia as a result of these cheap workers' com-
pensation rates.
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mained low and constant, premium rates for workers' compensation
programs in many other states rose dramatically. 9
The rate reduction appears to have been contrary to the explicit
fiduciary responsibility of the commissioner in managing the Fund
and therefore was vulnerable to legal challenge. Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, no one brought suit. Employers benefitted from the reduc-
tion; $375 million was not collected in premium dollars. 41 Benefits
were not, however, reduced. Claimants and their representatives there-
fore lost nothing, at least in the short run, as a result of the decreased
revenue to the Fund.
As of January 1989, when a new administration took office, the
Workers' Compensation Fund had been operating with revenue that
was thirty percent below the revenue levels needed to support the
1985-1986 program costs. The reported cash and actuarial deficits were
cause for serious alarm. The new administration immediately an-
nounced an overall thirty percent increase in premium rates, retroactive
39. From 1984 to 1988, workers' compensation insurance rates increased nationally,
from 1.238 percent of payroll in 1984 to 1.905 percent of payroll in 1988. In contrast,
during this same period, West Virginia's rates dropped from 1.855 to 1.506 percent of pay-
roll for the industrial classifications studied. John F. Burton, Jr., West Virginia's Workers'
Compensation Program: Miracle, or Smoke and Mirrors?, JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION MONITOR, May/June 1991, at 1-2.
40. The West Virginia Code states:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner to fix and maintain the lowest possible
rates of premiums consistent with the maintenance of a solvent workers' compensa-
tion find and the creation and maintenance of a reasonable surplus in each group
after providing for the payment to maturity of all liability incurred by reason of
injury or death to employees entitled to benefits under the provisions of this chap-
ter. A readjustment of rates shall be made yearly ....
W. VA. CODE § 23-2-4 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
41. This estimate is based upon an assumption that, instead of a reduction, rates
should have been increased a modest 5% each year. Finger & Briscoe, supra note 27, at
15. Had this policy not been pursued from 1985 to 1989, premium rates for employers
could have been raised gradually and nevertheless remained competitive on an interstate
basis. The following are the percent increases in overall premium rate which would have
been needed to maintain appropriate revenue for the Fund during the years 1985 - 1990:
1985: 17.5%; 1986: 2.4%; 1987: 10.6%; 1988: 7.9%; 1989: 2.2%; 1990: 1.9%. These in-
creases are below those enacted or approved in many other states during this same time
period. Information prepared by Robert Finger, consulting actuary to the Fund, and provided
by John H. Kozalc, Executive Secretary to the Fund (May 5, 1991) (on file with author).
346
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to January 1, 1989.42 Notably, this rate increase not only failed to
establish actuarially sound rates; it failed to restore the rates to the
level that had been needed to fund the program in 1985.43
As a result of the 1985 to 1989 underfinancing, the Fund entered
a period of alarming financial decline, moving from a relatively stable
situation into a period when the actuarial deficit grew dramatically and,
for the first time, the Fund operated at a cash loss.' The result of
failure to collect premiums meant that reserves were not funded which
would be necessary to pay the future costs of injuries which occurred
during this period.45 Since 1989, premium rates for employers have-
been raised annually.46 Nevertheless, since 1986, reserve funds, which
had been set aside to pay for the future long term costs of prior inju-
ries, have been spent on current costs, rather than remaining as reserve
available to pay the long term costs of prior injuries. Financial re-
42. Fanny Seiler, Workers' Comp. Premiums to Increase, CHARLESTON GAZErE, Apr.
15, 1989, at Al.
43. The reduction in 1985 involved an overall 30% decrease in rates. At a minimum,
therefore, a 42.8% increase would have been required (on an arithmetic basis only) to re-
store rates to their 1985 level. In fact, rates for dangerous industries were not nearly re-
stored to sound levels at this time. For example, base premium rates charged in the coal
mining industry were as follows over time: $20.42 per $100 payroll effective July 1, 1984;
$12.92 effective July 1, 1985 through Dec. 31, 1988; $16.80 effective Jan. 1, 1989; $20.66
effective July 1, 1990. FUND ANN. REP. (1984-91).
44. Cash deficits in the Fund's reporting first appeared in Fiscal Year (FY) 1987. The
cash deficits then reported were: $20 million for FY 1987; $42 million for FY 1988; $39
million for FY 1989; $32 million for FY 1990. The Fund reported a small positive cash
balance in FY 1991. FUND ANN. REP. (1986-1991).
45. Under traditional accounting methodology, necessary reserves for the future costs
of current claims are established based on a discounting approach which brings future costs
to present value based upon assumptions of future earnings. Therefore, the deficit "grows"
every year at the rate that the reserves were initially discounted, irrespective of whether the
current premium rates are adequate to meet the costs associated with new claims. If, for
example, the reserves today are estimated at $100 million, the actual future liability (when
it is paid) may be a considerably larger amount. The reserves are intended to grow through
the benefit of investment income in order to meet the larger future needs. For a full dis-
cussion of the financing and actuarial issues facing the Fund, see Finger & Briscoe, supra
note 27. New accounting principles (GAAP) may require that this unfunded deficit be rec-
ognized without any discounting; such a revised accounting methodology would vastly in-
crease the apparent size of the deficit.
46. Overall increases have been: 30% effective Jan. 1, 1989; 19% effective July 1,
1990; 15% effective July 1, 1991; and 8% effective July 1, 1992.
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serves are now seriously inadequate as a result. The level of actuarial
debt resulting from this past underfunding is now estimated to be $1.2
billion.4
7
The fiscal crisis resulting from the apparently illegal political
manipulation of premium rates which occurred in 1985 could not have
come at a worse time. Since 1985, while costs continued to rise, high
wage employment declined.48 A decline in employment from 1980 to
1990 in general,49 and declining employment in the coal industry spe-
cifically,5' meant that the payroll base for the collection of workers'
47. On Dec. 23, 1992, a new actuarial audit of the Workers' Compensation Fund was
provided to Commissioner Andrew N. Richardson by the Fund's consulting actuaries. The
prior audit, for FY 90, had estimated the Fund's deficit at $910 million; no audit was per-
formed for FY 91. The 1992 audit projects that the Fund has an estimated deficit of $1.2
billion, when future payments are discounted at a 9% annual rate of investment return. 1992
AUDIT, supra note 33. In the cover letter accompanying the audit, Robert J. Finger, consult-
ing actuary, stated:
In order to discharge the remaining liability, the Fund would need about $2.0
billion is assets as of June 30, 1992 and it would need to earn a 9% annual
investment return on these assets until the claim payments are made. Since the
Fund only has about $830 million in assets (net of liabilities), the Fund has an
estimated deficit, on a present value basis, of $1.2 billion.
There is an unresolved issue in financial reporting matters, whether generally
accepting [sic] accounting principles ("GAAP") allow a credit for anticipated in-
vestment income, if the supporting assets are not available to earn income ....
Thus, allowable investment income under GAAP may include only that which will
be earned on the Fund's $830 million of net assets prior to the payment of claim
liabilities equalling the net assets plus investment income earned on those assets.
We estimate that this will be only about $135 million.
Thus, on this basis, the Fund's deficit is about $4.2 billion.
Letter from Robert J. Finger of Milliman & Robertson, Inc., consulting actuary to the Fund,
to Hon. Andrew N. Richardson, Commissioner of Workers' Compensation (Dec. 23, 1992)
(on file with author). There is not, at this point, consensus that GAAP would require the
reporting of this $4.2 billion deficit. Nevertheless, the Fund must finance this $4.2 billion in
order to honor obligations that have already been incurred. Perhaps even more alarming,
exhibits to the audit indicate that, at the current rate of growth, the Fund will have expend-
ed all of its remaining assets by FY 97. 1992 AUDIT, supra note 33, exhibit 11.
48. Coal mining employment declined from a post-1960 high of 68,000 in 1978 to
38,200 in 1985 and to 29,900 in 1990. Manufacturing employment declined from 117,200 in
1980 to 89,500 in 1985 and to 87,100 in 1990. WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS TRENDS ANNUAL SUMMARY OF 1990 (1991).
49. Total nonagricultural employment in West Virginia was 645,900 in 1980, 597,200
in 1985, and 627,800 in 1990. Id
50. Id
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compensation premiums was smaller and therefore less adequate to
fund the resulting debt.
The decline in coal mining and manufacturing jobs during the
1980s, when combined with the deliberate underfunding, had three
profound implications for the health of the Fund. First, it meant that
the resulting deficit was impossible to recapture from the enterprises
responsible for a substantial portion of it.51 Coal mining is a danger-
ous industry; this is particularly true in West Virginia.52 Coal miners
file large numbers of claims 53 and, because they are high wage work-
ers, receive the maximum level of benefits paid by the program. Be-
cause the work is physically difficult and the injuries are often serious,
claims result in longer duration54 and greater levels of disability55
than in other industries. The resulting high cost claims cannot now be
funded from the enterprises which were responsible for them. The
shrinking payroll in the coal industry and the loss of corporate entities
responsible for the debt means that the debt must be financed by other
enterprises and industries that were not responsible for it initially.
. Second, the decline in the availability of high wage jobs has led
to major demographic changes in the state. West Virginia led states in
the rate of loss of population during the 1980s.56 In general, older
people remained.57 Older workers tend to file fewer workers' compen-
51. As of Jan. 1, 1990, 46% of the deficit was attributable to coal mining. In addi-
tion, the various sectors of the construction industry were responsible for 26.1% of the debt.
No other industry contributed more than 10% to the deficit. Letter from Chad C.
Wisehnieyer, William M. Mercer, Inc., to John Kozak, Executive Secretary to the Fund
(Jan. 21, 1990) (on file with author).
52. See supra note 10.
53. See supra note 7.
54. See infra note 109.
55. For example, in FY 1989, coal miners accounted for approximately 72.5% of the
costs of permanent total disability awards incurred by the program. Telephone Interview
with Robert Finger of Milliman & Robertson, Inc., consulting actuary to the Fund (Oct. 1,
1992).
56. Only four states lost population in the 1980s: West Virginia, 8.0% loss; Iowa,
4.7% loss; Wyoming, 3.4% loss; and North Dakota, 2.1% loss. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990 21 (111th ed. 1991);
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTs 389 (1992) (citing the 1990 Census).
57. 1 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION 20
(1982); 1 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION 43
1992-931
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sation claims; their claims tend to be more costly, however, because of
the combined effects of aging and injury.58 Younger workers, who are
generally less costly to a compensation system, have decreased in
numbers.
Third, many of these older workers were partially or totally dis-
abled from their years in coal mining. "Second injury" awards for
permanent total disability, which provide lifetime weekly benefits, have
risen steadily in recent years. 59 Under West Virginia law, an employ-
ee who is partially disabled by a prior injury (whether or not it was a
compensable injury) who then becomes permanently and totally dis-
abled "through the combined effect of such previous injury and a
second injury received in the course of and as a result of his or her
employment,"60 is entitled to a life award from the second injury
fund.61
Second injury funds are traditionally the mechanism used by com-
pensation programs to encourage the hiring or rehiring of previously
injured workers by limiting the liability of an employer for subsequent
on-the-job injuries.' In West Virginia, until 1990, all employers who
(1992).
58. Alan E. Dillingham, Demographic and Economic Change and the Costs of
Workers' Compensation, in SAFETY IN THE WORKFORCE: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 161, 163 (John D. Worrall ed., 1983).
59. Number of permanent total disability awards, including second injury awards, by
fiscal year: 1980-217 awards, 1981-153 awards, 1982-225 awards, 1983-246 awards,
1984-356 awards, 1985-387 awards, 1986-442 awards, 1987-525 awards, 1988-597
awards, 1989-693 awards, 1990-756 awards. FUND ANN. REP. (1980-1990).
60.. W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1(d)(1) (Supp. 1992).
61. The second injury reserve or "surplus" fund was to be created pursuant to W. VA.
CODE § 23-3-1 in order to pay for the costs of compensation for permanent total disability
awards resulting from the combined effects of previous and new injuries. W. VA. CODE
§ 23-3-1(d) (Supp. 1992).
62. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has specifically noted that the pur-
pose of second injury funds is to encourage reemployment. Cardwell v. State Workers'
Compensation Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790, 797 (W. Va. 1983); see also Pertee v. State
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 255 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1979); Estep v. State
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1982). For a general discussion
of the purposes of second injury funds, see Lloyd W. Larson & John F. Burton, Jr., Special
Funds in Workers' Compensation, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQ-
UITY, AND EFFICIENCY, supra note 4, at 117, 122-33; THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 83-84 (1972); HUGGINs FINANCIAL
[Vol. 95:333
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subscribed to the Fund also subscribed to the second injury fund; self-
insured employers could choose whether to subscribe to the second
injury fund. Self-insured employers who subscribe to the second injury
fund63 are responsible only for the costs of the partial disability at-
tributable to the last "second" injury;64 the second injury fund pays
the remainder.65 In many cases involving active self-insured employ-
SERVICES, ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS OF FISCAL ISSUES FOR THE WEST VIRGINIA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FUND 14 (1989) [(hereinafter HUGGINS REPORT]. This report noted:
It is true that one of the purposes of second injury funds is to protect employers
from shock losses which may not entirely arise out of current employment. How-
ever, perhaps a more basic purpose of the second injury funds is to promote the
employability of previously injured (handicapped) workers. Self-insurance for second
injury defeats this purpose.
L While employers' general workers' compensation premium rates are "experience rated"
based upon the frequency and size of compensation claims made by their own employees,
an employer's contributions to second injury funds are generally not adjusted based upon
the particular claims experience of that employer with the fund. Therefore, the premium
rates of the employer have not been affected by the number of second injury claims arising
from that place of employment, thereby creating an incentive to hire the previously injured.
The second injury statute was amended in 1991, however, to provide for experience rating
of employers based upon second injury life awards which are granted. W. VA. CODE § 23-
2-9(b)(2) (Supp. 1992). The apparent justification for this was the excessive "dumping" of
disabled employees into the second injury fund with the acquiescence of employers who no
longer wanted to provide employment and likewise wanted to avoid being charged for the
disability of the claimant. This amendment was designed to create a financial disincentive to
this collusive behavior, but has the potential perverse effect of discouraging employment or
reemployment of people with preexisting disabilities. Thus, when rights to employment for
the disabled are expanding generally, this amendment created a financial disincentive to
comply with the new civil rights laws.
63. Self insurance has historically been permitted for second injury claims. W. VA.
CODE §§ 23-2-9, 23-3-1(d)(2) (Supp. 1992). However, self insurance for this risk was elimi-
nated by the amendments to the statute passed in 1990, except for certain historically self-
insured employers. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-9(b) (Supp. 1992); see HUGGINS REPORT, supra
note 62.
64. Any injury that is not the first injury qualifies as a "second" injury; it can be the
second, third, or fourth injury.
65. W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1 (Supp. 1992). Awards for permanent total disability arising
from a single injury or disease are never chargeable to the second injury fund. When a life
award is granted, the insurer should reserve the discounted full lifetime cost of the award;
this amount can exceed $300,000. If the second injury fund is charged for the life award,
the employer will only be charged for the finite cost of the partial disability attributable to
the last injury. For example, if the last injury results in a 20% disability, the employer will
be charged for four weeks of benefits for each percent of disability paid at the permanent
partial disability rate, or approximately $30,000; the remainder will be charged to the sec-
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ers who subscribed to the second injury fund, the employers either did
not resist or actively supported these claims.' In order to ensure that
the incentive provided by the second injury fund includes both em-
,ployment of new employees and reemployment of previously injured
employees, the court has allowed employers to charge awards to the
second injury fund, even if both the initial injury and the second inju-
ry occurred when the claimant was employed by the same employ-
er.
67
The critical issue in making determinations regarding eligibility for
permanent total disability awards is the weight to be given factors
other than the specific physical impairment of the injured worker. The
availability of this reserve fund68 has encouraged judicial development
and injury fund. This is a particularly significant issue for employers who are self-insured
but subscribe to the second injury fund.
66. Premium rates for second injury coverage which have been charged to self-insured
employers have been much too low to fund the program. Employers who were self-insured,
except for second injury coverage, had a significant financial incentive for claims to be paid
from 'the second injury fund. The result, not surprisingly, was less active employer resis-
tance to claims made against the second injury fund than was asserted against claims which
would have to be paid by the self-insured employer directly. Employers who are self-insured
for general compensation claims and who subscribe to the second injury fund have support-
ed the claims of their former employees for second injury life awards in order to shield
themselves from any further direct liability to the worker. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Spieler, 395
S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1990) (employer and claimant jointly requested life award for claimant).
This behavior was particularly noticeable among coal industry employers. As a result, 85%
of permanent total disability second injury awards were awarded to employees of otherwise
self-insured employers in the coal industry from 1985-1989. Telephone Interview with Rob-
ert Finger, supra note 55.
67. Estep v. State workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 142, 143 (W. Va.
1982). The policy for encouraging employment would be defeated if the second injury stat-
ute did not apply to cases in which the employee suffered both injuries while working for
the same employer. "In such cases, the employer would have a financial incentive to dis-
miss the injured employee and hire a non-disabled worker. Application of the second injury
statute here places all injured workers on the same footing regarding the employer's com-
pensation liability for subsequent injury resulting in permanent total disability." Id.; see also
Pertee v. workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 255 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1979). This policy
also creates the somewhat bizarre effect of allowing an employer to maintain unsafe work-
ing conditions, resulting in multiple injuries to the worker, and then avoid full liability for
the resulting high compensation costs through second injury fund coverage.
68. Actually, the availability of this separate surplus fund is theoretical only. In fact, a
separate surplus fund has never been established nor have the necessary reserves to fund
these claims ever been set aside. By 1989, it was impossible to establish appropriate ac-
[Vol. 95:333
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/6
1992-93] WORKERS' COMPENSATION
of liberal standards for eligibility for awards. Most jurisdictions, in-
cluding West Virginia, have made an effort to respond to the hardship
of workers who have become unemployable as a result of a combina-
tion of factors, only one of which is occupationally-induced disability;
courts look to factors such as the claimants' level of education, mental
capacity, skills and training, prior work experience, and age69 to de-
termine whether they are permanently and totally disabled. 0 If work-
ers have become unable to work in jobs comparable to those worked
prior to an injury, they may be considered totally disabled.71
counting and reserving for this program, because it was disastrously underfunded during
prior years.
69. Age alone is not sufficient to justify a life award. "It must be shown that the
claimant's injuries are disabling from causes other than the normal aging process." Hunter v.
State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 386 S.E.2d 500, 503 (W. Va. 1989).
70. Cardwell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va.
1983); Posey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 201 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973);
see 1C ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.60, at 10-389 (1992). The
rule expanding eligibility for life awards to those disabled by a combination of work and
non-work factors is not a reflection of unusual liberalism on the part of the West Virginia
court. See IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.61(c), at 10-437 to
10-438 (1992) ("It is a well-known fact of modem economic life that the demand for un-
skilled and semiskilled labor has been rapidly declining with the advent of the age of
mechanization and automation, and that the great bulk of the persistent hard-core unemploy-
ment of the United States is in these categories"); Judith Higgs, Permanent Total Disability
and the Odd Lot Doctrine, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 689, 691-94 (1986-87). The idea of the odd
lot worker-s/he who is displaced from work as a result of factors including age, education,
skills, etc.-was articulated first by Justice Cardozo. Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E.
634, 636 (N.Y. 1921); see also Guytor v. Irving Jensen Co., 373 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa 1985);
Zanch v. S&K Construction Co., 307 A.2d 138 (NJ. 1971); Sterling Steel Casting Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 384 N.E.2d 1326 (11. 1979); Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d
208 (Utah 1984); Nevada Indus. Comm'n v. Hildebrand, 675 P.2d 401 (Nev. 1984);
Metzger v. Chemetron Corp., 687 P.2d 1033 (Mont. 1984); Espey v. Industrial Comm'n,
589 P.2d 1321 (Ariz. 1978); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).
71. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(n) (Supp. 1992); see Posey v. 'State Workmen's Compen-
sation Comm'r, 201 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973); Cardwell v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va. 1983). In cases of this type, West Virginia has followed
the majority rule and placed the burden of proof on employers to show that some kind of
suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the claimant. Cardwell, 301 S.E.2d
at 795. The court in Cardwell adopted the rule proposed by Professor Larson that if the
evidence of degree of impairment, coupled with other factors, places claimants prima facie
in the odd-lot category, the burden of proof should be on the employer to show that some
kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the claimant. See IC AR-
THuR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.61(c), at 10-405 to 10-439 (1992);
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In West Virginia, the decline in the availability of coal and other
manufacturing jobs and the lack of availability of comparable jobs thus
became a substanfial factor in the growth of applications and approvals
of these awards. The justification for this flexibility in the granting of
these awards flows from the concept that the individual was employed
and became unemployed and unemployable, at least in part as a result
of an occupational disability; that is, butfor the occupational disability,
the individual would not have been unemployed and would not have
needed benefits.72 The rise in permanent total disability claims is a
reflection, in part, of changing labor market conditions, as the number
of available manual labor jobs has declined and disabled workers have
been permanently displaced from employment." It is also a reflection
of the financial incentives for self-insured employers to have the sec-
ond injury fund pay for the costs of all future compensation costs for
disabled, displaced workers.7 4
Most of the increase in second injury life awards has been to coal
miners who have been displaced from employment. Coal mining is an
industry which combines frequency of serious injury with unskilled
manual work. Historically, boys left school to go to work in the
mines, often abandoning any hope for the individual economic mobility
that comes with adequate education. The state was complicit; the edu-
cational systems in rural West Virginia have been notoriously inade-
see also Higgs, supra note 70, at 705-06. In situations in which the claimant does not meet
this prima facie burden, Professor Larson indicates that the test of reasonableness does not
require the claimant to work beyond the geographical area in which s/he lives. 1C ARTHUR
LARSON, WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.61(d), at 10-489 (1992); see also Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 367 P.2d 270 (Ariz. 1961); McMannis v. Mad-Ray
Modulars, Inc., 289 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1974). There is no case law on the specific need for
geographical proximity of available work in West Virginia.
72. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Spieler, 395 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1990) (even if claimaht is
retired, when retirement is caused by work-related physical impairment, permanent total
disability benefits awarded); Hunter v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 386 S.E.2d
500 (W. Va. 1989) (when retirement occurred independent of any work-related impairment,
life award will not be awarded based solely upon age-related impairments).
73. It is a frequently observed phenomenon that claims for disability benefits rise
during periods of economic downturn. See DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 10
(1984); RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & ROBERT HAVEMAN, DISABILITY AND WORK 47 (1982);
ROBERT HAVEMAN, Er AL., PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD DISABLED WORKERS 81 (1984).
74. See supra note 66.
[Vol. 95:333
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quate." This means that the Fund continues to face claims for perma-
nent total disability benefits from older miners who are unable to work
because of their combined disabilities, lack of education, age, and
economic displacement.7
6
One of the critical problems now facing the Fund is the cost of
these permanent total disability awards which have been (and are be-
ing) granted to workers displaced from coal mining.77 Each of these
claims is expensive; 8 the actuarial cost of these permanent disability
awards in 1991 represented about one-third of total costs to the
Fund.79 Meanwhile, premium rates charged to both subscribing and
self-insured employers for second injury fund coverage have been
inadequate. The result for the Fund has been an enormous deficit in
the funding of second injury claims. Most of this deficit is attributable
to the coal industry, which now has lower aggregate payroll than it
had during the period of time that the injuries resulting in these obli-
gations occurred. Approximately one-third of these life awards have
been made against the accounts of now inactive coal operators.8"
Costs of workers' compensation are not limited to the dollars paid
to claimants and health care providers and the administrative expenses
75. See Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984) (finding inequitable school
funding created unconstitutional denial of thorough and efficient free schools; affirming
lower court's finding of a positive correlation between quality of a county's educational
system and its wealth of real and personal property); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.
Va. 1979).
76. The average age of individuals who have been awarded second injury life awards
is 58 years. Telephone Interview with Robert Finger, supra note 55.
77. In 1989, a total of $42 million for second injury life awards was charged to the
accounts of subscribers to the second injury fund who were otherwise self-insured; $36
million of this, or 86% was attributable to the coal industry. Among subscribing employers,
$60 million was charged to the second injury fund; $38 million, or 63% was attributable to
the coal industry. Premium rates for second injury coverage have been, and continue to be,
inadequate to support the costs of this program. The need to increase the premium rates for
second injury fund coverage, particularly in the coal industry, is acute. Id
78. On an actuarial basis, they are valued at approximately $250,000 per award. Id.
79. For example, 544 new permanent total disability awards made to employees of
employers who subscribed to the Fund "cost" the Fund, on an actuarial basis, $141 million
in 1991 or approximately one-third of the total costs incurred in that year. FUND ANN. REP.
(1991).
80. Telephone Interview with Robert Finger, supra note 55.
1992-931
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of the program."1 Both employer and employee costs rise in associ-
ation with the increases in these direct costs. For employers, the costs
are measured in increased premium costs through experience rating,
82
increased transactional costs related to claims management and litiga-
tion, and loss of efficiency as a result of loss of experienced employ-
ees. For employees, costs are measured in loss of income, lack of
complete compensation for injuries, and noneconomic, often psycholog-
ical, losses related to the loss of working status. Disability results in a
change of status for workers: the employee becomes a recipient of
benefits instead of a worker. Often this change in status is associated
with a dramatic shift in the worker's relationship with his or her pre-
injury employer; some employers view workers who have filed claims
for compensation benefits with a new level of suspicion and dis-
trust.8 3 The level of suspicion engendered by high costs exacerbates
the confrontational nature of the system at both the individual and the
political level.
The financial chaos resulting from economic change and deliberate
underfunding of the program has fed the chronically acrimonious poli-
cy debates regarding workers' compensation benefits. The failure to
fund past reserves has seriously jeopardized future benefits both in a
financial and in a political sense. The announcement of the size of the
deficits and the necessary increase in premium rates set off renewed
political debate over the future of the workers' compensation program
and created an unfavorable climate for the continuation of benefit
levels and eligibility standards at past levels.
81. In 1991, administrative expenses for the Fund totaled $16.9 million or approxi-
mately 5% of total cash disbursements. FUND ANN. REP. (1991). This is far lower than
most workers' compensation insurance programs.
82. Or, for self-insured employers, through the direct payment of the costs of claims.
83. No data are available to prove this phenomenon but illustrative anecdotal evidence
is abundant. Many workers with significant longevity with a single employer have reported
to me that their employers manifest a high level of distrust after they file a claim, even
their first claim, for workers' compensation benefits. This is true even if they have exhibit-
ed exemplary work performance for a substantial number of years. Similarly, several em-
ployers have reported that they challenge every claim for workers' compensation benefits
filed by their employees.
[Vol. 95:333
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As costs have risen, political disputes regarding workers' compen-
sation programs have become increasingly intense in many states. In
fact, all disability benefit programs have shown increases in costs over
the last fifteen years. 4 But the controversy surrounding workers'
compensation undoubtedly is more heated than debates regarding other
programs. There are a number of explanations for this.
First, and perhaps most importantly, workers' compensation, unlike
other social welfare or insurance programs, is enmeshed in the rela-
tionship between employers and employees. While the state mandates
the insurance coverage, the source of the premium payment and the
source of the disability are both derived from the workplace. The
external adjudication of claims by the Fund occurs against a back-
ground of a presumably on-going employment relationship and pits
injured-or allegedly injured-workers against their employers. Al-
though designed to be a "no-fault" system, both employers and em-
ployees frequently charge the other with responsibility for work-related
injuries. Political disagreements regarding social or governmental policy
governing workers' compensation mirror disagreements between labor
and management. Workers' compensation debates reflect deeply held
views of labor relations generally, and can be particularly heated in
states in which the history and articulation of labor relations problems
have been divided and confrontational.
Second, the level of distrust often inherent in the employer-em-
ployee relationship is heightened by the fact that only employers con-
tribute directly to the costs of the program. Unlike virtually all other
form of social insurance, employees make no direct monetary contribu-
tion to this program. In contrast, Social Security, to which employees
make required contributions, is viewed by both employers and employ-
ees as a vested program.85 This view ignores the indirect monetary
contribution in the form of decreased wages as well as the non-mone-
tary payment made by workers both through their work and through
loss of the general right to seek common-law remedies.86
84. STONE, supra note 73, at 7-10; BURKHAUSER & HAVEMAN, supra note 73.
85. This is true despite the fact that social security has never been a fully funded
program. Since it is financed on a cash basis, current beneficiaries did not, in an insurance
sense, contribute the cost of their own benefits.
86. Social insurance programs are based on a link between the beneficiary and work
1992-931
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Third, workers' compensation programs by their very nature re-
quire employers to provide weekly benefits and medical coverage to
employees when they are not working. The adjudication of these bene-
fits by an external agency creates, in many cases, a high level of
suspicion regarding the legitimacy of the claims, particularly if the
underlying labor-relations climate is hostile. This is a simple phenome-
non: no one wants to pay anyone for doing nothing, unless convinced
of the severity of the need. Views of what constitutes "true need"
vary.
Fourth, programs designed to provide benefits on the basis of
disabilities are inherently flexible: both definitions and perceptions of
disability vary tremendously over time and from individual to individu-
al. 7 Much of the legislative and regulatory energy involving disabili-
ty-based social welfare programs is focused on the drawing of lines
and definitions of categories; these are nevertheless subject to adminis-
trative and judicial reinterpretation. Because eligibility is not based
upon a clear and easily defined characteristic, the beneficiaries of these
programs are particularly subject to charges that they have forced
inappropriate expansions in the program by pretending to be impaired
or disabled: that is, that they seek not to work but to maximize dis-
ability, and -thereby abuse the system.
Fifth, despite federalization of most social welfare and social in-
surance programs, workers' compensation has withstood federal chal-
lenges and remains a state-controlled and administered program. 88
and generally depend on past monetary contributions of the beneficiary. MARMOR ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 99; Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To
Improve: Understanding American's Welfare State, 101 YALE L.J. 685, 694 n.30 (1991)
(pointing out that a number of social insurance programs offer benefits to individuals who
had employers pay taxes on account of their work. "If I were to stress any link between
benefits and past contributions, I would prefer to define the relevant 'contribution' not as
one of money, but rather as one of productive labor.").
87. See STONE, supra note 73; BURKHAUSER & HAVEMAN, supra note 73; Andrew W.
Haines, E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of Handicapped Individual
for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal
Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 LoY. L. REV. 527 (1983).
88. The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Programs stopped
just short of recommending federalization.. See supra note 5. No major proposal to do away
with state-based workers' compensation systems has surfaced since 1972.
358 [Vol. 95:333
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State political battles are unquestionably less remote. These battles also
draw on the inevitable interstate comparisons of state-based programs:
they invariably engender claims that lower costs in some neighboring
state will result in industrial decline or lack of economic growth in the
home state. 9 In view of the fact that costs vary and most states have
neighbors whose costs are lower, this is an argument that maintains
viability.
In West Virginia, as in many other states, these differing view-
points and the on-going political debate about workers' compensation
have resulted in almost annual amendments to the statute. The current
political debates intensified after the announcement in early 1989 that
employer premium rates were inadequate to support the program. In-
creases in these premium rates and announcements of growing deficits
have provoked intense reactions from the employer community and
considerable concern within the ranks of people responsible for the
management of the Fund.
This political debate is fueled by apparently diametrically opposed
views of injured workers. At one extreme, business organizations point
to abuse within the system and communicate an image of injured
workers as opportunistic abusers of the benefits systems, as unneces-
sarily idle or malingering. They urge that the compensation system be
designed so as not to encourage the allegedly relentless desire of
workers not to work. Those who are primarily concerned about escalat-
ing costs of workers' compensation systems urge reform of workers'
compensation by reducing benefits and tightening eligibility standards,
thereby discouraging abuse. This would, they maintain, achieve critical
societal goals by reducing employers' costs, viewed by many enter-
prises as excessive, and create an economic development "climate"
which maximizes the potential for growth. This "economic develop-
89. This is not only true in West Virginia; interstate workers' compensation cost dif-
ferentials are the subject of both political debate and academic study everywhere. See, e.g.,
John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle, Workers' Compensation Insurance Costs: Na-
tional Averages and Interstate Differences, JOHN BURTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MON-
ITOR, Nov./Dec. 1990, at 1, 13-14; H. Allan Hunt, Differences in Workers' Compensation
Costs, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES FOR LOWERING COSTS AND REDUCING
WORKERS' SUFFERING, supra note 1, at 107.
1992-93]
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ment" view of workers' compensation currently seems to dominate
popular discussions.
Following this model, in recent discussions in West Virginia, the
business community has expressed anger over the rate increases and
concern about their impact on economic development. According to
business leaders and organizations, high benefits levels (set by stat-
ute)' and liberal eligibility standards (set by the court)91 have creat-
ed a noncompetitive business environment and promote "idleness." 92
These business groups allege that the state workers' compensation
system is more expensive and has a more liberal benefit structure than
other states. The liberal benefit structure will, they maintain, increase
the length of temporary disability of workers by encouraging them not
to work. 93 Moreover, they repeatedly point to a study which showed
90. In particular, the temporary total disability/permanent total disability weekly benefit
rate of 70% of the worker's wages is attacked; most states set this rate at 66.67% of wag-
es. Some-states do, however, set the maximum benefit rate at greater than 100% of the
state average weekly wage. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS
COMPENSATION LAWS 18-21 (1991). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce publishes this analysis
annually and provides a full state by state comparison of benefits.
91. For example, employer and business organizations have repeatedly targeted the
standards for award of permanent total disability benefits as excessively liberal. See, e.g.,
ROBINSON & MCELWEE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS & PRO-
POSALS 1-2 (undated) (on file with author); Sarah Smith, Esq., untitled presentation handout
(1990) (labeling Posey/Cardwell standards as a "heart-of-the-problem" issue: "A worker can
be found permanently and totally disabled with less than 85% [disability) if his medical
impairment, when considering his age, education and prior work experience renders him
unemployable in a field regularly and continuously available to him"); Minutes of the Un-
employment and Workers' Compensation Committee, W. Va. Chamber of Commerce (May
2, 1990) (on file with author) (endorsing change in the definition of permanent total disabil-
ity in order to achieve "meaningful reform"). The "rule of liberality" which tends to result
in the resolution of evidentiary conflicts in favor of claimants has similarly come under
attack in the same sources. See cases cited infra note 149.
92. A report prepared by the Charleston law firm of Robinson & McElwee stated:
The liberal interpretations afforded the Posey/Cardwell holdings over the years have
idled a large portion of an able work force and cost the system a good deal of its
solvency ...when the system begins to foster and encourage a work force with-
out any motivation to work, it is the duty of industry to demand change for the
economic survival of the Fund and the state.
ROBINSON & McELWEE, supra note 91, at 1-2.
93. Bob Geiger, Cost Cutting Through Safety to Be Stressed, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
May 9, 1989, at IC, 3C (quoting Herschiel Sims, President, Employers' Service Corporation,
that lower benefit rates might induce people to return to work). The research literature is
360
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the cost of workers' compensation per covered worker in the active
workforce in West Virginia to be the second highest in the country.94
Latching onto the view that liberal benefits breed malingering and
abuse, one Charleston newspaper called for decreased benefits under
the title "Workers' Comp: Why not encourage employment?" 95
At the other end of the spectrum, disabled workers and labor
organizations urge us to see injured workers as victims. Our attention
is called to the high national rates of on-the-job morbidity and mor-
tality.96 In labor's view, workers become disabled victims of thought-
less, sometimes malicious, employers who allow injuries to occur and
then battle against adequate compensation. Therefore, proponents of
inconclusive on this issue. See Edward Yellin, The Myth of Malingering, 64 MILBANK Q.
622 (1986); John D. Worrall & David Appel, Some Benefit Issues in Workers' Compensa-
tdon, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY, supra
note 4, at 1, 12-16; John D. Worrall & Richard J. Butler, Benefits and Claim Duration, in
COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY 2 EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY, supra note 4, at 57, 68;
John D. Worrall, Compensation Costs, Injury Rates and the Labor Market, in SAFETY IN
THE WORKFORCE: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES IN WORKERS' COMIOENSATION, supra note
57, at 1; Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Workers' Compensation, Wages, and the Risk of Injury, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at 71, 85. For the current
actual experience of the West Virginia Fund, see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
94. NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION,
BULLETIN '91, Table 6 (May 28, 1991) (showing average benefit cost per employee by
state; West Virginia ranks second, after Alaska). This analysis divides the current costs,
being paid on present and past claims, by the number of currently active workers in each
state. West Virginia's high ranking is not surprising: this comparison divides the costs asso-
ciated with past claims (many of which arose out of now declining dangerous industries) by
the declining number of people in the workforce. Not surprisingly, states with dangerous
industries or declining workforces head this list. One consultant to the W. Va. Fund noted
with regard to this study:
To compare the costs in one state with a high proportion employed in more haz-
ardous occupations to those in a state dominated by clerical employment does not
show how the two states would compensate similar employees. All the comparison
would say is that one state has higher costs because more people work in danger-
ous occupations.
HUGGINS REPORT, supra note 62, at 33. The Huggins report found this comparison "techni-
cally unsound as the measure of relative benefit levels for which it is currently being used."
lt at 3. This comparison does, however, give a measure of the weight of the past on the
current system; this is a problem because the claims currently being paid were not funded
adequately in the past.
95. Editorial, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Mar. 22, 1989, at 4A.
96. See supra notes 4, 9-10.
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this view argue, workers should suffer no, or minimal, economic loss
when injured: they have already paid for these benefits by forfeiting
the right to sue their employers for negligent acts; they are, after all,
imbued with a strong work ethic clearly demonstrated by their pre-
injury capacity and willingness to work. Most recently, labor groups in
West Virginia have responded to business attacks by pointing to stud-
ies which showed that the premium rates paid by employers in West
Virginia were among the lowest in the country;97 that business cli-
mate studies have not shown workers' compensation to be a noncom-
petitive factor for West Virginia;98 and that the injury and fatality
rates in West Virginia businesses are among the highest in the coun-
try.99
Many of these arguments revolve around complex numerical is-
sues, resulting in a high level of public confusion regarding the prob-
lems of the program."°° Perhaps more importantly, the arguments rest
upon stereotypes and fail to distinguish between the inherited problems
of the system and its future programmatic needs. The polarities of
perspective interfere with the development of a clear understanding of
the problems currently facing the West Virginia workers' compensation
program. This understanding is critical to the development of any
solutions.
III. IssUES CONFRONTING THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND:
THE PRESENT
Problems confronting workers' compensation in West Virginia are
not limited to those inherited from the past. This section describes, in
97. See sources cited infra note 119.
98. See, e.g., GRANT THORNTON, ELEVENTH ANNUAL GRANT THORNTON MANUFAC-
TURING CIMATES STUDY 145 (1990). In this study, West Virginia ranks 6th (Ist being
most favorable to business) in workers' compensation insurance levels and 24th for statutory
average workers' compensation cost per case. XL Questions have been raised as to whether
the analysis of average cost per case is adequate to reflect, the incidence of high cost
claims in the West Virginia system.
99. See supra notes 9-10.
100. Making of social policy is often confounded by the mathematical "illiteracy" of
the American public. JOHN A. PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 99-100, 131 (1988).
[Vol. 95:333
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Part A, the current status of the program. Part B analyzes the judicial
treatment of injured workers under the various state statutes which
establish rights to either benefits or employment. In Part C, the admin-
istration of the workers' compensation program is examined, with
particular emphasis on the creation of pathways for claimants to return
to work. Finally, Part D looks at the process by which the Workers'
Compensation Act was amended in 1990 to expand return to work
opportunities for injured workers and further examines the adminis-
trative implementation of those amendments.
A. The Current Setting
Underlying problems continue to confound current attempts to
develop adequate social policy regarding occupationally-injured work-
ers. In particular, West Virginia continues to be a leader in rates of
occupational morbidity and mortality.1 ' For example, West Virginia
had the fifth highest aggregate rate of traumatic occupational fatalities
in the country from 1980 to 1988;1°2 preliminary data for 1989 indi-
cates that this dubious distinction is continuing.0 3 About one-third of
the fatalities in the country associated with mining occurred in West
Virginia in the last two years."w Fatality claims compensated by the
Fund have not declined, despite a decline in employment in dangerous
industries; in 1990 and 1991 claims to the Fund relating to fatalities
increased substantially.0 5
101. The Bureau of Labor Statistics data regarding injury rates are not readily available
on a state by state basis. Traumatic occupational fatalities, which are objective events, are,
however, an indicator of the underlying rate of non-fatal injuries, which are subject to more
reporting variability; that is, fatalities cannot be faked. It is these data which are reported in
the text.
102. The National Traumatic Occupational Fatality studies, conducted by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, show that West Virginia had the fifth highest
fatality rate for each of the years in question and, in the aggregate, for the entire period.
See supra note 9.
103. See supra note 9.
104. See supra note 10.
105. Number of fatality claims filed and number of awards made for fatalities by the
Workers' Compensation Fund by fiscal year.
1992-93]
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Each year, West Virginia workers file over 70,000 claims for
workers' compensation benefits. About 23,000 of these claimants cease
working, on either a temporary or permanent basis."° The majority
YEAR FATAL CLAIMS
Total Filed Awarded
1980 318 121
1981 192 123
1982 155 122
1983 73 103
1984 74 120
1985 121 106
1986 136 N/A
1987 88 134
1988 69 197
1989 171 158
1990 241 117
1991 344 111
FUND ANN. REP. (1980-1991). These claims reflect both single events resulting in deaths
and deaths which were caused by underlying diseases, such as occupational pneumoconioses
and cancers.
106. Total number of claims filed in FY 1991 was 71,258. Of these, 22,991 were "lost
time" claims, 344 were "fatal" claims, and the remaining 47,923 were "no lost time" claims
involving medical or permanent partial disability benefits. In 1990, the equivalent numbers
were: 71,229 (total claims), 23,006 (lost time), 241 (fatal); and 47,982 (no lost time). FUND
ANN. REP. (1990-91). The number of claims filed has remained surprisingly steady in recent
years, despite a decline in relatively more dangerous mining and manufacturing jobs. Total
claims filed per year since 1980 are as follows: 1980-89,529; 1981-76,606; 1982-76,133;
1983-64,398; 1984-67,161; 1985-68,937; 1986-75,967; 1987-71,973; 1988-70,827;
1989-69,773; 1990-71,229; 1991-71,258. FUND ANN. REP. (1980-91). Total nonfarm
payroll employment in West Virginia in 1980 was 645,900 and in 1990 was 627,800; dur-
ing this same period, manufacturing and mining jobs declined from 182,900 to 122,600.
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS TRENDS ANNUAL SUM-
MARY OF 1990 A2 (1991).
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of injured workers who receive temporary total disability benefits re-
turn to work in less than one month. 7 For a minority of workers
who receive temporary total disability benefits, however, the return to
work is delayed; approximately twelve percent are still collecting tem-
porary total disability benefits after 120 days.'0 8 The rate at which
these workers return to work does not appear to be the result of
whether they receive full wage replacement while they are dis-
abled." In fact, workers in more dangerous occupations, who are
107. According to unpublished data provided by the Workers' Compensation Fund,
approximately two-thirds of workers who are injured and collect temporary total disability
benefits are back at work within one month of the injury. As noted by Professor Larson,
"In the usual industrial situation, there is a period of healing and complete wage loss, dur-
ing which, subject to any applicable waiting period, temporary total is payable. This is
followed by a recovery, or stabilization of the condition, and probably resumption of work,
and no complex questions arise." IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 57.12(b), at 10-19 (1992), quoted with approval in Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compen-
sation Comm'r, 256 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. Va. 1979).
108. Based upon unpublished data supplied by the Workers' Compensation Fund, the
following picture emerges. Of claimants who filed lost time claims during 1988, 44.2% had
their cases closed on a lost time basis within 15 days of the injury, 66.72% within 30
days, 80.74% within 60 days, 85.79% within 90 days, 88.82% within 120 days. Over
97.29% of these claims were closed within one year. Thus, the claims of only 618 workers
survived on a lost time basis beyond this first year. Data from subsequent years follow this
pattern closely. No comparable national data are available on this issue. It is important to
note that closure of lost time benefits can occur either when a claimant returns to work or
when s/he reaches maximum degree of medical improvement after an injury. W. VA. CODE
§ 23-4-7b(e) (Supp. 1992). Although many of these claimants have, in fact, returned to
work, it is not possible to assess this based upon these numbers.
109. Based on the unpublished data from the Workers' Compensation Fund, at 120
days (the point at which the commissioner is statutorily mandated to perform both indepen-
dent medical and rehabilitation evaluations pursuant to W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-7a(f), 23-4-9
(Supp. 1992)), 88.82% of claimants injured in 1988 had their cases closed on a lost time
basis. See supra note 108. When investigating the available data by industrial classification,
no pattern emerges which would indicate that greater adequacy of wage replacement leads
to longer disability. In 1988, the state average weekly wage, and therefore the maximum
temporary total disability benefit, was $350.83. Underground coal miners, who in 1988
earned $727.77 per week on the average, received a maximum benefit that averaged 48% of
their preinjury wage, but returned to work somewhat more slowly than average: 83.6% of
them returned within 120 days. Among other, nonmining workers whose benefits were
capped by the maximum, and who therefore received less than 70% of their pre-injury
wage, only utilities/oil/gas pipeline operation workers returned more quickly than average.
For those who actually received 70% of their preinjury wage, some returned more slowly
and some more quickly than average. For example, workers in timbering and building main-
tenance returned slowly; workers in sawmill operations and bottle and glassware manufactur-
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likely to suffer more serious injuries, appear to return to work more
slowly whether they receive considerably less than their usual
wages"' or are fully compensated for their loss of income."'
The decline in employment in dangerous industries led to an ini-
tial drop in numbers of claims filed, but this decline did not continue
after 1983., Compensation costs in all categories have continued to
increase, although the costs associated with permanent total disability
and fatal claims have increased at a much faster rate than those associ-
ated with other claims."3 The Fund appears to be confronted, to
some extent, with increasing liabilities involving currently active work-
ers."4 Despite cost containment efforts, medical costs have continued
to rise rapidly." 5 Deteriorating availability of health insurance to
workers in general ' 6 undoubtedly contributes to the motivation of
ing returned more quickly. No tests of statistical significance have been performed on these
data. See WEST VIRGINIA DMISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURrrY, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES:
CALENDAR YEAR 1988 1-3 (1989).
110. As in the case of coal miners. See supra note 109.
111. As in the case of workers in the timbering industry. See supra note 109.
112. See supra note 106.
113. Total compensation incurred costs (for the Fund and self-insured employers com-
bined) as reported in the Fund's Annual Reports were as follows (by fiscal year in millions
of dollars, not corrected for inflation):
Partial Permanent Temporary
total partial total
Year Fatal disability disability disability Medical
1980 10.4 18.3 31.8 57.2 40.8
1985 29.7 49.5 54.2 76.4 73.3
1990 36.3 97.2 69.1 93.9 117.8
FUND ANN. REP. (1980); FUND ANN. REP. (1985); FUND ANN. REP. (1990).
114. The steady although not dramatic rise in temporary total disability benefits is an
indication of this. The rate of increase in these benefits is far lower than that for permanent
total disability or fatal benefits.
115. See supra note 113.
116. THE PEPPER COMMISSION, U.S. BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH CARE, A CALL FOR ACTION 22-23 (1990); RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL
COSTS 162-65 (1986).
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workers to file compensation claims which, if ruled compensable, will
guarantee lifetime medical coverage for the occupational impair-
ment. 
117
Nevertheless, the financial situation of the Fund, related to pro-
spective liabilities, is remarkably encouraging. Current premium rates
charged to subscribing employers for new claims (excluding claims for
permanent total disability) are now fiscally sound on a prospective
basis"' while remaining competitive on an interstate basis. 9
Underfunding is essentially confined to second injury permanent total
disability awards, which are largely granted to displaced older workers,
and to the inherited deficit, which is primarily an outgrowth of prior
political manipulations.
While political debates continue to focus on redesign of benefits
and eligibility criteria, the workers' compensation literature would
support a change in focus, in this situation, to long-term cost contain-
ment through aggressive safety and rehabilitation programs. 1 20 A
117. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-ie to -3 (Supp. 1992). One solution to this particular prob-
lem would, of course, be universal access to necessary health care that does not depend on
employment or work-relatedness of an impairment.
118. Excluding the costs of permanent total disability awards. Telephone Interview with
Robert Finger, supra note 55.
119. John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle, supra note 3, at 1, 5. The analysis
of 1989 rates shows that West Virginia's adjusted manual (base) rates ranked 38th out of
44 states analyzed. West Virginia's overall adjusted manual rate of 1.353 (dollars per $100
of payroll), effective Jan. 1, 1989 through June 30, 1990 compared to a national average of
2.225. I at 3-6. Burton has not analyzed rates subsequent to 1989. However, increases in
rates in West Virginia since 1990 do not exceed the increases announced in many other
states; it is therefore unlikely the West Virginia has attained noncompetitive rates during the
last two years.
120. VORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES FOR LOWERING COSTS AND REDUCING
WORKERS' SUFFERING, supra note 1; ROCHELLE V. HABECK ET AL., DISABILITY PREVEN-
TION AND MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS ch. V, at 16 (1988). This
is not to say that there are not some odd idiosyncrasies in the benefit and eligibility struc-
ture in West Virginia which could be addressed through careful amendment of the law. For
example, despite repeated agreements between the various lobbying groups, the statute has
never been amended to limit the number of times an individual can file a new claim for
occupational pneumoconiosis benefits; this means that one individual can have multiple
claims, which are not consolidated, pending for review simultaneously. Similarly, it is un-
usual that the West Virginia system allows the payment of permanent total disability bene-
fits to individuals who, in the aggregate, have shown that they are 85% partially disabled,
1992-931
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careful look at the system in West Virginia reveals, however, that little
has been done to promote either safety or rehabilitation. The adminis-
trative budget of the agency includes no money for assistance to em-
ployers who might want to improve their safety practices.12 1 While
employers' premium rates are adjusted based upon their past experi-
ence, presumably creating a fimancial incentive to prevent injuries, this
does not appear to have changed underlying industrial practices.12 A
provision to allow adjustments of rates based upon aggressive safety
programs,"z that was passed in 1990, has not been utilized. It is of
irrespective of the ability of the individual to work, comparatively few awards are made on
this basis, however. On the other hand, benefit levels for occupational disease are still
linked to the wages of the injured worker at the time of the exposure, irrespective of the
latency period of disease; this can result in a seriously deficient weekly benefit for a work-
er who is disabled as a result of a disease like lung cancer, which may appear many years
after exposure to an occupational carcinogen. These types of aberrations can be found in
every state statute, however, more importantly, they do not account, in the aggregate, for
serious financial deficiencies or excesses in the West Virginia program.
121. Mostly smaller employers might benefit from this assistance. Private insurers in
other states currently expend significant resources assisting their customers in "loss control."
Substantially higher proportions of premium dollars are spent by private insurers on admin-
istrative (i.e. non-claims related) expenditures such as this. The administrative budget of the
West Virginia Fund is controlled by the legislature; this year, application has been made to
add safety positions to the Fund's staff. It is too early to know whether these will be fund-
ed. Interview with John H. Kozak, Executive Secretary to the Fund (Sept. 21, 1992). It
must, however, be noted that there are no studies which evaluate the effectiveness of these
loss control efforts on the actual safety practices of the insured enterprises.
122. Injury rates in the aggregate simply are not declining. See supra notes 101-05.
Research to date has not demonstrated a correlation between experience rating of workers'
compensation rates and safety practices. See James R. Chelius & Robert S. Smith, Experi-
ence-Rating and Injury Prevention, in SAFETY IN THE WORKFORCE: INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES IN4 WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 57, at 128; James R. Chelius, The
Incentive to Prevent Injuries, in SAFETY IN THE WORKFORCE: INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 57, at 154; Richard B. Victor,
Experience Rating and Workplace Safety, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUA-
CY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY, supra note 4, at 71. One explanation for this is that the
experience rating systems limit the effect of prior claims and rates, particularly for smaller
employers. This is done for two reasons. First, particularly for smaller employers, the small
number of prior claims may not be considered a sound basis for future predictions. Second,
there is concern that full exposure to prior events will create volatility in rates which will
economically disadvantage smaller enterprises. As a result, the variations in rates may not
be adequate to send clear messages to employers.
123. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5(a)(5) (Supp. 1992). Prior studies do not show that pre-
mium rate levels affect safety experience. See supra note 122.
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course very difficult to evaluate the prospective effectiveness of any
safety programs instituted by employers, particularly in view of the
lack of industrial safety expertise at the Fund.
Perhaps more troubling, the courts and administration of the Fund
have together designed a system which often responds affmnatively to
injured workers requests for compensation benefits, but fails to support
consistently the desires of individuals to return to work. As a result,
rehabilitation of injured workers and return to work have not been em-
phasized. The following sections explore the continuing focus on the
use of benefits as the sole or primary means to resolve the problems
of injured workers. This can best be illustrated by judicial and admin-
istrative treatment of the claims of individual workers and by the expe-
rience, to date, with the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.
The continued focus on benefits has troubling future implications
both for injured workers and for the provision of compensation bene-
fits. It provides the backdrop for discussions regarding how to reform
the workers' compensation system. By insisting that injured workers'
only recourse is through the receipt of benefits, people who want to
work are displaced from the workforce. This encourages the view that
reform efforts should focus on the design of benefits alone in order to
establish a financially viable compensation system.
B. Judicial Treatment of Injured Workers
Courts universally respond with sympathy to individuals' stories of
disability. 24 As the analysis in this section reveals, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has shown a serious concern for the social
insurance needs of injured workers and approached their claims for
benefits with liberality. However, the court's liberality has largely been
limited to the provision of compensation benefits. Despite erosion of
the employment-at-will doctrine and development of strong state anti-
discrimination law, the court has been reluctant to intervene to require
employment opportunities for people injured on the job.
124. SToNE, supra note 73, at 74-75, 140, 154, 159.
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The West Virginia court's preference for providing benefits to
injured workers is best illustrated by the stories of three West Virgin-
ians who were injured at work.
Cardwell v. State Workers' Compensation Commission"2
On May 14, 1973, Jerry Cardwell was drilling a shot hole under-
ground at the Ittman Coal Company mines in southern West Virginia
when an explosion occurred. He suffered a head injury which resulted
in the loss of his right eye. Although disabled from performing his
prenjury job, Cardwell repeatedly expressed a desire to return to
work. 126 Ittman indicated, in response to Cardwell's requests for
work, that it no longer considered him to be an employee. 7 Unable
to regain employment, Mr. Cardwell applied for a permanent total dis-
ability or "life" award from the Workers' Compensation Fund. Ittman
Coal, having refused to provide him with a job, then fought his enti-
tlement to benefits.12 8 The court held that Cardwell was entitled to
the compensation award he sought. Thus, despite Cardwell's best ef-
forts to return to work, he was transformed from the status of working
125. 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va. 1983).
126. In June 1975, Cardwell wrote a letter to his former employer "stating that he was
incapable of returning to his previous position, but desired selective employment with Ittman
Coal Company, Pocahontas Fuel Company, Consolidated Coal Company, or Continental Coal
Company, even if vocational rehabilitation would be necessary to enable him to perform
such employment." Id at 793. He filed a grievance because he was denied the right to bid
on an alternative job while he was off work, having not been notified of the job opening.
Id
127. According to the grievance form, "the employer considered Cardwell not to be
one of its employees." Id
128. Ittman Coal did not support Cardwell's application for a life award from the sec-
ond injury fund. The decision in the case notes that Ittman Coal protested the initial award
of 38% permanent partial disability benefits. It was Cardwell's application for a life award
which was rejected by the commissioner. l In other words, Ittman both refused to reem-
ploy Cardwell and fought his eligibility for compensation benefits. This approach of em-
ployers to these claims is not unusual. As Professor Larson noted in commenting on a
similar Michigan case, "It is hardly necessary to labor the inconsistency of permitting an
employer to fire a man for physical defects caused by his own employment conditions, and
then to disclaim compensation liability by presenting medical evidence that the man is not
really disabled after all." 1C ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 57.61(b), at 10-403 (1992).
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coal miner to that of unemployed beneficiary of workers' compensation
benefits.
Coffman v. Board of Regents12 9
Dorothy Coffman worked for West Virginia University Hospital in
Morgantown when, in October 1980, she injured her back while emp-
tying trash cans. She continued to work, although suffering pain, until
the following July when she was advised by her physician that she
was temporarily disabled. After collecting temporary total disability
benefits for one month, she returned to work in August 1981 with
light duty restrictions. 30 Consistent with the recommendation that she
not lift more than ten pounds, the hospital relieved her of garbage
handling duties. Her back pain persisted and she was advised not to
perform tasks involving bending. The hospital again amended her du-
ties, assigning her with another custodian who would perform all work
involving bending. The hospital was, however, unwilling or unable to
continue this arrangement or to find her an alternative position in the
hospital. Although there was no evidence that this team approach re-
sulted in lower productivity, Coffman was discharged seven months
after she returned to work.131
Coffman did not initially seek additional compensation benefits.
Instead, she filed a complaint against the hospital alleging discrimina-
tory discharge because of her disability. The case was tried to a jury
in Monongalia County which found her discharge to have violated the
West Virginia Human Rights Act.132 The Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that an employer has no obligation to reassign an
employee to an alternative job or to create a "special job" if she could
129. 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988).
130. Light duty restrictions generally relate to specific physical limitations of the indi-
vidual worker, most commonly restrictions on bending or lifting as a result of a back inju-
ry. The classic definition of light duty explicitly addresses lifting and bending restrictions.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCIDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, REHABILITATION
COMMITITA JOB PLACEMENT IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION REHABILITATION: TECHNIQUES
AND CONCEPTS 13-18 (1989) [hereinafter REHABIUTATION TECHNIQUES AND CONCEPTS]. In
the Coffinan case, the plaintiff's physician indicated that she was "okay for light work; can
lift 10-15 lbs." 386 S.E.2d at 2.
131. 386 S.E.2d at 3.
132. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Coffman, 386 S.E.2d at 2.
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not do the one for which she was hired. 33 Instead, the court encour-
aged her to seek workers' compensation benefits."
Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc.135
Elizabeth Yoho was employed as a laborer and operator with
Triangle PWC Inc. On April 2, 1981, she was replenishing an acid
bath when she fell and was seriously burned by spilling acid, suffering
burns over thirty-five percent of her body. After she was absent for
twelve months, during which time she was collecting temporary total
disability benefits, she was terminated from employment pursuant to
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Shortly thereafter, Ms.
Yoho filed a complaint alleging that she was the victim of retaliatory
discharge for having pursued her compensation remedies.3 6
Yoho wanted to work and was, apparently, capable of working.
Her absence (and thence discharge) would not have occurred but for
her severe occupational injury. Nevertheless, her termination was not
seen as retaliatory by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The court found
no clear public policy in favor of continuing the employment of some-
one on workers' compensation 137 and concluded that termination pur-
suant to a neutral absence policy 3 ' did not violate the public policy
against retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims.
Cardwell, Yoho, and Coffman brought their cases forward under
three different legal theories.'39 Each of them wanted to return to
133. Coffman, 386 S.E.2d at 6.
134. Id. at 7 n.16.
135. 336 S.E.2d 204 (1985).
136. Id. at 206.
137. "An issue which is fairly debatable or controversial in nature is one for the legis-
lature and not for this Court." Id at 209.
138. In this case, the neutral absence control policy was contained within the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement. The court's decision is not, however, limited to individu-
als covered by such agreements.
139. Cardwell, having failed to obtain a job, pressed his claim for permanent total dis-
ability benefits. Coffman attempted, at least initially, to obtain employment, asserting her
claim under the disability discrimination provisions of the Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE
§§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1992). Yoho sought unspecified relief under the original
discriminatory practices provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, W. VA. CODE § 23-
[Vol. 95:333
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work, litigation* was the result of the refusal of their employers to
reemploy them on a permanent basis following occupational injury.
None were successful in negotiating or enforcing a right to continued
employment despite their obviously strong desire to work. None of
these workers successfully challenged the fundamental control that
employers have over choice of employees. Equally significantly, none
established precedent that would increase the incentive of employers to
reemploy occupationally injured employees.
These three cases exemplify the court's reluctance to promote
employment for occupationally injured West Virginia workers. This
pattern can be seen repeatedly in reported cases involving workers'
compensation entitlement,1 40 disability discrimination claims under the
Human Rights Act 141  and retaliatory discharge cases involving
workers' compensation claims.142
1. Entitlement to Benefits under the West Virginia Workers'
Compensation Act
143
The West Virginia court responds with notable compassion to the
work histories and personal narratives of individual claimants for work-
ers' compensation benefits.1" "Each workers' compensation claim,"
the court has noted "is singularly important to the claimant."1 4 "'In
5A-1 (1985).
140. Pursuant to W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-1 to -21 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
141. Pursuant to W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
142. Pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985).
143. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-1 to -21 (1985 & Supp. 1992)
144. It is important to remember that the court actually reviews very few of the claims
that are filed for compensation benefits each year. Even in the peak year of 1987, only 403
cases were reviewed by the court, as compared to the over 70,000 claims that were filed
with the agency. As a result, the claims reviewed often represent those with the most per-
suasive facts. Similarly, the court has reviewed only nine handicap discrimination cases
under the Human Rights Act to date.
As noted above, judicial liberality in the review of disability benefit claims appears
to be a universal phenomenon. STONE, supra note 73, at 73-75, 154-59. For another sym-
pathetic account of displaced, disabled workers, see THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE
You ON? 106-07 (1991).
145. Linville v. State Workmen's Compensation Conim'r, 236 S.E.2d 41, 45 (W. Va.
1977).
1992-931
41
Spieler: Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspective
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:333
view of the severe economic hardships which immediately befall the
families of injured or deceased workers, the primary objective is to
provide benefits to an injured claimant promptly.' 1 46 Case decisions
note the long work histories, often involving multiple injuries, of the
claimants 47 and reject images of the claimant as malingerer. 148
Concerned for the fate of the truly injured who might be excluded by
a stringent system of proof, the court has repeatedly endorsed pre-
sumptions in favor of compensation when expert or lay opinions ap-
pear to differ, developing what has become known as the "rule of
liberality" to be used in the review of expert evidence in compensation
claims.14
9
The court is not unaware of the issues surrounding continued
employment of injured workers.150 As its decisions demonstrate, the
court has focused on two objectives. First, its decisions support the
construction of a system which provides adequate compensation to
146. Meadows v. Lewis, 307 S.E.2d 625, 638 (W. Va. 1983) (quoting W. VA. CODE
§ 23-5-3a).
147. Numerous cases illustrate this point. See, e.g., Posey v. State Workmen's Compen-
sation Comm'r, 201 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973) (claimant worked continuously for this em-
ployer from 1945 until the time of his injury in 1969, during which time he suffered prior
work-related injuries); Spurlock v. Spieler, 395 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1990) (claimant worked
from 1953 to 1984 for her employer when she chose to retire as a result of her last inju-
ry); Linville v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1977)
(claimant worked in the mines from 1939 to 1972 when his final injury involving a fracture
of his back led to the granting of a life award).
148. See, e.g., Sisk v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 170 S.E.2d 20,25 (W.
Va. 1969) (noting "his disability is real and . . . he is not malingering").
149. This rule has been most clearly articulated in cases involving claims for benefits
under the occupational pneumoconiosis provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, W.
VA. CODE § 23-4-8c (Supp. 1992). See, 'e.g., Javins v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r,
320 S.E.2d 119 (W. Va. 1984) (claimant's expert evidence of disability cannot be disregard-
ed unless shown to be unreliable, incorrect, or clearly attributable to some other identifiable
disease); Persiani v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 248 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1978)
(commissioner may not disregard claimant's medical proof absent credible evidence in the
record that the testimony is unreliable). This particular presumptive rule has been the focus
of considerable political attack.
150. See, e.g., Cardwell v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W.
Va. 1983); Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 232 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va.
1977); Kamensky v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 134 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va.
1964); Gay Coal & Coke Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 2 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va.
1939).
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injured workers if they are not reemployed or if they become displaced
from their usual occupation as a result of occupationally-related dis-
ability. Second, the court has sought to encourage employers to reem-
ploy injured workers by insisting that failure to reemploy will result in
approval of benefits, thereby increasing the employer's workers' com-
pensation liability.151 Employers are not, however, required to provide
jobs; employees are not required to obtain them. The societal obliga-
tion to these workers is met primarily through the provision of com-
pensation benefits.
Three examples serve to illustrate the court's approach to compen-
sation cases involving return to work issues. First, the court has made
frequent use of the second injury fund in order to grant permanent
total disability or life awards to claimants who are unable to return to
work. As noted above, second injury funds are the traditional workers'
compensation mechanism for encouraging the employment of disabled
workers, by limiting the financial liability of employers who offer jobs
to previously impaired individuals. 5 2 Following what it has termed
the "enlightened and humane rule,"' 53 the West Virginia court has
made these awards available to workers who were displaced from
mining and manufacturing jobs.154 In keeping with its liberal ap-
proach to permanent total disability, it is not surprising that the failure
of an employer to reemploy an injured employee may be evidence of
total disability. 5 5 "We think," the court noted in Cardwell,
151. The issue of financial incentives is a complicated one. It is, however, important to
note that the primary reaction to increased workers' compensation costs for employers has
appeared to be to fuel the political demand that the legislative design for benefits be tight-
ened. Studies have not shown that normal increases in premium rates through experience
rating result in decreases in injuries. See supra note 122. Issues relating to financial incen-
tives for employers in West Virginia are further complicated by the fact that many coal
operators are no longer operating in West Virginia and therefore cannot be assessed their
share of current costs relating to past injuries.
152. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
153. Posey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 201 S.E.2d 102, 107 (W. Va.
1973) (rejecting the older view which "may well have been whether the workman was able
to perform any kind of work").
154. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
155. Cardwell v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va.
1983). West Virginia is certainly not alone in adopting this approach to an employer's
refusal to rehire. See, e.g., Leonardo v. Uncas Manufacturing Company, 75 A.2d 188 (R..
1992-93]
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mhat most employers, particularly large corporations that hire people in a
variety of positions, will retain a worker in his former position or in an-
other capacity after he has had an occupational injury. The legislature has
deliberately sought to encourage this practice by creating a second-injury
fund as part of our compensation system.' 56
Therefore, "an employer's refusal to reemploy an injured worker be-
cause of his medical condition, in light work that he can do, can be
persuasive evidence of the worker's inability to obtain employ-
ment.
, 157
The court is thus sending a message to employers: if you reem-
ploy injured employees you will not individually be responsible for the
costs if the worker becomes permanently and totally disabled. Design-
ing the incentives in this way should, theoretically, discourage discrim-
ination against people with previous injuries who may be more subject
to serious disability.'58 On the other hand, failure to reemploy injured
employees will result in expanded use of the second injury fund and
therefore expanded aggregate cost of the compensation program. As a
practical matter, these decisions do not, at least apparently, appear to
have resulted in an expanded commitment to reemployment of injured
workers.
Second, the court has attempted to address issues relating to bene-
fit entitlement in order to encourage claimants to return to work. This
can be seen particularly well in the decisions holding that the commis-
sioner may not eliminate eligibility for benefits based upon a
claimant's return, or attempt to return, to work. Claimants collecting
temporary total disability benefits will have these benefits terminated
when they reach their maximum degree of medical improvement, are
1950); Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 609 S.W.2d 102 (Ark. 1980); Watson v. Winston-Salem
Trans. Auth., 374 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Celio v. Workmen's Compensation
App. Bd., 531 A.2d 552 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 541 A.2d 1139 (Pa.
1988); IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.61(b) (1992).
156. Cardwell, 301 S.E.2d at 797.
157. Id.
158. There is not, however, any empirical or strong anecdotal evidence that this incen-
tive has, in fact, encouraged the employment of impaired workers. There is also no evi-
dence that the availability of second injury protection actually changes employer behavior.
376 [Vol. 95:333
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medically certified to return to work,159 or actually return to
work.' 6° However, when claimants have been collecting temporary
total disability benefits, resume work, and then find that they are un-
able to perform the work to which they have returned, the court has
been adamant that they should be able to resume collecting temporary
total disability benefits. 161 In addressing this issue, the court noted:
Indeed, a valid social policy can be served by encouraging an injured
employee on temporary total disability to attempt to return to work. If he
is able to work his period of disability is diminished. He is restored to his
former wage level and becomes once again a contributing member of the
work force. His employer gains in diminished compensation exposure. It
would run counter to such desirable end if we were to rule that the em-
ployee must bear the risk of loss of his temporary total disability benefits
if he attempts return to work and then has to stop working because his
medical condition has not improved to the point where he can handle his
job. Such a negative rule would indicate that no injured employee would
attempt to return to work unless he were absolutely certain he could do
the job.162
Similar reasoning has been extended to the cases of individuals who
are receiving permanent total disability weekly benefits and who return
to remunerative light duty work. The court has repeatedly held that a
permanent total disability award should not be affected by the fact that
159. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(e)(3) (Supp. 1992); Honaker v. State Workmen's Com-
pensation Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1982); Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compen-
sation Comm'r, 256 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1979); State ex. reL Wnek v. Blizard, 256 S.E.2d
772 (W. Va. 1979); Fakourey v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 258 S.E.2d 526 (W.
Va. 1979). Alternatively, temporary total disability benefits will terminate when the claimant
has exhausted the maximum duration for benefits (208 weeks) pursuant to W. VA. CODE
§ 234-6(c) (Supp. 1992); this maximum will only be extended if the claimant is receiving
vocational rehabilitation benefits pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9 (Supp. 1992).
160. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(e) (Supp. 1992). In cases in which the claimant is unable
to return to substantial gainful employment requiring the skills and activities comparable to
those of the pre-injury employment, it is not clear that benefits will be terminated. Allen v.
State Worlanen's Compensation Comm'r, 314 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1984).
161. Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 232 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va.
1977). The court held that Dunlap did not lose his eligibility for temporary total disability
benefits if he was unable to continue working because of the prior disability, even if there
was no reinjury or aggravation of the prior injury, relying upon the statutory language in
W. VA. CODE § 234-6(b). Id. at 345.
162. Id
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the claimant may have "fortuitously" found remunerative work that
s/he is able to perform, unless the lighter employment would ordinarily
be available to a person in the same situation." This creates the ap-
parently anomalous situation that a claimant may both work and col-
lect total disability benefits.164
Permanent total disability benefits are often viewed as a hybrid
between temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. In
general, temporary total disability benefits are viewed as replacement
for an individual's earnings while s/he is recovering from an inju-
ry165 Permanent partial benefits, on the other hand, are seen as pro-
viding compensation under a "whole man" theory of impairment or
disability which may be unrelated to actual post-injury wages or
work.' 66 The exclusivity provision of the compensation statute pre-
cludes civil recoveries in most cases; permanent partial benefits are, in
a sense, a limited replacement for these civil damages. These benefits
can always be collected, therefore, while a claimant is working and
even if s/he is working at the same job s/he performed prior to the
injury. Although collected over time, the amount of a partial award is
fixed and finite. Permanent total benefits, on the other hand, appear to
compensate for both specific wage loss and for disability. 67 It is
most likely that the ambiguous nature of these benefits results in al-
lowing claimants to both work and collect benefits.
163. Karnensky v. State Compensation Comm'r, 134 S.E.2d 582, (W. Va. 1964); see
also Cardwell v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va. 1983);
Linville v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1977); Gay
Coal & Coke Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 2 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 1939).
164. Approximately 200 workers are currently collecting permanent total disability bene-
fits and working. Interview with John H. Kozak, Executive Secretary to the Fund (May 5,
1992).
165. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(e) (Supp. 1992); see supra note 30.
166. See, e.g., Posey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 201 S.E.2d 102, 105-
06 W. Va. 1973); Cropp v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va.
1977); Evans v. State Compensation Director, 144 S.E.2d 663 (W. Va. 1965); Walk v. State
Compensation Comm'r, 58 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1950); Burgess v. State Compensation
Comm'r, 5 S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1939). With changes in the demographics of the workforce
and growing sensitivity to issues of gender, this terminology should, and undoubtedly will,
change from "whole man" to "whole person."
167. Posey, 201 S.E.2d at 105.
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In making its decisions, the court is aware that claimants may
sometimes lack financial incentives to return to work once they have
received a life award. However, irrespective of the individual's
compensation status, there is a strong desire not to discourage personal
efforts by the claimants to become rehabilitated by threatening them
with loss of benefits.169 These decisions reflect a clear commitment
to the exclusive and self-contained nature of workers' compensation
benefits. By investigating the eligibility of benefits through a theoreti-
cal inquiry into the availability of "remunerative work in a field of
work for which [the claimant] is suited by experience and train-
ing,,$70 the court avoids a specific, and potentially messy, inquiry
into the actual employment status of the individual claimant. A rigid
division is thus maintained between issues involving employment of
the individual claimant (which are outside the scope of compensation
inquiries) and the availability of benefits. 7'
168. The assumption underlying this assertion is that claimants who receive high non-
wage benefits will not return to work. Of course, beneficiaries of permanent total disability
benefits are generally not receiving, or at least likely to continue to receive, benefits which
are substantially equal to their pre-injury earnings. First, they are permanently locked into a
maximum weekly benefit of 70% of their pre-injury wage or 100% of the current state
average weekly wage (whichever is lower), until their benefit equals the minimum benefit of
one-third of the state average weekly wage. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-6(d), -14 (Supp. 1992).
Long term disability inevitably results, therefore, in a progressively lower benefit in compar-
ison to potential wages. Therefore, younger workers, those who have worked high wage
jobs, or those whose wages were rising rapidly at the time of injury, will be frozen at
benefit levels which are far below their potential pre-injury earning capacity. These people
may in fact have a strong economic incentive to work. See 2 ARTHUR LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 61.24 (1992).
169. As Professor Larson has noted: "If after a worker is restored to some earning
capacity by rehabilitation, his compensation is reduced by the amount of his earnings, his
financial incentive to make the efforts required for rehabilitation is largely destroyed." 2
ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 61.24, at 10-1023 (1992). Therefore,
in many jurisdictions possibilities of future rehabilitation or increased earning potential does
not affect the amount of the permanent award. See IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW § 57.51(g) (1992).
170. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(n) (Supp. 1992).
171. As noted above, the primary exception to this rule is that temporary total disabil-
ity benefits generally terminate when the claimant returns to work. The commissioner uti-
lizes a special "return to work" form to insure that notification is received by the agency
when the injured employee returns to remunerative employment; this termination of tempo-
rary total disability benefits occurs irrespective of whether the claimant has returned to the
same or an equivalent job. The temporary partial rehabilitation benefits created by the 1990
1992-931 379 -
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Third, the court has only rarely addressed the provision of voca-
tional rehabilitation benefits to injured workers. Rehabilitation, by its
very nature, is designed to decrease periods of disability or increase
the employability of the claimant. Provision of these benefits, there-
fore, raises different issues from determinations of eligibility for in-
demnity benefits. Few cases involving rehabilitation have reached the
West Virginia court, perhaps because few lawyers pursue rehabilitation
for their clients aggressively.172 Although there is no question that a
claimant who can be rehabilitated is entitled to these benefits, 73
there is no case law which develops incentives for either the claimant
to undertake rehabilitation 7 4 or the employer to provide assistance in
returning to work.
1 75
Thus, the court has tended to view the compensation system as a
closed system which provides medical and indemnity benefits to in-
jured workers. Although judicial decisions reflect an obvious concern
for workers who have difficulty in regaining full employment status,
the issues of reemployment, or other incentives to change the basic
employment relationship, have generally been seen as outside the scope
of any inquiry regarding the availability of benefits.
statutory amendments to W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9 were designed to address the situation in
which a temporarily disabled claimant is reluctant to return to a lower wage or light duty
job. See infra part lIM.D for a discussion of this amendment.
172. For a discussion of the role of lawyers in vocational rehabilitation, see infra notes
310-12 and accompanying text.
173. Estes v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 147 S.E.2d 400 (W. Va. 1966).
174. It is important to note that most commentators and experts on successful rehabili-
tative approaches to work injuries agree that forced rehabilitation is rarely successful. Nev-
ertheless, in West Virginia, a claimant may, at least in theory, be required to undergo medi-
cal rehabilitation, including surgery, if s/he wants to continue to receive benefits.
Shrewsbury v. State Compensation Comm'r, 32 S.E.2d 361 (W. Va. 1944); Wilson v. Lew-
is, 273 S.E.2d 96 (W. Va. 1980). This requirement is not imposed unless there is virtual
unanimity of medical opinion that the surgery should be undertaken. Cox v. State
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 146 S.E.2d 577 (W. Va. 1966).
175. The legislative findings accompanying the 1990 amendments to W. VA. CODE
§ 23-4-9 do, however, indicate that rehabilitation efforts are now to be the joint responsi-
bility of the employer, the employee, the commissioner, and the physician. W. VA. CODE
§ 23-4-9(a) (Supp. 1992).
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2. Entitlement to a Job under the West Virginia Human
Rights Act
In 1981, the Human Rights Act 7 6 was amended to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of handicap. 1" At that time, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had substantial experience in
evaluating both claims relating to disability (under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act) and charges of employment discrimination (under the
Human Rights Act). Somewhat remarkably, the court established whol-
ly different standards for the evaluation of handicap under the Human
Rights Act than it had previously applied to claims under either stat-
ute.
The 1981 provision defined handicap as "any physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's
major life activities.' 17' Like members of other protected groups,
176. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
177. The use of the term "handicap" in state law is equivalent to the current use of
the term "disability" in the more recently enacted ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
II 1990). To be considered either handicapped or disabled, a plaintiff must show that a
physical or mental impairment (the medical component) substantially limits a major life
activity (thereby creating a handicap or disability). The two terms are used interchangeably
in this Article. It should, however, be noted that handicap, when used currently, generally
refers to degrees of impairment and not to disability, which is a measure of the impact of
an impairment on an individual's ability to function.
178. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (1981) (repealed by 1989 W. Va. Acts ch. 92.) On
July 1, 1982, the Human Rights Commission approved interpretive rules which further de-
fined these terms:
2.02. Physical Impairment - Means any physiological disorder or condition or
cosmetic disfigurement or anatomical loss or abnormality affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary, hemic, and lymphatic.
2.03 Mental Impairment - Includes any mental or psychological disorder, such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
learning disabilities.
2.04 Physical or Mental Impairment includes but is not limited to such dis-
eases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cere-
bral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, autism, multiple sclerosis [sic], cancer,
diabetes, heart disease, obesity, drug addiction, tobacco addiction, and alcoholism.
However, use or abuse of alcohol, tobacco or drugs in the absence of medically
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handicapped people who were "able and competent to perform the
services required"'79 thus became entitled to protection under the
Act. °80 The interpretive rules adopted by the Human Rights Commis-
sion in 1982 followed previously enacted federal disability law' and
expanded the definition to include both individuals with actual disabili-
ties and those with a record of, or who were regarded as having, an
impairment1
82
The agency's interpretive rules also extended more specific protec-
tion to individuals with work-related disabilities:
Persons whose handicap arises during employment-When an individual
becomes handicapped in the course of employment, the employer shall, if
possible with reasonable accommodation, continue the individual in the
same position or reassign the employee to a new position for which s/he is
qualified or for which with training, s/he may become qualified. The re-
verifiable addiction does not constitute a 'physical or mental impairment'.
2.05 Major Life Activities - Includes communication, ambulation, self-care,
socialization, learning, vocational training, employment transportation, and adapting
to housing.
2.06 Substantially Limits - Means interferes with or affects over a substantial
period of time. Minor temporary ailments or injuries shall not be considered phys-
ical or mental impairments which substantially limit a person's major life activities.
Examples of minor temporary ailments are colds or flus, or sprains or minor inju-
ries.
INTERPRETIVE RULES GOVERNING DISCRMINATION ON THE HANDICAPPED, WEST VIRGINIA
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS, Series I (1982) [hereinafter
Series I (1982)]. This rule has since been superseded by the Legislative Rules Regarding
Discrimination Against the Handicapped. 77 W. Va. C.S.R. § 2.1-2.8.3 (1991).
Federal rules defining these terms under the ADA can be found at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h), (i), (j) (1992); under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 at 29 C.F.R. § 1615.103
(1992); 45 C.F.R. § 707.3 (1991).
179. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
180. Discrimination in compensation, hiring, tenure, terms or conditions of employment,
as well as preemployment inquiries which would elicit information regarding membership in
a protected class, are prohibited. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992).
181. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. 11). A handi-
capped person is "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)
(Supp. 1, 1990).
182. "2.07 Handicapped person - Is one who: (a) has a handicap as defined above; (b)
has a record of such handicap; or (c) is regarded as having such a handicap." Series I
(1982), supra note 178.
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quirements of this paragraph shall be interpreted in such a way as to be
consistent with W. VA. CODE 23-5A-1 which prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees because they have applied for or received
workers' compensation benefits.1
3
It was clearly the intention of the commission to extend broad discrim-
ination protection to people who were injured at work.
No case involving allegations of discrimination based on handicap
reached the court until 1988." 4 At that time, the court was confront-
ed with questions involving the intended scope of the original statutory
definition. Rejecting the broad interpretation of the statute contained in
the agency's rules, the court held that only those with actual handicaps
were entitled to protection under the law.8 5
The legislature responded immediately in 1989 by broadening the
definition of handicap to extend statutory protection under the Human
Rights Act to individuals with past record of handicaps or who were
regarded as having a handicap;"8 6 the definition of handicap in state
183. Id. § 4.07. After the decision in Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386
S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988), the language of this regulation was changed to say that an em-
ployer shall provide job restructuring but "may" reassign the employee to a new position.
See § 4.13, Series I (1991), supra note 178.
184. The eight year delay was in part the result of the failure of the Human Rights
Commission to process any handicap discrimination cases prior to the granting of the writ
of mandamus against the agency in late 1984. Allen v. West Virginia Human Rights Com-
mission, 324 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1984).
185. "The decision of the West Virginia Legislature to adopt only the definition found
in part (i) . .. [of) the federal definition, indicates the legislature's clear intent to limit
Human Rights Act protection to those individuals who, because of their handicap, have
substantial difficulty in finding work." Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 159 (W. Va. 1988). The court held that the Commission's rules
were improperly promulgated as interpretive rules, at least to the extent that they attempted
to expand the definition, and therefore the reach, of the statute. Chico Dairy Co. v. West
Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989); see also Fourco Glass Co.
v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va. 1989).
186. The 1989 statutory language defines handicap as follows:
The term "handicap" means a person who: (1) Has a mental or physical impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities;
the term "major life activity" includes functions such as caring for one's self, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working; (2) Has a record of such impairment; or (3) Is regarded as having such
an impairment.
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law is now fully consistent with federal law. ' The court has not yet
decided a case which arose subsequent to this amendment. 8 As a
result, the case law which is currently available for examination was
all decided under the 1981 statutory language.
In contrast to prior decisions under both the Human Rights Act
and the Workers' Compensation Act, the court immediately adopted a
narrow view for the analysis of handicap discrimination claims. Prior
to reviewing the 1981 handicap amendment to the Human Rights Act,
the court had consistently followed a clear statutory directive8 9 to
apply a rule of liberal statutory construction to provisions of the
Act.' 9° However, the court apparently perceived the statutory defi-
nition of handicap adopted in 1981 as indicative of specific legislative
intent for the court to act with restraint in this area.
Under both state and federal law, a plaintiff in a disability dis-
crimination case must be able to demonstrate that s/he is a qualified
individual with a handicap which substantially limits a major life activ-
ity and that s/he was denied an employment opportunity despite the
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(m) (Supp. 1992). Note that the definition of major life activity was
amended by this statutory change. See supra note 178 for the text of the interpretive rule.
187. Current legislative rules of the Human Rights Commission are consistent with the
1989 statutory language, which in turn is consistent with both the language of the Rehabil-
itation Act and the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g)
(1992); see supra note 181.
188. Those decisions issued recently nevertheless involved situations which arose prior
to the effective date of the 1989 statute. The court may have presaged its view of this
amendment, however, by having noted that "fj]urisdictions that have examined the three-part
federal definition of 'handicapped individual' have consistently interpreted part (i) strictly
according to its terms and have interpreted parts (ii) and (iii) to expand the reach of the
Rehabilitation Act." Ranger Fuel Corp., 376 S.E.2d at 159 n.2.
189. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-15 provides: "The provisions of this article shall be liberally
construed to accomplish its objectives and purposes." W. VA. CODE § 5-11-15 (1990).
190. See, e.g., Independent Fire Co. No. 1 v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n,
376 S.E.2d 612 (W. Va. 1988); Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256 (W. Va. 1986) (interpreting employment discrimination based
on gender to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, despite lack of specific stat-
utory directive); Allen v. West Virginia Human Rights Conim'n, 324 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va.
1984) (mandamus action against commission for failure to enforce law); Shepherdstown
Volunteer Fire Dept. v. State ex. rel. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d
342, 351 (W. Va. 1983) (interpreting public accommodations to include volunteer fire de-
partments).
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fact that s/he could perform the essential functions of the job in ques-
tion, with or without reasonable accommodation.1 91 There are thus a
series of hoops that an individual must go through in order to present
a prima facie case. The court's strict interpretation of the 1981 disabil-
ity provision has not been limited to the exclusion of claims which
were not based upon actual handicap; instead, strict statutory interpre-
tation was extended to each of the substantive aspects of the plaintiff's
claim. 192
The court provides no doctrinal explanation for its failure to apply
the directive to interpret the statute liberally to these handicap claims.
The case law does, however, provid6 some insight into the court's
underlying motivation for its somewhat surprising analysis of these
claims. In particular, because of handicapped plaintiffs' right to de-
mand reasonable accommodation, handicap discrimination law posed a
new and difficult problem: instead of demanding the same treatment as
other workers, those with disabilities could legally assert a right to
different treatment based upon their disability.193 This right to accom-
191. "4.02 Qualified Handicapped Person Defined - As it relates to employment, a
'qualified handicapped person' is one who is able and competent, with reasonable accommo-
dation, to perform the essential functions of the job in question." Series I (1982), supra
note 178. Alternatively stated, in order to meet the plaintiff's prima facie burden, s/he must
show that s/he "(1) meets the definition of 'handicap,' (2) possesses the skills to do the
desired job with reasonable accommodations and (3) applied for and was rejected for the
desired job." Ranger Fuel Corp., 376 S.E.2d at 156, syl. pt. 2. Note that denial of the
employment opportunity is irrelevant if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that s/he meets the
definition of "handicapped." Therefore, the more narrowly construed the definition is, the
more likely that individuals can be legally excluded from jobs because of impairments.
192. The level of confusion which then emerged in Human Rights Act decisions is
troubling. First, acknowledging the shift in interpretation created by the early handicap dis-
crirnination cases, the court observed, in dicta, that "this principle of liberal construction
does not apply in ascertaining if an act is an unlawful discriminatory practice." West Vir-
ginia Inst. of Tech. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 490, 502 n.17
(W. Va. 1989). This dicta was soon explicitly rejected: "The West Virginia Human Rights
Act 'shall be liberally construed to accomplish its objective and purposes.' W. VA. CODE
§ 5-11-15 (1967). This construction applies to both its substantive and procedural provi-
sions ... ." Paxton v. Crabtree, 400 S.E.2d 245, 249 (W. Va. 1990). The court has con-
tinued, however, to allude (without explanation) to the strict construction standard in handi-
cap cases. Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46, 52 n.12. (W. Va. 1992).
193. Although the original statute failed to provide explicitly that handicapped individu-
als would be entitled to "reasonable accommodation," both the Human Rights Commission's
interpretive rules and the court never questioned that employers would be required to pro-
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modation for disabled individuals is more than a de minimis obligation
for employers. 194 Faced with this necessary component to protecting
disability rights in the workplace, the West Virginia court immediately
expressed concern for the "proper accommodation of the interests of
handicapped individuals, other employees, the employer and the
public."1 95 The court was noticeably reluctant to place injured or
handicapped workers at a competitive advantage in seeking jobs 96
and therefore concluded that all aspects of the definition of handicap
"must be strictly construed."197 The court has thus displayed a reluc-
tance to protect disabled workers with the same vigilance that it has
been extended to victims of race and gender discrimination.19"
vide such accommodation to handicapped employees. See Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of
Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1, 7 (W. Va. 1988) (Miller, J., dissenting).
194. The only prior right to accommodation arose in cases involving discrimination on
the basis of religion. In contrast to disability law, in claims involving religious discrimina-
tion the employer need not make more than de minimis changes in order to accommodate
the religious needs of the employee. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977). The disability rules, in contrast, require a substantial effort at accommodation. See
§ 4.03, Series I (1982), supra note 178; 77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 §§ 4.4, 4.5 (1991). See infra
note 216 for the full text of the current regulation. The employer can counter a demand for
reasonable accommodation by affirmatively demonstrating that the accommodation would
impose an "undue hardship" which is defined narrowly. § 4.03(2) & (3), Series I (1982),
supra note 178; 77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.6 (1991). For equivalent provisions under the
ADA, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1992). These rules were consistent with prior case law un-
der the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which rejected employers' claims that their obligation to
accommodate should be interpreted as a de minitnis obligation. Prewitt v. United States
Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir. 1981); Harrison v. Marsh, 691 F. Supp.
1223 (W.D. Mo. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Baker, 677 F. Supp 636,
638 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
195. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 156,
syl. pt. 3 (W. Va. 1988). In contrast, the court has not avoided providing relief that would
affect other employees' seniority or other vested rights in race discrimination cases. See,
e.g., West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. United Transp. Union, Local No. 655,
280 S.E.2d 653 (W. Va. 1981); Greyhound Lines-East v. Geiger, 366 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va.
1988).
196. This same concern is explicitly stated in Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d
204, 209 (W. Va. 1985). See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
197. Ranger Fuel Corp., 376 S.E.2d at 159. The court has reiterated this strict ap-
proach repeatedly. See, e.g., Casteel v. Consolidation Coal Co., 383 S.E.2d 305, 307 (W.
Va. 1989); Anderson v. Live Plants, Inc., 419 S.E.2d 305, 306 (W. Va. 1992); Teets v.
Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46, 52 n.12 (W. Va. 1992).
198. In prior situations in which a federal statute has provided more protection than the
state statute, the court has chosen to read the West Virginia law broadly and extend it to
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(a) Defining "Handicap"
The court has adopted a narrow interpretation of each aspect of a
disabled plaintiffs claim under the Human Rights Act, including the
general definition of who has a qualifying handicap.' 99 The court's
definition of handicap includes only those individuals "who, because of
their handicap, have substantial difficulty in finding work."2°° The
court has displayed an unwillingness to establish broad protection for
people whom the court apparently perceives as marginally disabled,
even if the workers are refused employment or reemployment as a
result of a physical condition.2 1 Protection under the Human Rights
Act is limited to people the court considers to be seriously dis-
abled2 -but who are still able to perform the essential functions of
their jobs.
Having adopted this strict statutory definition of protected individ-
uals, it is perhaps not surprising that the court then concluded that
individuals adjudged partially disabled under the Workers' Compen-
encompass federal protections. See, e.g., Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 365 S.E.2d 251 (W. Va. 1986) (expanding sex discrimination to include pregnancy
discrimination despite lack of state equivalent to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-317, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); Guyan Valley Hosp. Inc. v. West Virginia
Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 88 (W. Va. 1989) (applying adverse impact theory
under Human Rights Act, despite lack of equivalent language which specifically authorizes
such actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(1988)).
199. It is essential to note that the 1989 amendment to the Act appears to reject the
court's interpretation of legislative intent in this arena.
200. Ranger Fuel Corp., 376 S.E.2d at 159.
201. let at 154 (psoriasis which was basis for rejection from employment not a handi-
cap within meaning of Human Rights Act); Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human
Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989) (facial disfigurement, including glass eye
resulting from childhood surgery for cancer, not a handicap); O'Dell v. Jennmar Corp. of
W. Va., 400 S.E.2d 288 (W. Va. 1990) (15% permanent partial disability rating from
Workers' Compensation Commissioner does not constitute per se proof of handicap; without
independent evidence of handicap, plaintiff may not prevail, irrespective of the employer's
motivation).
202. "The very concept of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not common-
place and that poses for the particular individual a more general disadvantage in his or her
search for satisfactory employment." Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46, 52
(W. Va. 1992).
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sation Act were not necessarily "handicapped" within the meaning of
the Human Rights Act. There are strong similarities between the defi-
nitions of disability under the two acts. Under both statutes, there must
first be a finding that the individual has a medical impairment. Under
both statutes, plaintiffs must demonstrate that this medical impairment
has some impact on their ability to function in work or life; that is,
they must show they are "disabled." This is not purely a medical
judgment. In setting the degree of permanent disability on a workers'
compensation claim, the commissioner (not the physician) must there-
fore make a determination that the claimant's ability to work or pursue
the normal tasks of everyday life has been permanently affected by the
medical impairment. °3
Nevertheless, in O'Dell v. Jennmar Corp. of West Virginia, °4
the court held that a determination of permanent partial disability made
by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner was not in itself ade-
quate to show that the individual suffers from a handicap which sub-
stantially affects a major life function; this was true despite the fact
that the court acknowledged that O'Dell had undergone disc surgery in
an attempt to correct his back injury. 05 Encouraged by O'Dell, em-
ployers argued that a partial disability rating under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act foreclosed the possibility of finding that an individual
203. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6 (Supp. 1992); Posey v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 201 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973); Kubachka v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 259 S.E.2d 21 (W. Va. 1979). A medical finding of impairment is insufficient
alone to justify such an award; the commissioner must assess evidence of medical impair-
ment and disability. Stewart v. State workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 186 S.E.2d 700
(W. Va. 1972); Sisk v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 170 S.E.2d 20 (W. Va.
1969); McGeary v. State Compensation Director, 135 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1964); Haines v.
Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 150 S.E.2d 883 (W. Va. 1966). The only clear excep-
tion to this principle is the specific statutory provision which requires the commissioner to
accept the medical assessment of permanent impairment when set by the treating physician
after a period of temporary disability is closed, if the degree of impairment is 15% or less.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(c)(1) (Supp. 1992); Spurlock v. Spieler, 395 S.E.2d 540 (Vt. Va.
1990).
204. 400 S.E.2d 288 (W. Va. 1990).
205. IM at 293. The circuit court had found that O'Dell's back injury constituted a
handicap but that he had not shown the requisite nexus between the handicap and any
adverse action taken against him. The Supreme Court instead found that he had not dem-
onstrated that he had a handicap, thereby leaving open the possibility that adverse action
could be taken against him which would not be prohibited under the Human Rights Act. Id
[Vol. 95:333
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was disabled. 6 Recently, however, in Teets v. Eastern Associated
Coal Corp.,2°7 the court explicitly rejected this approach2 8 in favor
of individualized assessment of whether the work-related disability is
sufficiently severe to merit protection under the Human Rights
Act.
209
As part of establishing that an impairment is sufficiently severe to
merit protection under the disability laws, a plaintiff must show that
his or her impairments substantially limit a major life activity.2 0 As
under the compensation laws, this major life activity can be
"working." 211 In order to rise to an adequate level to merit protection
206. The employer explicitly advanced this argument in Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal
Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1992).
207. 421 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1992). Judge Fox, the circuit court judge who reviewed
Teets' claim, characterized her position in these terms: "The plaintiff is indeed ensnared in
the typical 'Catch 22' situation: too handicapped to work and yet not handicapped enough
to be 'handicapped.'" IL at 49. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that Teets' back
injury was sufficient to render her handicapped. Id. at 52.
208. The holding in O'Dell "merely precluded an automatic determination of 'handicap'
based upon [a permanent partial disability rating]." let at 52.
209. Id at 51-52. The court in Teets cited the length of her absence from work-2
years-and the fact that her only significant employment experience involved heavy work in
the mines as evidence that she might be disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights
Act.
210. See supra note 186 for the current statutory language. "Substantially limits" is fur-
ther defined in the current regulations to mean "interferes with or affects over a substantial
period of time. Minor temporary ailments or injuries shall not be considered physical or
mental impairments which substantially limit a person's major life activities." § 2.5, Series I
(1991). For the prior, similar regulatory language,' see supra note 178. The regulatory lan-
guage under the ADA is similar but specifically notes that the term "substantially limits"
means "unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general popu-
lation can perform." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (1992).
211. The term "substantially limits" when applied to the life activity of working is not
specifically defined in the Human Rights Commission regulations but has received special
attention under the ADA:
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working-
(i) The term substantially limits means siguificantly restricted in the ability to per-
form either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita-
tion in the major life activity of working.
(ii) * * * Mhe following factors may be considered in determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
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under the disability laws, the interference with the ability to work must
prevent the plaintiff from performing a broad range of jobs.2" In
finding that Silva Teets, who had suffered an occupational back injury,
was substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the
court used language which was remarkably reminiscent of that used in
workers' compensation cases involving applications for permanent total
disability benefits:
Relevant to the inquiry are "the number and type of jobs from which the
impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which the
individual has reasonable access, and the individual's job expectations and
training." In this case the employee missed almost two years of work due
to a back injury requiring surgery ... [The fact that Mrs. Teets' only
significant employment experience involyed heavy duty work in the mines
shows that her back disability could have substantially limited her major
life activity of employment.213
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impair-
ment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills
or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also dis-
qualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the indi-
vidual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in vari-
ous classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1992). In its Interpretive Guidance to this rule, the EEOC notes:
For example, an individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual
from performing any heavy labor' job would be substantially limited in the major
life activity of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her
ability to perform a class of jobs. This would be so even if the individual were
able to perform jobs in another class, e.g., the class of semi-skilled jobs.
Id app. at 409.
212. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154. But
see Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1992). In Ranger Fuel
Corp., the court apparently rejected the idea that Joyce Marcum's inability to perform un-
derground coal mine work substantially limited the major life activity of working. In Teets,
on the other hand, the court noted that the fact that an impairment is a disadvantage in
someone's general search for satisfactory employment may be sufficient to justify a holding
that the individual is disabled. l at 52. Marcum, on the other hand, was unable to per-
form coal mining work, but not other heavy manual work.
213. Id (citations omitted). Note the similarity of the test used by the court and the
regulatory definition under the ADA, supra note 211.
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Although the Teets decision was issued per curiam, it appears to repre-
sent at least a tentative shift toward developing a consistent doctrinal
view of potential entitlement under both the Human Rights and the
Workers' Compensation Acts. It establishes an odd parallelism howev-
er: only those claimants adjudged permanently and totally disabled
under the workers' compensation law clearly meet the test of being
substantially limited in the life activity of working, thereby becoming
entitled to protection in the context of employment. In other words,
individuals who meet the standard for permanent life benefits from
workers' compensation may assert employment claims under the dis-
ability discrimination laws instead. On the other hand, those who are
only partially disabled (from the compensation point of view)-and
therefore presumably more easily employable-may not necessarily be
considered disabled and entitled to employment protection under the
Human Rights Act.
2 14
(b) Defining "Reasonable Accommodation" and "Essential
Job Functions"
Individuals who successfully demonstrate that they are handicapped
within the meaning of the Human Rights Act must also demonstrate
that they can nevertheless perform the essential functions of the
job, 15 with or without reasonable accommodation,216 in order to
214. This will, however, depend somewhat on the court's interpretation of the 1989
statutory language. Arguably, such individuals will fit in the category of being regarded as
being handicapped by their employers.
215. "Essential job functions" is not defined in either the Human Rights Act or in the
rules promulgated thereunder. It is, however, defined in the regulations under the ADA. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992).
216. The current West Virginia Human Rights Commission Rules Regarding Discrimina-
tion Against the Handicapped, which are substantially the same as the interpretive rules
adopted in 1982, define "reasonable accommodation" as follows:
4.4. "Reasonable Accommodation" means reasonable modifications or adjustments
to be determined on a case-by-case basis which are designed as attempts to enable
a handicapped employee to be hired or to remain in the position for which he
was hired.
4.5. An employer shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or
mental impairments of qualified handicapped applicants or employees where neces-
1992-93]
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prevail. This additional burden can likewise be difficult for a disabled
worker to meet. Obviously, individuals who are totally disabled from
working cannot claim any protection under the laws governing disabili-
ty discrimination during the period of the total disability. The distinc-
tion between being adequately handicapped (to meet the definition of
handicap) but not too handicapped (rendering the plaintiff unable to
perform the essential functions of the job) can be a fine line to walk.
In those cases considered by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, the plaintiffs who have ultimately been successful in walking
this line have, to date, been individuals with non-job-related disabilities
which did not substantially affect their ability to perform the job in
217question.  In each of these cases, the court has identified a major
life activity which was affected by the plaintiff's handicap but which
did not require the imposition of any burden on the employer or on
any other employees. In cases in which the plaintiffs had an impair-
sary to enable a qualified handicapped person to perform the essential functions of
the job. Reasonable accommodations includes, but are not limited to:
4.5.1. Making facilities used by handicapped employees, including common areas
used by all employees such as hallways, restrooms, cafeterias and lounges, readily
accessible to and usable by handicapped workers;
4.5.2. Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modi-
fication of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters; and simi-
lar actions;
4.5.3. Alteration of the amount or methods of training; and
4.5.4. the preparation of fellow workers for the handicapped employee, to obtain
their understanding of the handicapping limitations and their cooperation in accept-
ing other reasonable accommodations for the handicapped employee.
77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.4-4.5.4 (1991). Similar definitions appear in federal law. See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1992).
217. Anderson v. Live Plants, Inc., 419 S.E.2d 305, 307 (W. Va. 1992) (congenitally
and severely deformed right hand is a handicap within meaning of Human Rights Act; "it
is obvious that a deformed right hand and arm substantially limit a person's major life
activities," even though plaintiff had no difficulty performing job); Davidson v. Shoney's
Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1989) (worker who suffered from petit Mal
epileptic seizures was able to perform her job in a restaurant without substantial risk to
herself or others); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990)
(HIV-positive worker, whose major life function of "socializing" was substantially impacted
by his health status, entitled to protection); Casteel v. Consolidation Coal Co., 383 S.E.2d
305 (W. Va. 1989) (coal miner with degenerative joint disease which caused him to move
with pain, substantially limiting his major life activity of walking, who stoically sought to
continue working without accommodation at work).
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ment which did not appear to affect a major life activity, the court has
refused to extend the protection of the Human Rights Act.21
Dorothy Coffman2 9 failed to walk the line successfully. Having
found that her back injury did indeed make her a handicapped person
within the meaning of the Human Rights Act, the employer asserted,
and the court found, that she was nevertheless not a qualified handi-
capped person. She could not perform the essential functions of her
custodial job: she could not life heavy objects nor bend to clean low
places.2 0 She was therefore not, according to the majority, entitled
to any accommodation.221 In reaching this conclusion, the majority
adopted both a narrow definition of essential job functions' and a
218. In these cases, the court has noted that prior to July 1, 1989, the statute did not
prohibit discrimination based on the perception of handicap. Chico Dairy Co. v. West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989); Fourco Glass Co. v. West
Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va. 1989) (back anomaly identifiable
on X-ray but not disabling not entitled to protection); Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia
Human Rights Comnn'n, 376 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1988). Part of the problem with these
cases is that they were brought to hearing or trial before the court had determined that the
definition of handicap would not encompass perceived handicaps. As a result, when the
cases reached the appellate level, the plaintiffs attempted to convert cases tried under a
theory of perceived handicap to ones which fit within the narrower definition; often, they
failed.
219. Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988).
220. Id at 4-5.
221. Id at 6.
222. In attempting to define the essential job functions, the majority in Coffman ap-
pears to have accepted the employer's job description. Justice Miller noted in his dissent
that tasks may be essential for the group of employees but not for a particular individual.
IM at 11 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citing Ackerman v. Western Electric Co., 643 F. Supp.
836 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (asthmatic condition necessitating personal protective equipment and
reassignment of certain job duties); Trimble v. Carlin, 633 F. Supp 367 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Guinn v. Bolger, 598 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1984); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm'n, 480 A.2d 342 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), remanded on other grounds, 508
A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1986)); see also LaMott v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 465
N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (nursing home housekeeper forced to resign from her
job because of disabilities associated with stroke; court faulted employer for failing to re-
structure the job to permit a coworker to accompany her on her cleaning rounds). The rules
under the ADA appear to endorse Justice Miller's view. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992). This
rule also appears to indicate that the employer's job description will be considered proba-
tive, but not necessarily dispositive, of the issue. In its Interpretive Guidance to these rules,
the EEOC noted that the size of the workforce would be relevant to this inquiry:
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restrictive view of what might constitute reasonable accommodation of
her disability.2 Although citing the commission's regulations with
approval, 4 the Coffman majority nevertheless rejected notions that
[1]f an employer has a relatively small number of available employees for the
volume of work to be performed, it may be necessary that pach employee perform
a multiple of different functions. Therefore the performance of those functions by
each employee becomes more critical and the options for reorganizing the work
become more limited. In such situations, functions that might not be essential if
there were a large staff may become essential because the staff size is small com-
pared to the volume of work that has to be done. See Treadwell v. Alexander,
707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) app. at 411 (1992).
223. See supra note 216 for the regulatory definition of "reasonable accommodation." It
is difficult to separate the definition of "reasonable accommodation" from the definition of
"essential job function." The majority in Coffinan concluded that the employer had no duty
to provide accommodation if Coffman could not perform the essential functions of the job,
citing federal rules promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b)
(1991). Although job restructuring which removed marginal job functions might constitute
reasonable accommodation (as long as the employee could perform the essential functions of
the job), reassignment to a vacant position would not be required under reasonable accom-
modation. Coffman, 386 S.E.2d at 5-6. This conclusion followed most existing federal case
law under the Rehabilitation Act. Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Carty v.
Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985); Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.
Tenn 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1987); Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731
(D.R.I. 1984); Johnson v. Frito Lay, Inc., 905 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1990) (reasonable accom-
modation does not extend to new job placement); Jasany v. United States Postal Service,
755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Alderson v. Postmaster General, 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.D.
Okla. 1984); see also LaProte v. Jostens, 572 N.E.2d 1209 (Ill. 1991). The Coffinan court
joined these other courts in specifically rejecting the reasoning in Ignacio v. United States
Postal Service, 30 M.S.P.R. 471 (1986) (special panel), which held job transfer to be rea-
sonable accommodation. The Coffinan majority failed to address the language of the United
States Supreme Court in School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
where the Court held that an employer "cannot deny an employee alternative employment
opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies." Id at 289 n.19;
see also Kathryn W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act:
Does Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 781, 782 n.1 (1989). Under the ADA, both the definition of essential functions of the
job and the definition of reasonable accommodation are more liberal. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)-
(o) (1992). Reasonable accommodation under the ADA explicitly includes job restructuring,
work modification, and reassignment to vacant positions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (Supp. HI
1990), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1992).
224. Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1, 3 (W. Va. 1988). The
court endorsed those aspects of the rules which were interpretive in nature, Teets v. Eastern
Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1992), and rejected those which it viewed as
legislative, cf Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154
394
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the employer's duty might vary depending upon such variables as its
size and structure of workforce, at least where the accommodation
would require the kind of job restructuring sought here.' The opin-
ion makes no mention of the specific provision in the commission's
rules which would have required job restructuring or reassignment for
work-injured employees.226 Employers were not to be required to ac-
commodate work-injured employees by reassigning them to alternative
jobs they were capable of performing (even if the job was vacant), nor
would they be required to make significant restructuring changes if
these would remove any essential functions from the employee's job.
Dorothy Coffman was caught in a bind that might confront other
workers suffering from work-related back injuries: she was suffering
from a handicap that was severe enough to put her into the protected
class, but too severe to be accommodated. 7  Arguably, Coffman
would have been in a stronger position in seeking a job as a new
applicant with a handicap than as an injured employee: new applicants
would be considered for a wide range of jobs; prior employees were
not entitled to reassignment to an alternative job, even if it was va-
cant.2
28
(W. Va. 1988). Although the rule interpreting the meaning of reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship could be seen as interpretive only, the court did not address this in Coffman
or subsequently.
225. Reasonable accommodation does not require an employer, irrespective of its size
or hiring capabilities, to create a new position within the job description consisting only of
those duties which the handicapped employee can perform. Coffman, 386 S.E.2d at 6 n.14.
Compare the ADA treatment of these issues, supra notes 216, 222, 223.
226. See supra text accompanying note 183.
227. Silva Teets may also be caught in this bind. The court declined to rule on the
employer's contention that it was under no legal duty to accommodate her by transferring
her to a light duty position. Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46, 49
(NV. Va. 1992)
228. Joyce Marcum, the plaintiff in Ranger Fuel Corp., was caught in a similar bind.
The court held that Marcum's impairment was not serious enough to be a handicap; it did
not affect a major life activity. But, at the same time, the court found that she was not
"able and competent to perform the job of general underground miner" noting that because
of her medical condition there was no reasonable accommodation that could have made her
employable. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154,
159 (W. Va. 1988). The court did not accept the argument, initially advanced by Marcum,
that she was simply regarded as having a handicap. According to the court, Marcum suf-
fered from a medical impairment that was too severe to allow her employment as an un-
derground coal miner but not severe enough to merit protection under the Act. Ranger Fuel
1992-931
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(c) Employer Defenses to Charges of Handicap
Discrimination
Once an individual has met the prima facie burden to show that
s/he is a qualified handicapped person, the burden then shifts to the
employer to present a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its deci-
sion. 9 Affirmative defenses can include that the discrimination was
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification,230 that the employ-
ee would be unable to safely and adequately perform the essential
functions of the job, or that employment of the individual would im-
pose an "undue hardship" on the employer.23t In the past, affirmative
defenses to discrimination have been interpreted very narrowly.232
Again, the court has not applied its prior standards for discrimination
cases to claims of disability discrimination.
The Human Rights Commission regulations, which are consistent
with federal law, require that the trier of fact consider the size, profit-
Corp. was therefore free to turn her away because of her medical condition.
229. This order of proof is drawn directly from cases involving other protected classes
under the Human Rights Act. See, e.g., Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v. State ex rel.
West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983) (race discrimination
in public accommodations, adapting test developed under federal law for cases involving
intentional discrimination when direct evidence is lacking); State ex reL West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Comm'n v. Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health Agency, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 77 (W..
Va. 1989) (race discrimination in employment); Conaway v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 358
S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1986) (age); Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 365 S.E.2d 251 (W. Va. '1986) (pregnancy discrimination and retaliatory dis-
charge); West Virginia Inst. of Tech. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d
490 (W. Va. 1989) (national origin discrimination in employment); see also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S 248 (1981).
230. Section 4.06, Series I (1982), supra note 178; 77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 §§ 4.10, 4.15
(1991). For the equivalent language in the ADA, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (1992).
231. § 4.03(2) and (3), Series I (1982), supra note 178; 77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.15
(1991). For the equivalent language under the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12111(10),
12113 (Supp. H 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q)-(r) (1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (1992). Addi-
tional defenses available to employers, although not relevant to the discussion in this Arti-
cle, include that the individual is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
232. For example, the defenses of bona fide occupational qualification and business
necessity have consistently been interpreted extremely narrowly. See IA ARTHUR LARSON &
LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 13.00, at 4-1 to 4-3 (1992).
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ability, and nature of the employer's operation, the nature and cost of
the accommodations, and the possibility that the same accommodations
may be able to be used by other prospective employees 3 before de-
termining whether a particular accommodation would constitute undue
hardship. Despite this clear direction, the court in Coffman refused to
consider these factors before rejecting Coffman's claim for a restruc-
tured job.' Since she was unable to perform the essential functions
of the job, her employer was not required to explore any of the op-
tions for accommodating her disability.
Similarly, an employer may refuse to hire or continue to employ
an individual if employment would result in a materially enhanced risk
of substantial harm to the applicant or to others.235 On the other
233. The Human Rights Commission Regulations state:
4.6. An employer shall not be required to make such accommodation if she/he can
establish that the accommodation would be unreasonable because it imposes undue
hardship on the conduct of his/her business. In determining whether or not an
accommodation would constitute an unreasonable burden upon the employer, the
Commission shall consider:
4.6.1. The overall size and profitability of the employer's operation; and/or
4.6.2. The nature of the employer's operation including composition and
structure of the employer's workforce; and/or
4.6.3 The nature and cost of the accommodations needed (taking into account
alternative sources of funding, such as Division of Vocational Rehabilitation);
4.6.4. The possibility that the same accommodations may be able to be used
by other prospective employees.
77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.6 (1991). This language was adopted unchanged from the
Commission's prior interpretive rule. A similar but somewhat more extensive provision gov-
erns the defense of undue hardship under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. II 1990);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1992).
234. Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1, 6 n.15 (W. Va. 1988).
235. The Human Rights Commission Regulations state:
An employer may refuse to hire or may discharge a qualified handicapped person
if, even after reasonable accommodation, the handicapped person is unable to per-
form the duties of the job without creating a substantial hazard to his/her health
and safety or that of others. However, any such decision shall be based upon the
individual handicapped person's actual abilities, and not upon general assumptions
or stereotypes about persons with particular mental or physical handicaps.
77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.7 (1991). In order to meet the burden of this defense, an employer
must be able to show that there is a "reasonable probability of a materially enhanced risk
of substantial harm to the handicapped person or others." Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 160 (W. Va. 1988) (holding increased risk
of psoriatic lesions met this test); Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d
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hand, neither the possibility of future workers' compensation costs nor
purely speculative future risk is an adequate justification for a refusal
to hire or reemploy a worker.' 6 When addressing the needs of peo-
ple who have been previously injured at work, it is unfortunately
sometimes difficult, as a practical matter, to distinguish between the
two. In the past, employers have been notoriously reluctant to hire or
reemploy workers who pose a risk of increased workers' compensation
costs, despite the availability of second injury fund protection.237 The
232, 236 (W. Va. 1989) (holding risk posed by petit mal epileptic seizures did not meet
test); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1992); James G. Frierson, An Analysis of ADA Provi-
sions on Denying Employment Because of a Risk of Future Injury, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
603 (1992). But cf. ADA statutory language, which defines "direct threat" only as "a signif-
icant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accom-
modation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (Supp. H 1990) (emphasis added).
236. "An employer shall not discriminate against an applicant or employee because of
a handicap or impairment which is not presently job related but which may worsen and
become job related in the future." 77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.9 (1991). "Refusal to select a
handicapped individual for a position because of ... increased cost of insurance (whether
actual or anticipated)" is not a defense. kla at § 4.11.2. According to the EEOC:
mhe employer must be prepared to show that there is: significant risk of substan-
tial harm; the specific risk must be identified; it must be a current risk, not one
that is speculative or remote; the assessment of risk must be based on objective
medical or other factual evidence regarding a particular individual; and even if a
genuine significant risk of substantial harm exists, the employer must consider
whether the risk can be eliminated or reduced below the level of a "direct threat"
by reasonable accommodation.
EEOC Technical Assistance Manual § 4.5, reprinted in 2 ADA Man. (BNA) 90:0540
(1992).
An employer may not base an employment decision on the speculation that an
applicant may cause increased workers' compensation costs in the future. However,
an employer may refuse to hire, or may discharge an individual who is not cur-
rently able to perform a job without posing a significant risk of substantial harm
to the health or safety of the individual or others, if the risk cannot be eliminated
or reduced by reasonable accommodation.
Id. § 9.1, reprinted in 2 ADA Man. at 90:0571; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) app. at
410-11 (1992); State Division of Human Rights v. City of New York, 510 N.E.2d 799
(N.Y. 1987) (refusal to hire plaintiff who had spondylolisthesis but passed physical agility
test as policeman violates state anti-discrimination law); Pecinovsky v. City of Lancaster,
No. 90-C-296-C, 1991 WL 74140 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 14, 1991) (mere fear of future workers'
compensation claim is not legitimate reason for refusing to hire). But cf. Frank v. American
Freight Sys., 398 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1987) (refusal to hire upheld where testimony that
hiring 49-year-old applicant as truck driver was 50-75% likely to result in injury).
237. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text for an explanation of the second
injury fund. For example, in Pertee v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, the prior
66
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/6
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
court has interpreted this safety defense narrowly;"8 nevertheless,
when it is applied to risk to the individual employee (as opposed to
risk to other employees), it is inconsistent both with recent federal
decisions which emphasize the personal autonomy of the worker in
assuming such risks' and with the express statutory language of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).'
Thus, the West Virginia court has endorsed employers' use of
defenses, particularly those involving claims of undue hardship and
risk of harm to the individual, which can be used to validate decisions
not to hire or reemploy people with work-related disabilities. This
leaves open the question whether individuals with occupational injuries
who are able to meet their prima facie burden will be excluded from
employment as a result of the employer's available defenses. Despite
the strong language of both the Human Rights Act and the ADA,
people with work-related disabilities may have a difficult time success-
fully asserting a right to employment or reemployment.
(d) Relationship of Workers' Compensation and
Disability Claims
The court's apparent ambivalence toward aggressive enforcement
of the Human Rights Act's protection of handicapped workers has led
to an unmistakable inclination toward the awarding of compensation
benefits (instead of jobs) to people with work-related disabilities, even
if they want to work.241 This can be seen in a number of ways. Indi-
employer testified that "although the claimant had been a good worker, he would not re-
employ him because he did not want to jeopardize his compensation rates." 255 S.E.2d 914,
916 (W. Va. 1979).
238. Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1989).
239. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). The court
in Johnson Controls noted that "benign" motives of the employer may not justify actions
which discriminatorily exclude protected individuals from jobs. l at 1204. The defense
raised by Johnson Controls, based upon safety of pregnant women and their unborn chil-
dren, received greater scrutiny than the "direct threat" defense appears to demand under
current federal and state regulations promulgated under the disability discrimination laws.
240. The regulations promulgated by the EEOC recreated the risk of harm to self de-
fense. See supra note 236. There will undoubtedly be litigation regarding the validity of the
EEOC rule.
241. The courts preference for the awarding of non-working benefits is a recurrent
1992-931 399
67
Spieler: Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspective
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:333
viduals who are adjudged to be disabled under the liberal construction
of the Workers' Compensation Act are not necessarily considered
disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Act.u2 Further,
although stopping short of an explicit determination that disability dis-
crimination actions are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
workers' compensation statute, 3 a majority of the court has articu-
lated a distinct doctrinal preference for the granting of workers' com-
pensation indemnity benefits over the accommodation of injured work-
ers at work. In Coffinan,'44 the majority made the following observa-
tion about the plaintiff:
[S]he became handicapped as a result of an injury sustained on the job
during the course of her employment. In this regard, we are concerned as
to why Coffman did not pursue a claim for workers' compensation bene-
fits beyond the 30-day period of temporary total disability .... We note
that the intent of the legislature inherent in the enacting of the handicapped
provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act was to assure equal
opportunities for the handicapped in housing and employment. W. VA.
CODE § 5-11-2. Thus, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended the
handicapped provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act as an
alternative source of compensation for injuries sustained on the job."'
theme. In addition to the cases cited in this section relating to workers' compensation bene-
fits and claims under the Human Rights Act, the court has also held that claims for unem-
ployment benefits are to be more liberally analyzed than those involving retaliatory dis-
charge. "Mhe statutory standard applicable in unemployment compensation claims is more
liberal in accordance with the beneficial purposes underlying unemployment security law and
is not applicable in a constructive discharge case." Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. &
Redevel. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547, 558 (W. Va. 1992).
242. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
243. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6a (1985). There are
two exceptions to exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy in West Virginia. First,
employer may be liable at common law when the injury is the result of "deliberate inten-
tion" as defined in W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c) (Supp. 1992). Second, employee injuries or
illness arising from an employer's negligence which are not within the scope of the
workers' compensation statute may lead to recovery at common law. Jones v. Rinehart &
Dennis Co., 168 S.E. 482 (W. Va. 1933) (civil action can be maintained for silicosis where
statute makes no provision for compensation). This latter exception has declined in impor-
tance as the scope of compensable diseases has expanded.
244. Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988).
245. 1& at 7 n.16.
400
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The implication is obvious: the employee should go get workers' com-
pensation benefits instead of insisting on a job. 2  In a dissent, Jus-
tice Miller, joined by Justice McGraw, took issue with the majority's
refusal to extend protection under the Human Rights Act to Coffman
because of the availability of a workers' compensation remedy. 247 As
Justice Miller noted, workers' compensation exclusivity provisions have
rarely been used to bar actions under discrimination laws.2' Notably,
246. There is a troubling historical note to be added here. Following this decision,
Coffrman did indeed apply for additional compensation benefits. Her attempt to increase her
permanent partial benefits or to obtain a permanent total disability award failed. She re-
ceived a final permanent partial disability rating of 15% from the commissioner. Her
employer's refusal to continue to employ her was based upon her physical impairment.
Nonetheless, the hospital contested her claim for increased benefits. Despite the fact that Dr.
Eric Radin, Chairman of the Department of Oithopedics, West Virginia University School of
Medicine, recommended a permanent partial disability rating of 25%, both the commissioner
and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board declined to increase the award or to grant
her a life award. The Supreme Court of Appeals refused to grant her petition for review in
her workers' compensation case. Interview with Jacques Williams, Coffman's attorney (July
31, 1992). Like Coffman, Teets was granted a 15% permanent partial disability award and
was denied permanent total disability benefits by the commissioner and Appeal Board; the
Supreme Court of Appeals declined to review. Interview with James McLaughlin, Teets'
attorney (Aug. 15, 1992).
247. The majority's opinion
seems to suggest that the legislature did not intend to accord handicapped workers
any rights if they were injured on the job . . . . It is obvious that workers' com-
pensation benefits relate to the employee's injuries and have nothing to do with
his status under the handicap law. This latter provision is designed to prevent
discrimination against a person who has a handicap. The potential for handicap
discrimination occurs when the injured employee is well enough to return to work
and has a handicap as defined in the Act.
Coffmn, 386 S.E.2d at 13-14 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
248. Id at 13-14; Teats v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1992).
Other jurisdictions have rejected claims that the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensa-
tion statutes bar disability discrimination claims. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362
N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d 497 (Wash. 1987) (en
banc); Jones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist, 244 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1988);
Hartman v. Mathis & Bolinger Furniture Co., 282 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1991); Shoemak-
er v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990) (workers' compensation exclusivity provisions do
not bar civil action challenging discharge under whistleblower statute). Jurisdictions which
have held that discrimination claims are barred by workers' compensation exclusivity explic-
itly extend protection against employment discrimination to injured workers under the provi-
sions of the workers' compensation statute. See, e.g., Alexander v. Frank, 777 F. Supp. 516
(N.D. Tex. 1991) (government's exclusive liability to postal employee is through FECA,
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the majority's apparent preference for workers' compensation over
human rights remedies appears to be limited to claims of handicap
discrimination. Without any concern for the potential duality of reme-
dies, the court had previously found sexual harassment to be actionable
under both the Workers' Compensation Act? 9 and the Human Rights
Act.25
0
Evidence that is considered probative of disability under the
Workers' Compensation Act may not be relevant to proving that an
individual has a handicap under the Human Rights Act. For example,
Chico- Dairy's failure to promote Terrah Alfred to store manager be-
cause of facial disfigurement was not discriminatory under the Human
Rights Act.251 In contrast, facial disfigurement which impaired oppor-
tunity for future employment may strengthen claims for workers' com-
pensation benefits. 2  In other words, the court has adopted a far
more expansive view of what contributes to disability under the
Workers' Compensation Act than under the Human Rights Act.
The liberality extended to proof of disability under the Workers'
Compensation Act is not applied to proof of discrimination under the
Human Rights Act. In claims under the Workers' Compensation Act,
barring recovery under Rehabilitation Act, noting FECA is a comprehensive scheme specifi-
cally designed to provide the exclusive and preemptive remedies for all work-related injuries
for those employees it covers); Schachtner v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations, 422 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding workers' compensation statute
which provided comprehensive rights to injured employees to be rehired after occupational
injury is the exclusive remedy for work-injured employees); see Deborah A. Ballam, The
Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Doctrine: A Threat to Workers' Rights Under State Em-
ployment Discrimination Statutes, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 95 (1989).
249. Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981)
(stress-related disorder resulting from sexual harassment is compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act).
250. Westmoreland Coal Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 382 S.E.2d
562 (W. Va. 1989) (sexual harassment is actionable as gender-based discrimination under the
provisions of the Human Rights Act). There was no indication that either the exclusivity
doctrine or election of remedies would bar either action. Since by definition discrimination
cases involve intentional acts, exclusivity would not bar these actions.
251. Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 77 (W.
Va. 1989).
252. Kamensky v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 134 S.E.2d 582, 584 (W.
Va. 1964).
[Vol. 95:333
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the "rule of liberality" extends to both statutory construction and to
weighing of the evidence; 2 3 the commissioner is not entitled to dis-
believe expert medical evidence "exclusively upon subjective evaluation
of credibility."25 The claimant's evidence in a compensation claim is
to be given the "benefit of all reasonable inference", 55 unless the
employer can demonstrate that the evidence is unreliable, technically
flawed, the product of intentional misrepresentation, or clearly at-
tributable to an identified nonoccupational medical problem." The
court has therefore accepted the medical opinions of claimants' physi-
cians in order to extend the benefit of doubt to claimants when the
degree of medical impairment is at issue. In contrast, in claims involv-
ing disability discrimination, the trier of fact is, like in other civil
matters, free to reject credible expert evidence submitted by the plain-
tiff in favor of evidence submitted by the employer's physicians. 7
This dichotomy between the judicial approach to disability under
the Workers' Compensation Act and to handicap under the Human
Rights Act is the result of at least three interrelated factors. First, as
Justice Miller observed in his dissent in Coffman, the two statutes are
designed for different purposes."8 In order to meet the goals of an
adequate compensation program to provide speedy and adequate bene-
fits to injured people, presumptive rules regarding the weighing of con-
flicting medical evidence are essential. The difference in purpose re-
flects, however, our preference for the awarding of benefits outside the
employment relationship to more direct intervention in the employment
relationship itself.
253. Javins v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 320 S.E.2d 119, 130 (W. Va. 1984);
Workman v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1977); Pennington
v. State Workmen's Compensation Comna'r, 175 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1970).
254. Javins, 320 S.E.2d at 130; see also Persiari v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 248 S.E.2d 844, 848 (W. Va. 1978).
255. Javins, 320 S.E.2d at 130.
256. Id
257. For example, despite the fact that Joyce Marcum's doctor said that she was capa-
ble of working in the mines without significant adverse consequences, the court concluded
that this opinion could be rejected in favor of the opinion of the employer's expert. Ranger
Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 160 (W. Va. 1988).
258. Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1, 13-14 (W. Va. 1988).
1992-93]
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Second, the remedial nature of the compensation statute is, as the
court has observed, linked to the exclusivity of workers' compensation
as the method of compensating victims of workplace accidents. The
"quid pro quo for the employees" is the guarantee that they will be
afforded rapid "and proper restitution for injuries."259 In other words,
because of the limitation of employer liability, the employee should
receive the benefit of the doubt in compensation matters. Obviously,
no equivalent "quid pro quo" exists to bolster the claims of plaintiffs
in disability discrimination matters.
Third, the Human Rights Act requires the court to intervene di-
rectly into the employment relationship. By doing so, the court must
restrict managerial autonomy and may impact on the rights of other
workers. Although willing to take this risk in situations involving other
forms of discrimination, the court appears less willing to do so in
claims of disability discrimination. This reluctance, which can be seen
most clearly in the majority opinion in Coffinan, is bolstered by the
knowledge that monetary benefits will, at least in theory, be readily
available for those displaced from work. The irony of Dorothy
Coffman's case is, of course, that this was not in fact true.26°
(e) The West Virginia Court's Treatment of Disabled
Workers: a Summary
The court's interpretation of the Human Rights Act can hardly be
seen as assisting injured workers to return to work. In every disability
discrimination case reviewed by the court, the worker has asserted both
a strong desire to work26 and a capability of working.2 62 As a
259. Javins, 320 S.E.2d at 131.
260. See supra note 246.
261. Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46, 49 (W. Va. 1992) ("She was
not certain she could do all the requirements of her job, but was willing to try."); Chico
Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 84 (W. Va. 1989) ("the
complaint in the present case . . . alleges the unimpaired ability to do the work in ques-
tion"); O'Dell v. Jennmar Corp. of W. Va., 400 S.E.2d 288, 293 (W. Va. 1990) ("appellant
testified that his back did not prohibit him from driving trucks for a subsequent employer")
Casteel v. Consolidation Coal Corp., 383 S.E.2d 305, 307 (W. Va. 1989) (plaintiff "could
work through the pain because he was a stoic"); see also Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1988); Davidson v. Shoney's Big
[Vol. 95:333
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practical matter, this is not surprising: individuals seeking jobs would
logically try to convince potential employers that they can do the job;
job applicants are, after all, seeking jobs, not potential lawsuits. How-
ever, workers who insisted that they are perfectly able to work, despite
a physical impairment, were denied protection under the Human Rights
Act. Ironically, the more eagerly the plaintiffs sought work-and the
more effectively they argued that they could do the work because they
were not seriously impaired-the less likely they were to receive pro-
tection under the Act.263 Moreover, the longer an individual stays off
work as a result of a work-related injury, the more likely the court
will view the handicap as sufficiently serious to merit protection under
the disability laws. This, of course, has troubling implications for
workers' compensation claims.2"'
Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1989); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
Inc, 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990). In six of these seven cases (all except O'Dell), the
decision leaves little doubt that adverse employment action was taken because of the
individual's disability. In Davidson, Benjamin 1., and Casteel, the court rejected the
employer's defenses and upheld the plaintiff's claim for employment. In Teets, the matter
was remanded for further development of defenses. The plaintiffs' claims were rejected in
Ranger Fuel Corp., Chico Dairy Co. and O'Dell. Coffman attempted to continue working
after her occupational back injury, instead of seeking compensation benefits, but the court
upheld her discharge.
262. In only Coffman and Teets did the plaintiffs seek any accommodation. Coffman's
employer ultimately prevailed in its refusal to extend continued accommodation to her. In
Teets, the court only resolved the question of whether she was handicapped and remanded
the case, leaving open issues relating to the employer's defenses. 421 S.E.2d at 52.
263. In fact, the decisions in cases in which the plaintiff did not demand accommo-
dation led employers to argue in later cases that the plaintiff could not be a qualified hand-
icapped person unless s/he demanded accommodation. This view was, however, rejected.
Casteel v. Consolidation Coal Corp., 383 S.E.2d 305, 308 (W. Va. 1989).
264. For example, the court in Teets specifically notes that she was absent from work
for two years as evidence of the seriousness of her disability. 421 S.E.2d at 52. In contrast,
the decision in Coffman encouraged her to pursue compensation benefits; she attempted to
work, though in pain, and only collected temporary total disability benefits for one month.
386 S.E.2d at 2. The issue of absence is indeed a troubling one. On the one hand, inability
to show up for work may not require accommodation under the discrimination laws.
Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), af'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.
1987). On the other hand, longer duration of an impairment may provide stronger proof that
the individual suffers from a significant handicap, as occurred in Teets. Temporary impair-
ments are generally not considered disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1992). The EEOC
observed in its Interpretive Guidance to this rule: "Thus, for example, a broken leg that
takes eight weeks to heal is an impairment of fairly brief duration. However, if the broken
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As long as the court applies a more expansive definition of dis-
ability for purposes of qualifying for disability benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act than the definition of handicap under the
Human Rights Act, disabled workers may be encouraged to seek
workers' compensation benefits rather than work. This is unfortunate,
since the plaintiffs in the West Virginia handicap discrimination cases
were primarily characterized by their fierce desire to continue working.
The lack of success of some of these workers can only serve to dis-
courage others from seeking to work and therefore to increase the
costs of the workers' compensation program.
Obviously, there are many points at which a court may decide that
an expansive approach to disability discrimination is not attractive. In
view of the inevitable insistence that these cases be decided "on their
individual facts," 265 there is perhaps an understandable reluctance to
burden employers with ex post facto damages when they may have
attempted to comply in good faith with the statute. Case-by-case analy-
sis tends to provide little future guidance to employers.
Of course, workers' compensation claims are also assessed on a
case-by-case basis. In these cases, however, fault is not an issue; there
is no need for a finding of intentional malfeasance on the part of the
employer; the costs have been assessed in advance through the pay-
ment of insurance-type premiums; and, most significantly, no meddling
leg heals improperly, the "impact' of the impairment would be the resulting permanent im-
pairment." Id app. at 407-09. This makes sense from the vantage point of disability dis-
crimination law. Viewed in the context of workers' compensation law, however, the implica-
tion is that the employee who returns to work earlier will not be protected under the dis-
crimination laws if s/he n eeds accommodation. Finally, longer absence may result in termi-
nation under absence control policies; such a discharge involving individuals who were off
work due to an occupational injury would have been upheld under Yoho v. Triangle PWC,
Inc., 270 S.E.2d 178 (V. Va. 1980), and would still be legal today if undertaken pursuant
to the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3
(Supp. 1992). Thus, while longer absence may be justification for discharge under the
workers' compensation laws, it will be evidence of membership in the protected class under
the Human Rights Act and ADA.
265. Coffman, 386 S.E.2d at 5 n.10. "Each handicapped individual's ability to perform
a particular job must be assessed on an individual basis." § 4.04 Series I (1982), supra
note 178; 77 W. Va. C.S.R. 1 § 4.7 (1991). "The determination should be based on the
capabilities of the individual with a disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) app. at 410-11
(1992).
406 [Vol. 95:333
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is required in the employer's managerial autonomy or in the entitle-
ment of other employees to jobs. It is perhaps not surprising that there
has been a divergence between the liberality applied by the court when
assessing a case for disability benefits (that do not impinge on mana-
gerial control) and the reluctance of the court to uphold a claim of
disability discrimination. The result, unfortunately, may be a system
which fails to support workers who want to return to work after an
occupational injury.
3. Right to a Job Under Section 23-5A-1 of the West
Virginia Code
Although workers' compensation benefits became available to
workers injured on the job in most states before 1920, little attention
was focused on employment rights of injured workers until recently. In
keeping with other inroads on the employment-at-will doctrine, in the
early 1970s states began to provide protection to workers who claimed
that they were discharged in retaliation for seeking compensation bene-
fits. In 1978, the West Virginia Legislature followed this trend and
amended the Workers' Compensation Act to prohibit discrimination by
employers against workers' compensation beneficiaries.266 For the
first time, the compensation statute was extended to address employ-
ment issues surrounding claims for benefits arising out of occupational
injuries. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court of Appeals was asked in
Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co.26 to address questions arising
out of an employee's discharge allegedly in retaliation for pursuit of
workers' compensation benefits. Although Shanholtz was terminated
prior to the effective date of the new statute, the court found the new
statutory provision to be a codification of broader existing state
law.268 The court thereby extended the relatively new public policy
retaliatory discharge cause of action to cases involving workers' com-
pensation discrimination claims.269
266. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985).
267. 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980).
268. XL at 183.
269. See Pritchett v. Affinity Mining, 356 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1987); Messenger v.
Volkswagen of Am., 585 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. W. Va. 1984). Prior to Shanholtz, the West
1992-931
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Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc.270 was the first case arising under
the new statutory provision to reach the court. It was undisputed in
Yoho's case that she was discharged pursuant to a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement that eliminated seniority rights for
employees absent from work for longer than one year; in practice, the
effect of this provision had always been to require discharge.27 The
court did not question the severity of Yoho's injury or the justification
for her absence. In fact, the court specifically noted that she had re-
ceived a "substantial settlement" 272 in a separate action against her
employer in which she had claimed that the injury was the result of
deliberate and intentional acts of the employer within the meaning of
the Mandolidis provisions273 of the Workers' Compensation Act. In
his opinion, Justice Brotherton noted that "the [c]ourt cannot help but
feel sympathy for a woman who suffered a physically and emotionally
painful injury which caused her to be off work for the last twelve
months."274 Although "this Court has consistently fought to aid the
injured employee, we will not go so far as to give an advantage to the
injured employee over the other employees."275 In language echoing
its discomfort in disability discrimination cases, the court concluded
that, without specific legislative instructions, it "must exercise re-
straint"27 6 in expanding any rights under the discrimination provisions
of the workers' compensation statute. The facially neutral provision of
the collective bargaining agreement which mandated Yoho's discharge
was not against public policy or violative of the statutory provision:
Yoho would have been fired "just as quickly under the collective bar-
gaining agreement if she had never applied for those benefits."21
Virginia court had endorsed a limited common-law exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine when discharges contravened a substantial public policy. Harless v. First National
Bank of Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
270. Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
271. d at 207.
272. Id at 206.
273. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2)(ii) (Supp. 1992); see Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc.,
246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
274. Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at 209.
275. Id
276. Id
277. Id at 210.
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Again, as it did in order to correct the narrow judicial interpreta-
tion of the Human Rights Act, the legislature intervened and amended
the statute to expand the protection for temporarily disabled work-
ers.278 The court has not yet reviewed any cases under this new stat-
utory language.279 Although the legislature clearly indicated that the
court's interpretation of Yoho was not what was intended, the case law
under the 1978 statutory language is nevertheless instructive with re-
gard to the court's general view of employment rights of work-injured
individuals.
Many other states have also developed either common law or
statutory protection for employees who receive, or are eligible to re-
ceive, workers' compensation benefits.280 In cases involving discharge
for absences related to work-related injuries, most (but not all) jurisdic-
tions have reached results similar to Yoho.281 Causes of action arising
278. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3 (Supp. 1992). The 1990 amendments to the Workers'
Compensation Act are discussed at greater length in the next section of this Article.
279. Although it has taken note of the passage of the amendment, Powell v. Wyoming
Cablevision, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 717, 723 n.10 (W. Va. 1991), and has noted that the new
provision is to be applied prospectively only. Pannell v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 422 S.E.2d
643, 646-47 (W. Va. 1992).
280. Indiana was the first state to extend common law protection to occupationally-in-
jured workers by holding that discharges for filing workers' compensation claims violated
public policy. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). Similar deci-
sions were later reached in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677
S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Smith v. Piezo
Tech. & Professional Admrs., 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Lally v. Copygraphics, 428 A.2d
1317 (NJ. 1981); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't. of Labor Servs., 630
P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087 (Ore. 1978) (en
bane); Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (111. 1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245
N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). Numerous other states have extended express statutory
protection against discharge to workers' compensation beneficiaries. See Theresa L. Kruk,
Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers'
Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984).
281. See, e.g., Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 588 A.2d 652 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991);
Hayden v. Bruno's, Inc., 588 So. 2d 874 (Ala. 1991); Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 406
S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1991); Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 821 P.2d 18 (Wash.
1991); Metheney v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Willoughby
v. Gencorp, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Johnson v. Saint Francis Hosp.,
Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. CL App. 1988); Pericich v. Climatrol, Inc., 523 So. 2d 684
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1988); Pierce v. Franklin Elec. Co., 737 P.2d 921 (Okla. 1987); Kern
v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Slover v.
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under statutes like section 23-5A-1 of the West Virginia Code have
generally been predicated upon a finding that the employer intentional-
ly retaliated against the employee because s/he sought compensation
benefits. Retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims was en-
dorsed as a cause of action, not to extend reemployment rights to in-
jured workers, but rather to guarantee that they would not be intimi-
dated and thereby denied access to monetary benefits. Therefore, em-
ployer reliance on neutral policies not specifically directed at eligibility
or availability of compensation is not of concern to these courts.
Those jurisdictions which have decided that discharge for absences
related to work-related injuries are inherently retaliatory have taken a
broader view: that the underlying policy is to protect work-injured
employees, not simply to protect their access to benefits.28 It was
this minority view that the West Virginia court rejected in Yoho. To
the injured worker, the claim that is being made is essentially that but
for the occupational injury, s/he would still be employed; therefore,
any discharge related to the injury is punishment for the injury it-
self. 3 The existence of a neutral absence policy as justification for
the discharge is persuasive only if the courts' focus is on the intent of
the employer to limit the availability of workers' compensation bene-
fits. The West Virginia court adopted the more narrow view, apparent-
ly to-avoid establishing any precedent that would place occupationally-
injured employees in a different category, as employees, from those
whose absences were caused by other factors.
Brown, 488 N.E.2d 1103 (111. App. CL 1986); Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 353
N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1984).
282. See, e.g., Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d
564 (Cal. 1978); Lindsay v. Great N. Paper Co., 532 A.2d 151 (Me. 1987); Lo Dolce v.
Regional Transit Serv., Inc., 429 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 1980); Coleman v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645 (Kan. 1988). But cf. Raymond v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
762 F. Supp. 901 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding discharge proper under Kansas law when em-
ployee could not perform duties of job at time of discharge.).
283. Professor Mark Rothstein characterizes this as follows: "It is ironic that an em-
ployee may not be discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim, but the employee
may be discharged, in effect, for becoming sick or injured in the first place." Mark A.
Rothstein, A Proposed Model Act for the Reinstatement of Employees Upon Recovery from
Work-Related Injury or Illness, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 281 (1989).
[Vol. 95:333
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More recently, in Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., w  the
court clarified its view of workers' compensation-related discharges
arising under the 1978 statutory language which involved neutral ab-
sence control policies. In Powell, the policy was not reduced to writ-
ing. The employee was terminated after a four month absence, during
which he collected temporary total workers' compensation benefits.
The Wyoming County jury, which heard the case, determined that
Powell had been retaliated against for filing a compensation claim.
Finding guidance in the proof schemes of other types of discrimination
cases, the court held that the employee could rely on inferential proof
to establish a prima facie case that the filing of a workers' compensa-
tion claim was a substantial factor in the employer's decision to dis-
charge.5 5 Employers who engage in discriminatory practices, includ-
ing retaliation for the filing of workers' compensation claims, "may be
expected to seek to avoid detection., 28 6 Since they are "vested with
considerable discretion in the hiring and firing of their employees so
as to maintain an efficient and productive work force, '287 it may be
difficult for an employee to demonstrate retaliatory motive. Therefore,
use of the proof mechanisms developed in race, age, and gender dis-
crimination cases, which allow the plaintiff to rely on inferences in
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, is appropriate here as
well. 28
284. 403 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1991). This decision includes a comprehensive review of
judicial decisions in West Virginia and elsewhere in which an injured worker challenged a
discharge for absence associated with a period of temporary total disability resulting from an
occupational injury.
285. ML at 721.
286. Id (quoting Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 389 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 1979)).
287. kd
288. l at 720. The West Virginia court first adopted the inferential method of proof
articulated in federal race discrimination cases in cases under the Human Rights Act, W.
VA. CODE § 5-11-1 to -19. (1990 & Supp. 1992). Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v.
West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983). The court later
developed a generic framework for the plaintiff's prima facie case. Conoway v. Eastern
Assoc. Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1986). It is this latter framework which was
then adapted to require plaintiffs in workers' compensation retaliatory discharge cases to
prove that "(1) an on-the-job injury was sustained; (2) proceedings were instituted under the
Workers' Compensation Act, W. VA. CODE § 23-1-1 to -18 (1985 & Supp. 1992); and (3)
the filing of a workers' compensation claim was a significant factor in the employer's deci-
sion to discharge or otherwise discriminate against the employee." Powell, 403 S.E.2d at
1992-93]
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Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer
must "prove a legitimate, nonpretextual, and nonretaliatory reason for
the discharge." 289 Legitimate reasons for discharge might include, for
example, specific employee misconduct or general business condi-
tions, such as layoffs which involved employees who had not filed
compensation claims. 29
1
The court in Powell acknowledged that the more difficult cases
involve discharges in which the employer alleges that the worker can-
not resume employment because of his or her disability or because of
a lengthy injury-related absence. Written neutral absence control poli-
cies, such as the one in Yoho, shield the employer from liability.
Where the policy is not written, and may have been arbitrarily or
discriminatorily directed at workers' compensation-related absences, the
court will look to such factors as how quickly the employer terminated
the employee after compensation benefits were sought. In essence, the
decision in Powell tells us that the mere allegation of a neutral ab-
sence policy would not automatically shield an employer from liability.
On the other hand, nondiscriminatory application of a neutral policy,
as in Yoho, could, in the court's reasoning, still justify a discharge. As
the court noted in Powell, however, the 1990 amendments to the
Workers' Compensation Act may change this result. 2
721.
289. Note that the court indicates that the employer must prove, not simply articulate,
a legitimate reason for its actions. Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 722; see also Pannell v. Inco
Alloys Int'l, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1992). This is in contrast to the burden of pro-
duction (not proof) which employers are generally assumed to have to meet in discrimina-
tion cases. See, e.g., Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d 342, 352 (W. Va. 1983); West Virginia Inst. of Tech. v. West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 490, 495-96 (W. Va. 1989); 2 ARTHUR LARSON
& LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 50.10, at 10-3 (1992). But see
Conoway v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 430 (W. Va. 1986).
290. Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 722; see also Gondolfi v. Mid-Gulf Stevedores, 621 F.2d
695 (5th Cir. 1980) (discharge for tardiness); Pientka v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 465
N.E.2d 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (plaintiff had previously filed false workers' compensation
claim); Vollenweider v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 466 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 468 So. 2d 577 (La. 1985) (failure to follow company policy).
291. Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 722; see 2A ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW § 68.36(d), at 13.188 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
292. Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 722 & n.10.
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The court continued to struggle in Powell with the fate of employ-
ees who have been severely injured at work. "Obviously," wrote Jus-
tice Miller for the unanimous court,
[W]here the employee has suffered a severe injury that forever limits the
employee's ability to perform his accustomed work, the employer should
not be penalized for discharging the employee. Where the injury is less
serious, further consideration must be given to what is a reasonable recov-
ery period viewed again with the prospect of when the employee will be
able to perform his accustomed work In this regard, the employer is enti-
tled to show that it is economieally unfeasible to keep the job open or to
hire a temporary substitute.'
Again, this language echoes the concerns expressed in the disability
discrimination cases. Here, the injury must be not too severe to justify
reemployment; if the injured worker's ability to perform his or her
customary work is undermined by an injury, s/he is not protected
under the statute. In disability cases the injury must result in impair-
ment which substantially limits a major life function; extended absence
may bolster claims that the individual is disabled. But the handicap
must not be so severe that it would prevent the worker from perform-
ing the essential functions of the job for which s/he was hired. Unlike
its approach to claims for compensation benefits, the court has not
successfully developed a consistent mechanism for protecting the
reemployment rights of injured workers. The judicial interpretation of
section 23-5A-1 of the West Virginia Code, softened but not eliminat-
ed in Powell, is further evidence of the court's reluctance to intervene
directly in the employment relationship.
C. Administration of the Workers' Compensation Fund: Erecting
Barriers to Returning to Wor 2 94
Although the Supreme Court of Appeals must set the legal stan-
dards for both claims for compensation benefits and discrimination
293. Id. at 723.
294. The information in this section is drawn largely from my own personal
observations while I served as Workers' Compensation Commissioner (1989-90) and from
informal conversations with attorneys, employers, claimants, and members of the staff of the
Workers' Compensation Fund from 1989 to the present.
1992-931
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charges, it is the Workers' Compensation Fund which actually makes
the determinations in the vast majority of claims involving occupation-
al injuries and disabilities.295  The commissioner 29 must review
thousands of claims each year;2' each claim involves myriads of is-
sues regarding the allowance of wage replacement, permanent disabili-
ty, and medical benefits. Both claimants and employers complain bit-
terly about the decisions made on claims at the administrative level.
They can match each other in the telling of horror stories, piling one
narrative on another. Claimants and their representatives talk of claim-
ants who were denied benefits who should have received them under
the legal precedents articulated by the Supreme Court of Appeals;
often these people are destitute as the result of the apparent failure of
the Fund to award benefits due and owing. Employers tell stories
about claimants who have bilked the system by faking the source,
existence, or extent of disabilities.
In fact, the workers' compensation apparatus has been designed
only to collect premiums from employers and pay out monetary bene-
fits to claimants and health care providers. The administration of the
Workers' Compensation Fund has displayed a reluctance to encourage
or assist injured workers' claims for continued employment. Employers
charge that the Fund actually discourages workers from returning to
work, employees charge that it fails to help them when they are pres-
sured inappropriately to return to work "or else."
295. For example, in calendar year 1986, 75,967 claims were filed; 24,877 protests
(i.e., administrative appeals of some ruling on a claim) were acknowledged (i.e., filed and
docketed); 2,100 appeals were filed with the Appeal Board, and 421 petitions were filed to
the Supreme Court of Appeals. See Memorandum from Emily A. Spieler, Workers' Com-
pensation Commissioner, to Richard Neely, Chief Justice, West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, Attachment A (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with author).
296. All initial orders on claims are issued over the name of the commissioner. Obvi-
ously, the commissioner her/himself does not make these thousands of decisions; instead,
decisions are made by employees of the Fund who then add the commissioner's signature
(with a rubber stamp) to the bottom of the orders. Until 1991, all post-protest orders also
issued over the commissioner's name. Since 1991, post-protest decisions are made through
the administrative law judge system. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5-1 to -6 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
In view of the fact the commissioner does not personally make these administrative deci-
sions, I have chosen to refer to them as having been made by the Fund.
297. See supra note 106 for data regarding numbers of claims filed and adjudicated.
414 [Vol. 95:333
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Despite the arguments on these issues, it is important to remember
that the vast majority of injured workers do return to work promptly
after an injury.29s The issue of how to approach the claims of those
claimants who are off work a longer period of time is both difficult
and troubling. It is, of course, these claims, which involve more seri-
ous injury or greater duration of payments, which present the largest
cost to the Fund.299 Thus, while relatively small in number, they are
often the primary focus of anecdotes, administrative concerns, and
litigation.
It is true that the traditional handling of claims has'sometimes
encouraged claimants to stay off work and has discouraged the final
closure of even minor claims. The Fund has, perhaps unwittingly,
erected administrative barriers which make it more, rather than less,
difficult for workers who want to return to work to do so. Four exam-
ples of administrative functioning serve to illustrate this pattern.
First, the Fund has put little energy or thought into vocational
rehabilitation efforts for injured workers. Despite clear statutory direc-
tion to provide a wide range of rehabilitation assistance," 1 no ag-
gressive program for rehabilitation has ever been successfully institut-
ed. It is widely believed that early intervention in claims which may
involve lengthy disability is essential to successful rehabilitation. 302
298. See supra note 107.
299. For example, 544 new permanent total disability awards made to employees of
employers who subscribed to the Fund "cost" the Fund $141 million in 1991 or approxi-
mately one-third of the total charges incurred in that year. For a discussion of actuarial cost
and charges, see supra note 33.
300. There are, of course, exceptions to this. There is, for example, an inexplicable
amount of litigation over entitlement to benefits for occupational noise induced hearing loss,
despite the fact that almost three quarters of these awards are for partial disability of less
than 10%. FUND ANN. REP. 10 (1991).
301. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9 (Supp. 1992). Prior to the 1990 amendments, this section
of the code provided rehabilitation benefits to individuals who had sustained a permanent
disability or sustained injuries likely to result in permanent disability, to a maximum cost of
$10,000 per injured employee. See discussion infra part M.D. Temporary total disability
benefits were to be paid to any individual undergoing rehabilitation, without regard to the
usual 208 week maximum for such benefits. The 1990 amendments, substantially expanded
the scope of rehabilitation. No major administrative change has been made in the delivery
of rehabilitation services since the 1990 amendments took effect. See discussion infra notes
358-69 & 393-419 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., JOHN A. GARDNER, IMPROVING VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OUT-
1992-931
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Nevertheless, few West Virginia claimants have received active assis-
tance from the Fund in returning to work, either with their pre-injury
employer or elsewhere, until -they have been temporarily disabled for
substantial periods of time, often years. During the period from 1985
through 1988, the limited rehabilitation efforts of the Fund were large-
ly dismantled; no one (other than the rehabilitation specialists em-
ployed by the Fund) appears to have complained. A major interagency
agreement reached in 1990 between the Fund and the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation Services. 3 has never been fully implement-
ed.
Rehabilitation can take many forms. In its broadest sense, it is any
program which assists a claimant to regain functional capacity or to re-
turn to employment, using either medical or vocational rehabilitative
services." 4 Much debate in workers' compensation circles focuses on
COMES: OPPORTUNIE FOR EARLIER INTERVENTION XiV (1988) (this report for the Workers'
Compensation Research Institute concludes: "The results suggest that encouraging employers
and insurers to evaluate cases for vocational rehabilitation not later than six months after
injury can yield benefits for workers, employers, and insurers. These benefits far exceed the
additional costs incurred."); see also JOHN A. GARDNER, WORKERS COMPENSATION RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 55-57
(1985).
303. Rehabilitation Services Cooperative Agreement Between the Bureau of Workers'
Compensation and the Division of Rehabilitation Services signed May 23, 1990 by Com-
missioner Emily A. Spieler and Director John M. Panza and approved by Taunja Willis
Miller, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Resources on May 25, 1990. The
Agreement provided: "The WCF and DRS agree that careful and aggressive case manage-
ment, together with early identification of individuals needing rehabilitation services and ap-
propriate plan design, form the core of a successful rehabilitation program. Rehabilitation
staff of the WCF and DRS will therefore supervise and manage cases so that regular con-
tact is maintained with the claimant, the employer and the injured employee's treating phy-
sician or other providers." Il at 4. This Agreement incorporated a written agreement exe-
cuted between the same parties on July 31, 1989, which provided in part that "the Division
of Rehabilitation Services agrees to assign a minimum of twenty-five (25), or more if the
need should be shown, rehabilitation counselors as Workers' Compensation WCF specialists.
These rehabilitation counselors shall have appropriate education and/or prior work experi-
ence." Id The agreement further set-case limits for individual counselors and parameters for
the provision of services. It is my understanding that additional counselors have been added
to provide DRS services to workers' compensation claimants, but that they are not assigned
full time to these duties.
304. For general discussions regarding rehabilitation in workers' compensation, see
GARDNER, VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 302;
416
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the appropriate goals for rehabilitation within the workers' compensa-
tion context. For example, employers regard individuals who are assist-
ed in finding light duty work, even if the work is not generally avail-
able, as having been rehabilitated; that is, that their claim for on-going
benefits or assistance should terminate. The worker, on the other hand,
may be unemployable as a result of the injury if s/he loses the particu-
lar light duty job, which may have been provided only in order to
terminate the worker's temporary total disability benefits.3°5 There is
therefore a continuing tension regarding the extent to which seriously
injured workers should receive more complete retraining in order make
a competitive and complete reentry into the labor market.3 6
This tension is reflected in the West Virginia rehabilitation pro-
gram. There is little assistance provided to claimants to return to work
at their original jobs or with their pre-injury employer; generally, these
arrangements are made directly by the parties without any programmat-
ic intervention. On the other hand, Fund employees are skeptical of
attempts by other rehabilitation specialists to provide extensive retrain-
ing for claimants, particularly when that retraining would result in a
significant change of status for the employee. Thus, claimants who
were employed, for example, in mining or manufacturing jobs, who are
no longer able to perform manual labor, and who might otherwise
qualify for permanent total disability awards, encounter bureaucratic
resistance to suggestions that they attend college programs that would
GARDNER, IMPROVING VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OUTCOMES, supra note 302; REHABIL-
ITATION TCHNIQUEs AND CONCEPTS, supra note 130; 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW, §§ 61.20-61.25 (1992); Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Workers' Com-
pensation: Vocational Rehabilitation Statutes, 67 A.L.R.4th 612 (1989).
305. See IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.12(d), at 10-47
(1992); Id. § 57.35, at 10-247.
306. In general, the mission of federally funded state rehabilitation programs, like the
Division of Rehabilitation Services, is to provide rehabilitation services which maximize the
their clients' potential. Workers' compensation programs, in contrast, focus on the return of
the injured worker to a reasonably equivalent position to that which s/he had prior to the
injury. This difference in mission creates a tension: rehabilitation specialists often send cli-
ents to formal educational programs in school in order to improve their entire life status;
workers' compensation specialists, on the other hand, are resistant to such training programs
because they are expensive and do more than is really required-they change the status of
the injured worker rather than restoring him or her to pre-injury status. GARDNER, VOCA-
TIONAL REHABILITATION IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 302, at 26-27.
1992-931
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allow them to make a complete career change. In view of the negative
association between poor labor market conditions and reemployment of
previously injured workers, a phenomenon which is particularly evident
in southern West Virginia, this resistance may actually result in in-
creased financial liability for the Fund. 07
Everyone gives lip service to rehabilitation. But significant distrust
clouds rehabilitation efforts. Claimants often view the active partici-
pation of an employer (or employer's counsel) in the rehabilitation
process as proof that rehabilitation assistance is being provided only
for the purpose of limiting liability for on-going compensation benefits.
Employers sometimes offer limited light duty jobs andthen resist any
efforts to expand the employment possibilities for their injured employ-
ees, or fail to continue to comply with the employee's physical restric-
tions, once s/he has accepted the job. Employers, on the other hand,
see any resistance to rehabilitation as proof that the injured worker
wants only to maximize eligibility for benefits, not to return to work.
The end result of the Fund's approach to rehabilitation is that workers
receive monetary benefits but only rarely receive financial or logistical
support from the staff of the workers' compensation program if they
want to return to work.
Second, the structure of the litigation system has provided little
assistance in defining or expanding efforts which might help injured
workers return to work. The adversarial nature of the system means
that both employers and claimants seek the assistance of lawyers. The
fee structure for the payment of lawyers encourages litigation, both
because it results in increased hourly fees for defense counsel and
because it often results in increased awards, and therefore increased
fees, for claimants' counsel.30' These problems are compounded by
307. In response to the enormous costs of permanent total disability awards, it seems
obvious that one focus should be on significant retraining efforts. Political proposals, how-
ever, focus instead on redefining eligibility standards for life awards, in order to eliminate
Posey/Cardwell awards which are made to odd lot workers-those who are displaced and
unemployable as a result of a combination of factors.
308. Claimants' attorneys fees are capped at 20% of an award to a maximum of 20%
of 208 weeks of benefits. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-5 (1985). Claimants' attorneys have been
the subject of scrutiny by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the State Bar for attempting to
maximize fees. E.g., Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v.
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traditional legal specialization; historically, there has been a complete
bifurcation between the members of the bar who provide representation
on workers' compensation claims and those who represent employees
and employers in employment-related matters.
Unlike personal injury cases, workers' compensation claims gener-
ally involve benefits which are to be paid during the course of an on-
going employment relationship. The maximally beneficial result for the
injured party may not, therefore, be in the largest cash transfer if the
individual forfeits a right to return to work. However, since claimants'
attorneys' fees rise with length of disability, there is simply no finan-
cial incentive for them to assist their clients to get back to work.
Some treating physicians find their patients resistant to returning to
work because of the advice' of their attorneys. Attorneys, of course,
charge that the physicians "don't understand the system." Physicians
who do "understand the system" may be complicit, or forced to be
complicit, in this disability maximizing behavior.3"
Attorneys for the parties show little interest in promoting rehabili-
tation efforts.310 The workers' compensation bar has not generally as-
Coleman, 377 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 1988) (collection of fees in excess of 208 weeks by
collection of 20% of accrued back award and 20% of future 208 weeks prohibited but
deemed to have been done in good faith, therefore requiring restitution but not resulting in
discipline); Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Wilson, 408
S.E.2d 350 (W. Va. 1991) (fraudulent alteration of medical reports, resulting in increased
awards and, therefore, increased fees justifies annulment of law license). There is, of course,
no cap on fees for employers' attorneys. Draft rules governing fees for claimants' counsel
were in circulation as this article went to press.
309. In 1979 and 1980, a group of primary care physicians and attorneys, myself in-
cluded, met on several Saturday afternoons at the Cabin Creek Medical Center in Dawes,
W. Va., to discuss concerns about the tendency of the compensation system to promote dis-
ability. The physicians were particularly concerned that their patients, who told them that
they wanted to return to work, were being discouraged from returning by their attorneys,
the Fund, or their employers. Other patients, who were still unable to work, were under
intense pressure from employers to return to work or risk losing their jobs. One physician
related that he was regularly called by the company medical doctor for a major employer in
the Kanawha Valley and told that a patient would lose his job if he did not return to work
forthwith. Other than the sharing of concerns by the participants, nothing came of these
meetings.
310. The role of attorneys is discussed at length in REHABILITATION TECHNIQUES AND
CONCEPTS, supra note 130, at 31-34. The author describes a worst case scenario jurisdiction,
which he hypothesizes does not exist. Although not entirely applicable to West Virginia, this
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sisted in developing voluntary rehabilitation as an option."' Claim-
ants' attorneys, ivhose financial interests do not mesh with encouraging
early reemployment for their clients, often ignore rehabilitation options,
regard them as outside the scope of their representation, or actually
discourage rehabilitation.3 12 Employers have charged that the primary
description is nevertheless similar, in troubling ways, to what occurs here. It should be
remembered that it is the injured worker him or herself who stands to lose the most:
In Jurisdiction A, attorneys regularly do everything they can to discourage the
efficient and successful rehabilitation of workers. Plaintiff's lawyers take cases on
the basis of a contingent percentage fee. Accordingly, they have an incentive to
make the workers look as severely disabled as possible. If the worker is success-
fully rehabilitated he will appear to be less severely disabled, will receive lower
benefits, and the attorney fee will be less. Moreover, plaintiff's attorneys see reha-
bilitation specialists as agents for employers and insurance companies: Any cooper-
ation with such a person might provide information to the employer or insurance
carrier and accordingly is discouraged. Defense lawyers also discourage rehabilita-
tion efforts. If a rehabilitation specialist is involved, he may take control of the
case away from the attorney and will probably suggest solutions to the problem
which do not involve litigation or adversary proceedings where the defense attor-
ney is paid by the hour.
This is not to say that lawyers in Jurisdiction A do not "use rehabilitation.
Indeed, they frequently "use" it. Defense lawyers often hire rehabilitation counsel-
ors as part of a plan to obtain information from workers that they are not able to
get through the plaintiff's attorney. They also use rehabilitation counselors to re-
quire workers to go through exhaustive but clearly fruitless job finding efforts in
order to make the worker's situation more uncomfortable and to make the worker
willing to take a smaller settlement. If this fails they use the rehabilitation coun-
selors to devise "a job offer." The job offered is one in which no reasonable
worker could ever hope to make a living. However, when the worker turns down
this job offer this is used as evidence of his bad faith and benefits are terminated.
Plaintiff lawyers, on the other hand, "use" rehabilitation specialists as adver-
sary witnesses to help exaggerate the disability of the worker and emphasize the
hopelessness of any eventual return to work. In other cases they use rehabilitation
specialists to concoct a lengthy and costly rehabilitation program which they do
not believe the worker will ever follow but which is likely to increase the settle-
ment value of the case.
Ia at 31-32.
311. Of course, there are exceptions on both sides of the bar.
312. I have frequently been told by claimants' attorneys that they plan to use the fail-
ure of the Fund to provide adequate rehabilitation services to their clients as evidence of
their clients' entitlement to increased awards. Often, they lament the human cost in the
Fund's inadequate efforts at rehabilitation. When I have asked whether they sought the
rehabilitation efforts with equal zeal to the effort they have put into obtaining benefits, they
sometimes react with surprise. It has simply not always occurred to them, even if they have
serious concern for their client, to assist their client in obtaining rehabilitation. This may
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exception to this appears to be when a rehabilitation program can be
used to extend the availability of weekly benefits beyond the statutory
maximum duration for temporary total disability payments. Employers'
attorneys distrust any intervention in the relationship with the pre-exist-
ing employer and ridicule a system of rehabilitation that has, or has
been perceived to have, focused on expensive retraining programs
rather than programs which provide fewer opportunities to claimants
but might help them return them to work more quickly and more
cheaply.
Third, the administrative operation of the Fund sometimes appears
to discourage claimants in their efforts to return to work. Claimants
receive temporary total disability benefits, generally without excessive
delay313 and most return to work reasonably quickly after an inju-
ry.314 There are, however, many anecdotal reports of individuals who
are afraid to return to work promptly because they might jeopardize
their benefits; physicians, concerned about the ability of claimants to
reinstitute benefits, delay releasing people to return to work until they
are fairly certain that they will be able to perform the work without
problem.315
The perception that reinstituting benefits can be difficult is accu-
rate. The administration of the program has consistently resisted the
reinstatement of benefits for individuals who try to return to work and
fail. Historically, the Fund simply refused to reinstate benefits if an
individual tried to return to work and found s/he was unable to contin-
ue, unless the claimant could demonstrate aggravation or progression
of the injury.316 In Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Corn-
explain the sparse number of reported cases involving rehabilitation benefits.
313. Partly in response to several decisions by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals which required prompt adjudication of claims for temporary total disability benefits,
a system was instituted which pays claims quite quickly if the submitted forms meet prima
facie scrutiny.
314. See supra note 107. Almost 90% of claimants return to work within 120 days.
315. See infra text following note 335 for discussion about this point by physician
members of the Workers' Compensation Advisory Board in 1989.
316. In general, progression or aggravation is required for reopening of a claim after it
has been closed. Wilson v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 328 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va.
1984).
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missioner,317 the court ordered the Fund to allow claimants to reopen
their cases in these situations. The agency also established a standard
for reopening which required more evidence for reopening than for
opening the initial claims. Again, the court intervened and ordered the
adoption of a more lenient standard for evaluating reopening peti-
tions.318 Despite the court's clear direction that encouraging an in-
jured employee to try to return to work was "valid social policy, 3 19
the employees of the Fund have continued to resist reopening petitions.
Although precise data are not available, both anecdotal evidence and
interviews with Fund employees indicate that reopening petitions filed
in these circumstances continue to be denied at a much higher rate
than initial applications for temporary total disability benefits.
Fourth, the Fund is remarkably inefficient in closing claims on a
permanent basis. Any delay in finality in claims has troubling implica-
tions for all parties by prolonging the life of the claim. This can be
both psychologically damaging for claimants and financially damaging
for the Fund .or the self-insured employer. Two examples illustrate the
increased financial liability of the Fund.
First, in cases involving "lost time" (temporary total) benefits,
weekly benefits terminate when a worker has reached his or her maxi-
mum degree of improvement from the injury or when s/he returns to
work.320 Delay in assessing a claim for permanent partial benefits af-
ter temporary total disability benefits end results in the continued pay-
ment of "non-awarded partial" (nap) benefits while claimants (who
have reached their maximum degree of improvement but were unable
to return to work) await final permanent partial evaluations.321 These
317. 232 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va. 1977).
318. Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 234 S.E.2d 779, 780 (W. Va.
1977).
319. Dunlap, 232 S.E.2d 4t 345.
320. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(e) (Supp. 1992).
321. *W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(e)(3) (Supp. 1992). In the past, an individual who was
adjudged to have reached "maximum degree of medical improvement" (thereby terminating
eligibility for temporary total disability benefits) sometimes still could not return to work,
either because s/he could not do the pre-injury job or because the job was no longer
available. At this point, the claimant (who is entitled to receive, and should receive, voca-
tional rehabilitation assistance, but rarely does) is left without any income at all. The clo-
sure of claims on a temporary total disability basis, combined with the delay in providing
[Vol. 95:333
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"nap" benefits are now routinely paid, sometimes in excess of the final
permanent partial disability award, but the claimants are still not pro-
vided with aggressive vocational rehabilitation services. The ability of
the claimant to reenter the work force declines while the workers'
compens tion fund retains liability for the resulting greater disability.
Attempts to increase the use of rehabilitation services and to force
immediate permanent partial disability evaluations of claims are met
with remarkable administrative resistance.
Second, in "no-lost-time" claims, a claim is not considered legally
closed until the worker has been evaluated for any residual permanent
paial disability that may have resulted from the injury.323 The later
evaluation for permanent disability can occur years after the occurrence
of the injury. Moreover, such permanent partial disability awards,
unrelated to a recent injury, can be used to reopen claims for the
purpose of seeking permanent total disability awards. 324 It is, of
permanent partial disability benefits, led the legislature to create a new benefit, known as
'non-awarded partial" benefits, in order to provide a bridge for claimants between temporary
total disability and permanent partial disability benefits. The amount of nap benefits paid is
then deducted from the final permanent partial disability award. If the nap benefit exceeds
the permanent partial disability award, then the amount is considered an overpayment, but is
only collectible from future permanent partial disability awards. See UMWA v. Lewis, 309
S.E.2d 58 (,V. Va. 1983).
322. For example, in 1989 I notified physicians that the Fund would accept recommen-
dations from authorized treating physicians for permanent partial disability ratings of 15% or
less when patients had reached maximum degree of medical improvement after a period of
temporary disability, in keeping with W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a(c) (Supp. 1992). Fund em-
ployees objected; the statute, they said, required consideration of "all other available infor-
mation" before such an award could be entered. Obviously, my directive was not taken too
seriously: employees persisted in refusing to accept recommendations from treating physi-
cians, until, in Dalton v. Spieler, 401 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1990), a mandamus action, the
court ruled (after my departure from the commissioner's position) that the commissioner
must accept the recommendation of treating physicians in these situations.
323. Baker v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 263 S.E.2d 883 (W. Va. 1980)
(compensation claim for noise induced hearing loss was ruled compensable but no perma-
nent partial disability award was entered; court held that three year statute of limitations for
reopening claims did not apply to claims that had never been closed. It is the
commissioner's duty to ensure that claims receive final awards).
324. As long as a claimant has an open claim, s/he can make a motion for a second
injury life award. The usual practice for claimants' attorneys in these situations is to obtain
a permanent partial disability rating, often for an old injury or a newly diagnosed occupa-
tional disability such as hearing loss. It has been estimated that as many as 10% of second
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course, difficult for medical professionals or Fund employees to make
clear determinations regarding the etiology of any disability at a much
later date, particularly if the claimant is an older or retired worker.3"
The continuing failure of the Fund to perform medical evaluations on
these claims, while often unrelated to claimants' return to work, never-
theless creates an on-going and substantial financial liability for the
Fund.
There are three primary explanations for this administrative behav-
ior. First, the Fund is notoriously understaffed. Second, the desire by
the Fund for control results in an unwillingness to trust information
provided by anyone who is external to the Fund's bureaucracy.326
Evaluations by treating physicians, for example, are often assumed to
be tainted by the physician's pro-worker bias; this is, after all, often
the physician who supported the worker's claim in the first place. This
even occurs when the claimant's evaluating physician is a well known
and respected member of the medical community;327 this resistance
has not been obliterated by the judicial rulings requiring liberal evalua-
tion of claimants' medical evidence.32 Third, some employees of the
Fund act as if they distrust workers. This may not be surprising: the
injury life awards are now "piggy-backed" onto hearing loss claims. Finger & Briscoe,
supra note 27. A protest is then filed to the permanent partial disability award and the
claimant then makes a motion for a second injury life award. Under current practice, the
administrative law judges will remand any case in which such a motion is made to the
commissioner for evaluation before ruling on the motion; the commissioner may then appear
to defend the Fund in any claim which would be paid by the second injury fund (rather
than a self-insured employer) or in any claim that is not otherwise defended by the employ-
er. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1h (Supp. 1992). Thus, the failure to close claims opens the door
to new, more expensive claims. For those claimants who are permanently and totally dis-
abled, this process achieves some justice. It is, however, an odd, and perhaps inequitable,
way for justice to be dispensed.
325. This problem is well illustrated by the claim of the 70-year-old retired worker in
Hunter v. Workers' Compens,3tion Comm'r, 386 S.E.2d 500 (W. Va. 1989). The physicians
who examined Hunter simply could not distinguish any disability attributable to age from
disability caused by his occupational pneumoconiosis. Id. at 502.
326. Although employers tend to believe that the Fund is excessively pro-claimant,
claimants believe that the Fund is excessively pro-employer. The distrust of external influ-
ences in fact extends to both claimants and employers.
327. The experience of Dorothy Coffman is illustrative of this. See supra note 246.
328. See, e.g., Javins v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 320 S.E.2d 119 (W. Va.
1984).
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claims requiring the most work are often the claims that are the most
questionable. When much of an employee's time is spent reviewing
claims which involve potential abuse, the employee is left with the
impression that the majority of claims similarly involve abuse.329 The
result of this is often a failure to believe that individual claimants
might, in fact, prefer to work than to collect benefits. Thus, there is no
reason to explore mechanisms that would assist claimants to do the
"right" thing; it would hardly be worthwhile to make administrative
changes to respond to people who, if they exist at all, exist in such
small numbers.
D. Amending the Workers' Compensation Statute in 1990:
Promoting Reemployment of Injured Workers?
Both the court and the Workers' Compensation Fund have (albeit
perhaps unintentionally) thus prolonged the life of compensation claims
while failing to assist injured workers in returning to work. The efforts
underlying the 1990 statutory amendments to the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act were intended to begin to address some of these problems.
Although legislative tinkering with the workers' compensation
program has occurred almost on an annual basis, the 1990 amendments
were of particular interest. Huge public outcry had greeted the an-
nouncement that employers were not paying a sufficient level of pre-
miums to fund the existing program.33" Despite considerable opposi-
tion from the legal community, the legislature in 1990 attempted to ad-
dress serious administrative problems in the handling of claims.331
329. When I first took the position as commissioner, I met with every supervisory
employee. I asked the people who served as unit managers the following question: How
many claimants do you think are off work after an injury for more than six months or a
year? Quite a few replied that they believed 50% or more of claimants who received tem-
porary total disability benefits were absent from work for this long. The data does not
support this conclusion, of course. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. It is, of
course, possible that 50% of some employees' time is spent dealing with these claims.
330. See discussion supra part II.
331. The 1990 amendments to the statute created a new administrative law judge sys-
tem to allow adjudication of claims previously decided by the commissioner to be reviewed
in a separate forum rather than being reviewed by the commissioner a second time. This
meant that the commissioner could appear to defend the Fund in previously undefended
1992-93] 425
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They also focused on issues of employment and reemployment of
injured workers.
1. 1990 Statutory Amendments
In response to the public hue and cry regarding workers' compen-
sation costs and abuse, Governor Gaston Caperton convened the
Workers' Compensation Advisory Board in 1989.332 By statute, the
Board consists of three representatives from the medical community,
three employee or union representatives, three representatives of em-
ployers, and the commissioner, who sits by statute as ex officio chair-
man. The individuals named to the Board by the Governor did not
include the usual spokespeople for the interested groups.333 Instead,
the Governor primarily sought the advice of businessmen, physicians,
and employee representatives who might not be bound by prior posi-
tions and statements regarding the issues. Significantly, no lawyers
were named.
The Board met in monthly public meetings from August 1989
until January 1990, in order to identify the problems which beset the
program and to draft recommendations to the Governor and the legisla-
ture.33 The physician members of the Board expressed concern from
claims and that claims, at least in theory, could be handled more expeditiously. See W. VA.
CODE §§ 23-5-1g to -lh (Supp. 1992). This new system is now under attack. See supra
note 22.
332. The Advisory Board was created by the legislature in 1979 and was required by
statute to meet and report to the legislature on an annual basis. W. VA. CODE § 23-1-18
(Supp. 1992). in fact, the Advisory Board was not convened between 1981 and 1989 and
has not been convened since 1990.
333. Employer representatives named to the board were William Goldsmith (C&P Tele-
phone of W. Va.), Rick Abraham (Laurel Creek Mining), and Sherry Wizba (Aladdin
Foods, Inc.). Employee representatives were Robert Miller (Deputy Commissioner of Labor),
Steve Webber (UMWA), and Jack McComas (AFL-CIO). Physicians members were Dr.
David Clayman (psychologist), Dr. Kenneth Wright (physiatrist), and Dr. Robert Walker
(family practitioner and Chairman, Department of Family and Community Health, Marshall
University School of Medicine).
334. In the process, a letter of solicitation was issued to obtain the advice of a na-
tional expert in workers' compensation regarding methods to improve the West Virginia
program. After reviewing a number of responses to the solicitation, the Board voted unani-
mously to retain Arthur Cohen, a consulting actuary from the firm of Huggins Financial
[Vol. 95:333426
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the outset about their inability to assist their patients in returning to
work. In particular, Dr. Kenneth Wright, M.D., a rehabilitation medi-
cine specialist, complained that there was no system in place to enable
workers to return to work on a part time or light duty basis without
losing all wage replacement benefits. Since these transitional jobs paid
far less than their permanent full time jobs, a return to work often
meant that they would receive less from their transitional wages than
they received from compensation; it was therefore difficult to advise
them to attempt most transitional work. The statute made no provision
for workers to collect partial weekly benefits to supplement transitional
wages in order to allow people to return to work during the healing
process.335 Similarly, Dr. Robert Walker, M.D., a family practitioner,
discussed his reluctance to encourage patients to return to work, for
fear that their benefits would not be reinstated if they were unable to
perform their jobs. Both physicians pointed repeatedly to barriers erect-
ed by the law and by the administration of the Fund which prevented
them from assisting their patients in returning to work. They expressed
concern that the advice their patients received from their attorneys was
designed to assist the claimant in maximizing their monetary benefits,
not their physical and psychological recovery from the injury; this
particular concern was echoed by both the claimant and employer rep-
resentatives on the Board.
Both employee and business members of the Board repeatedly
discussed their frustrations with the administrative functioning of the
Workers' Compensation Fund. Comments echoed those made else-
where: claimants who needed benefits often could not, according to the
labor side, obtain them; employers who identified employees who
needed assistance also could not get help for them. On the other hand,
Services, a practice of Ernst & Young.
335. Under West Virginia workers' compensation law, there had been no partial wage
replacement benefit. Once a claimant returned to work, temporary total disability benefits are
terminated and the individual becomes eligible for evaluation for permanent partial disability
benefits. Many claimants, with the advice or consent of their physicians, delay returning to
work because of the loss of benefits, particularly if the wages in the transitional job are
less than those in their pre-injury job, if they fear that they will be unable to perform the
proffered job, or if they distrust the employer's commitment to maintain them in a transi-
tional or light duty job that they will be able to do.
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individuals who were not in need of benefits often seemed to be able
to obtain them, and no intervention by the employer seemed able to
stop this process.
The focus of the Advisory Board shifted quickly to these adminis-
trative concerns. In part, of course, the members of the Board were
reluctant to enter the eye of the storm by suggesting that benefits be
modified. The Board set two priorities: "[t]o assist the [c]ommissioner
in addressing the fiscal and administrative problems facing the Fund";
and "[t]o focus on three specific areas of concern: elimination of abuse
by all parties in the workers' compensation program; redefining and
improving the approach to rehabilitation of injured workers; and pre-
vention of workers' compensation claims through improved workplace
health and safety efforts. 3
36
The report received from Arthur Cohen of Huggins Financial
Services, who was hired to assess the need for change in the program,
encouraged the Board's approach: it recommended no changes in the
benefit or eligibility structure at all.337 The Huggins' report did, how-
ever, make substantial alternative recommendations for administrative
and legislative changes. 33' The report specifically proposed
"[e]nhancement of rehabilitation programs through trial return to work
programs, temporary partial disability benefits and monitoring" of
claims.339 In addition, with regard to the issues raised by the busi-
ness community, the consultant reviewed the various business studies
and concluded that "while workers' compensation costs are not the
predominant consideration in locating businesses, West Virginia would
have an advantage over the majority of states if they were." 34 ° Many
of the Huggins recommendations were endorsed by the Board in its
336. REPORT OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ADVISORY BOARD 3 (1990) [hereinafter
ADVISORY BOARD REPORT].
337. HuGGINs REPORT, supra note 62, at 1-3.
338. Id. These recommendations included legislation to permit subrogation recoveries,
enhancement of medical cost containment efforts, development of an administrative law
judge system, creation of medical panels, introduction of settlement provisions, elimination
of the daily rate of pay calculation and enhancement of rehabilitation and return to work
programs.
339. 1& at 2.
340. Id. (emphasis added).
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final report to the legislature; these were incorporated, in somewhat
altered form, in the legislation amending the Workers' Compensation
Act which was finally passed during a Special Session of the legisla-
ture in June 1990.341
The Advisory Board sat at the center of a maelstrom of controver-
sy. The most significant characteristic of the members of the Board
was that they were not primarily preoccupied with issues of malingers
and abuse. All Board members viewed injured workers as on-going
employees of their pre-injury employers, unless the worker became too
disabled to work. 2 This is not to say that they did not personally
know workers who had abused the system; all of the members of the
Board were familiar with abusive behavior. In fact, considerable time
at meetings was devoted to discussing problems with claimants who
sought to maximize benefits, lawyers who encouraged and assisted this
behavior, physicians who primarily regarded the Fund as a high-paying
source of income,343 and employers who used a variety of strategies
to avoid paying appropriate premiums.'"
Nevertheless, from the outset the Board focused its concern on the
need to make the system work for both claimants and employers,
rather than on the need to create a system that would effectively dis-
courage disability by making benefits difficult to obtain or provide less
adequate economic support. The unanimously-held philosophy of the
Board evolved to the following position: it is difficult or impossible to
stop people who intentionally abuse any system; reduction in benefits
or eligibility would have little impact, therefore, on those who were
341. 1990 W. Va. Acts ch. 12 (2d Extraordinary Sess.) (H.B. 213).
342. One employer member of the Board expressed surprise that employers were not
legally required to reemploy workers after they had recovered from an injury sufficiently to
return to work.
343. Medical benefits under workers' compensation in West Virginia, as in most places,
provide "first dollar" coverage without deductibles or co-payments for medical costs associat-
ed with compensable injuries and diseases. Although paid under a fee schedule since 1987,
the fees, at least when they were first set, reflected reasonable and customary fees then
charged and therefore did not substantially reduce the fees of most providers. See W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-3 (Supp. 1992).
344. The collection and lien procedures for collection of employer premium revenue
were also revised in 1990, and again in 1991. See W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-14 to -16 (1985
& Supp. 1992).
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abusers; but such reductions would exclude or punish those workers
who needed benefits but did not know how to "play the system"; we
therefore must find alternative mechanisms to combat abuse, through
better administrative claims management4 5 and increased penalties
for both claimants and physicians who abuse the system.3 6 As a re-
sult, the Board was, almost immediately, regarded as an unproductive
forum by representatives of organized business groups who came to
observe the Board's deliberations and to advocate for benefit reduc-
tions or eligibility restrictions.
The final report of the Advisory Report represented the unanimous
opinion of the Board members and was transmitted to the governor
and the legislature on January 18, 1990. The initial legislation recom-
mended by the commissioner and introduced at the request of the
Governor closely followed the Advisory Board recommendations. These
recommendations contained a number of administrative and financial
proposals, including three significant and interrelated legislative pro-
posals involving the right of injured workers to return to work. 47
345. The Advisory Board reported:
It is the observation of the Board, in keeping with the conclusions in the Cohen
[Huggins] report, that the Fund currently pays claims instead of managing
them . ... [Tihe Board recommends that the commissioner develop a claims
management system that addresses the concerns of both claimants and employ-
ers . . . . The goal of claims management should be to get benefits to claimants
who deserve them quickly and efficiently; to weed out undeserving claims before
any substantial expenditure; and to assist claimants to return to work at their prior
job or, when necessary, at an alternative job.
ADVISORY BOARD REPORT, supra note 336, at 13.
346. In fact, the Board recommended increased penalties for claimants and physicians
who abused the system. IL at 6-7. This recommendation was passed as part of the 1990
legislation. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-19 (Supp. 1992) (increased penalties for claimants); W.
VA. CODE § 23-4-3a (Supp. 1992) (expanding penalties for medical providers who defraud
compensation system); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-3c (Supp. 1992) (new provision allowing for
removal of health care providers from workers' compensation payment system if they abused
the system).
347. These included, in addition to those previously enumerated, recommendations for
legislation for subrogation recoveries by the Fund and self-insured employers, enhanced
medical cost containment through implementation of recommendations regarding diagnosis
and treatment from a Medical Advisory Panel, and transfer of the actuarial surplus from the
Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis Fund to the Workers' Compensation Fund. The most impor-
tant of these proposals, in the long run, was hoped to be the conversion to an administra-
430
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First, it proposed that a mechanism be established for claimants to
return to work on a trial basis with a guarantee that, if they failed,
their temporary total disability benefits would be reinstated without
additional review.3 Second, the Board proposed a significant expan-
sion of vocational rehabilitation efforts, including a partial benefit to
provide an incentive that would encourage claimants undergoing reha-
bilitation to reenter the work force in part time or other transitional
jobs.s' 9 And third, it proposed expanded protection from discharge
and rights of reemployment for claimants who were absent from work
due to an occupational injury and who were able to return to their pre-
injury or equivalent jobs.35 All three of these proposals met with
significant opposition from the organized business community and were
revised substantially before enactment by the legislature during the
Special Session in June 1990.
(a) Trial Return to Work 51
The legislation proposed by the Administration, 352 which was
based upon the recommendations of the Advisory Board, provided that
a claimant "shall be entitled to return to work for a three month trial
period" to the position he or she held at the time of the injury or,
upon mutual agreement with the employer, to a comparable posi-
tion.353 If the worker found, within the three month time period, that
tive law judge system of litigation that would speed the resolution of individual claims and
allow the commissioner to defend claims, particularly those which might involve payment by
the second injury fund. ADVISORY BOARD REPORT, supra note 336, at 6-18.
348. This was proposed specifically because of the continuing problem that claimants
were having in reopening claims after an unsuccessful attempt at returning to work. The
proposal specifically allowed the advice of the treating physician to be controlling as to
whether the claimant could continue in the job or should return to temporary total disability
status. Id at 9.
349. Id at 11.
350. Id at 10.
351. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7b (Supp. 1992).
352. H.B. 4691, 69th Leg., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (1990) (proposed).
353. § 23-4-7b, H.B. 4691, supra note 352. The provisions were envisioned to be
limited by the provisions of the proposed revision to the discriminatory practices article of
the Workers' Compensation Act, which would have allowed employers to replace injured
workers and provided only a limited right for injured workers to return to work by "bump-
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s/he could not perform the pre-injury work, then temporary total dis-
ability benefits were to be automatically reinstated and the claimant
referred for a rehabilitation evaluation. If, on the other hand, the trial
return to work was successful, the claim would be closed on a tempo-
rary total disability basis and the claimant would be referred, as previ-
ously required, for a permanent partial disability evaluation.35 4 Under
this proposal, the claimant, with medical concurrence, would have had
the right to decide whether to engage in a trial work period. As long
as the claimant and his or her physician said that s/he was able to try
working at the pre-injury job, the employer could not refuse to provide
the trial work, the employer could not, however, force the employee to
return on a trial basis. Business opposition to the proposal, which saw
this as an unfair lack of symmetry, led to the removal of any obliga-
tion of employers to provide a trial work period. Instead, the final trial
return to work provision requires agreement among the claimant, phy-
sician, and employer that a trial return to work period should be at-
tempted. 55 Business, for inexplicable reasons, continued to oppose
this provision;356 as a result, the provision was passed but is sched-
uled, by statute, to expire in 1994 unless further legislative action is
taken.357
(b) Vocational Rehabilitation
The Advisory Board's proposal to "substantially revise and expand
rehabilitation programs"358 , included recommendations that rehabili-
ing" replacement workers. § 23-5A-3, H.B. 4691, supra note 352. This section is discussed
more fully below.
354. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7a (Supp. 1992).
355. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7b (Supp. 1992).
356. Minutes of the Unemployment and Workers' Compensation Committee, West Vir-
ginia Chamber of Commerce (May 1, 1990) (on file with author) listed trial return to work
and rehabilitation as "unfavorable provisions." This meeting was held after the regular ses-
sion of the legislature and before the special session in June. These provisions were final-
ized on the last day of the regular session and passed without changes in the' special ses-
sion.
357. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-Tb(f) (Supp. 1992).
358. The Board recommended that rehabilitation "be managed through a case manage-
ment system which allows rehabilitation counselors to monitor carefully the progress and
employability of the claimant and the availability of appropriate employment from the em-
[Vol. 95:333
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tation programs should remain voluntary;. 9 that a new partial dis-
ability benefit be created to supplement partial or reduced wages; and
that rehabilitation case management provide for continued monitoring
of the progress of any claimant returned to modified job on a trial
basis. The initial draft of the legislation included extensive rehabilita-
tion language which, in addition to the specific Board recommenda-
tions,3 ° proposed regulation of private rehabilitation vendors. 61
ployer. Light duty programs should be encouraged. In order to encourage return to work
programs, the Board recommends that the statute provide for creation of incentives for em-
ployers and employees to participate in light duty, transitional work or other modified return
to work programs." ADVIsORY BOARD REPORT, supra note 336, at 11.
359. The Huggins Report had recommended voluntary participation in rehabilitation,
noting, "[m]andatory rehabilitation is not recommended. Effective rehabilitation requires the
cooperation and desire of the injured worker." HUGGINS REPORT, supra note 62, at 20. The
draft legislation which was introduced ultimately included some requirements for participa-
tion. H.B. 4691, supra note 352.
360. The provisions in the proposed H.B. 4691 regarding rehabilitation ran to a full
eighteen pages in the proposed bill and included a provision for temporary partial rehabilita-
tion benefits (§ 23-4-9(o)), definitions of suitable gainful employment (§ 23-4-9(b)(2)), reha-
bilitation services and rehabilitation professionals qualified to provide services (§ 23-4-
9(b)(1), (3), (4)), established strict time limits for rehabilitation assessments (§ 23-4-9(d) to
(g)), set a maximum duration of rehabilitation plans of 208 weeks (§ 23-4-9(h)), but al-
lowed the commissioner to extend the plan beyond this period if the extension "would be
likely to result in less cost to the workers' compensation fund or self-insured employer than
would denial of said petition."(§ 23-4-9(k)(7)). The bill also established the following priori-
ties for the development of rehabilitation plans for injured workers:
(1) Return of the employee to the pre-injury job with the same employer, (2)
Return of the employee to the pre-injury job with the same employer and with
modification of task, work structure or work hours; (3) Return to employment with
the pre-injury employer in a different position; (4) Return to employment with the
pre-injury employer with on-the-job training; (5) Employment with a new- employer
without training; (6) On-the-job training for employment with a new employer, or
(7) Retraining which shall consist of a goal-oriented period of formal retraining
which is designed to lead to suitable gainful employment.
§ 23-4-9(i), H.B. 4691, supra note 352. The proposal included the following provisions
designed to protect injured workers from inappropriate job assignments:
As part of a rehabilitation plan, an injured employee may return to work at a
transitional, light duty, restructured or modified work assignment, on either a tem-
porary, trial or permanent basis. Such assignment may include modifications of the
duties assigned or of the hours of work or any other modification which may
assist the injured employee in attaining the goals of the rehabilitation program and
the rehabilitation plan. Whenever the injured employee is asked to return to work
under this subsection, the prospective employer, whether the original employer or a
new employer, shall furnish to the injured employee's treating physician and the
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Concerted opposition from these vendors and from the business
community led to a complete revision of this portion of the bill. No
comments were made during the legislative process regarding the
methodology for calculation of partial benefits; this subsection was
therefore passed without change.362 The final version underscored the
view of the Board-and the legislature-that workers should be assist-
ed in returning to work that was comparable to their pre-injury work
or "to alternative suitable employment, using all possible alternatives
of job modification, restructuring, reassignment and training. '3  The
findings of the legislature specifically noted the responsibility of the
employer, as well as the employee, the physician, and the commission-
er in securing successful return to work for the claimant.3 "
assigned qualified rehabilitation professional a statement describing the available
work in terms that will enable the physician to relate the physical activities of the
job to the employee's disability . . The physician shall then advise the assigned
qualified rehabilitation professional as to whether the employee is physically capa-
ble of performing the work described. The employee may consent to undertake the
job without the consent of his or her treating physician. Should the available work
described, once undertaken by the employee, impede his or her recovery to the
extent that he or she should not continue to work, the employee's temporary total
disability payments shall be resumed .... If the injured employee is released
from said work and the commissioner determines that the work thereafter came to
an end before the employee's recovery is sufficient in the judgment of the com-
missioner to permit him or her to return to his or her usual job or to perform
other available work, the employee's temporary total disability benefits shall be re-
sumed . . . . Once the employee returns to work under the terms of this subsec-
tion, he or she shall not be assigned by the employer to work oiier than the work
described to the physician without the employee's written consent, or without prior
review and approval by his or her physician.
§ 23-4-9(m), H.B. 4691, supra note 352. The proposal also included substantial incentives
for the employee to participate: failure to cooperate in the initial assessment and develop-
ment of a rehabilitation plan (without good cause) would result in suspension of temporary
total disability benefits (§ 23-4-9(p)(1)); refusal to cooperate in the provision of rehabilita-
tion services "shall be admissible in any proceeding involving an application for permanent
total disability benefits" (§ 23-4-9(p)(2)). If the employer failed to offer the employee suit-
able gainful employment, "such failure to offer suitable employment" would also be admissi-
ble in these proceedings. § 23 -4-9 (p)(3), H.B. 4691, supra note 352.
361. §§ 23-4-9(b)(3) & (4), 23-4-9(s), H.B. 4691, supra note 352.
362. Now codified at W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9(d) (Supp. 1992).
363. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9(a) (Supp. 1992).
364. Id
434
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The revised rehabilitation provisions of the statute require that
workers who sustain an injury "likely to result in temporary disability
in excess of one hundred twenty days" be evaluated for rehabilitation
services.365 A personal rehabilitation plan must be developed for all
claimants who might benefit from the provision of services, including
"vocational or on-the-job training, counseling, assistance in obtaining
appropriate temporary or permanent work site, work duties or work
hours modification."' 66 Eligibility for temporary total disability bene-
fits continues as long as a claimant is receiving rehabilitation services
and not working.367 But claimants who return to work, while receiv-
ing rehabilitation services, at a job in which the earnings were less
than their pre-injury earnings would be eligible for a new "temporary
partial rehabilitation benefit." 368 This new benefit would guarantee
365. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9(b) (Supp. 1992).
366. l
367. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9(c) (Supp. 1992). This is true even if the claimant has
exceeded the limit of 208 weeks which is the usual maximum duration for temporary total
benefits. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(c) (Supp. 1992). Note that this does not represent a
change from prior law.
368. This benefit would be calculated as follows:
In every case in which the claimant returns to gainful employment as part of a
rehabilitation plan, and the employee's average weekly wage earnings are less than
the average weekly wage earnings earned by the injured employee at the time of
the injury, he or she shall receive temporary partial rehabilitation benefits calculat-
ed as follows: The temporary partial rehabilitation benefit shall be seventy percent
of the difference between the average weekly wage earnings earned at the time of
the injury and the average weekly wage earnings earned at the new employment,
both to be calculated as provided in sections six, six-d and fourteen ... of this
article as such calculation is performed for temporary total disability benefits, sub-
ject to the following limitations: In no even shall such benefits be subject to the
minimum benefit amounts required by the provisions of subdivision (b), section
six ...of this article, nor shall such benefit exceed the temporary total disability
benefits to which the injured employee would be entitled pursuant to sections six,
six-d and fourteen of this article during any period of temporary total disability
resulting from the injury in the claim: Provided, That no temporary total disability
benefits shall be paid for any period for which the temporary partial rehabilitation
benefits are paid. The amount of, temporary partial rehabilitation benefits payable
under this subsection shall be reviewed every ninety days . . . .Temporary partial
rehabilitation benefits shall only be payable when the injured employee is receiving
vocational rehabilitation services in accordance with a rehabilitation plan developed
under this section.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9(d) (Supp. 1992).
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that claimants in this situation would receive in total income (wages
plus benefits) more than the amount of their temporary total disability
benefits, but no more than their pre-injury wage. The financial
disincentive for returning to a lower wage job, ,at least on a transition-
al basis as part of rehabilitation efforts, would therefore be eliminated.
In lieu of the other specific provisions contained in the originally
proposed bill, the final legislation required the commissioner to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations no later than July 1, 1991 "for the pur-
pose of developing a comprehensive rehabilitation program which will
assist injured workers to return to suitable gainful employment after an
injury." 369
(c) Expansion of Prohibitions on Discriminatory
Practices
The Advisory Board also concluded that injured workers received,
under then existing law, inadequate protection in terms of longitudinal
guarantees for continued employment after an injury. The particular
focus of concern was the injured employee who recuperated fully but
still could not return to employment. The Board unanimously felt that
employees should not be discharged or forced out of employment as a
direct result of sustaining an injury at work.37°
At its meetings, the Board explicitly discussed the holding in Yoho
v. Triangle PWC, Inc. 371 To the extent that Yoho endorsed the use of
neutral absence control policies in order to terminate employees who
missed work as a result of work-related injuries, it was the hope of
the Advisory Board to overrule the case by recommending statutory
369. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9(e) (Supp. 1992): "Such legislative rules shall provide
definitions for rehabilitation facilities and rehabilitation services pursuant to this section." lad
As of Feb. 1, 1993, these rules had not yet been issued.
370. For a fuller discussion of discriminatory practices provisions in state workers'
compensation laws, see, Rothstein, supra note 283. Bryan Cokeley discussed the Rothstein
proposal at length in comparison to West Virginia's 1990 statutory amendments. Bryan R.
Cokeley, West lirginia's New Workers' Compensation Anti-Discrimination Provision, 94 W.
VA. L. REV. 725, 748-57 (1992) (concluding that the West Virginia statute is poorly and
ambiguously drafted and arguing that Rothstein's model act is both less ambiguous and
more comprehensive in scope).
371. 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
[Vol. 95:333
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revisions.371 The Board also discussed, at substantial length, what
should happen to employees who recover from their injuries and want
to return to work. The critical question was, not surprisingly, whether
the employer should be required to reinstate the injured employee if
the job had been filled during his or her absence.
The Board finally proposed a two-tier approach based upon em-
ployer size. Employers with more than fifteen employees37 3 would be
required to reinstate employees who were capable of returning to their
pre-injury job, with two exceptions. First, if the job had been filled
"and at the time the injured worker is released to return to work the
replacement worker has actively worked more time in that job than the
injured worker had worked prior to the injury," then the injured work-
er would be entitled to preference in hiring; that is, s/he could not
"bump" the replacement worker out of the job.374 Second, if the in-
372. The Board in its report therefore recommended that the statute be amended "to
restrict the ability of an employer to discharge an employee while he or she is collecting
[temporary total disability] benefits." ADVISORY BOARD REPORT, supra note 336, at 10.
373. Id There is often discussion about the dominance of small business in the West
Virginia economy. Available data shows the following distribution in private sector employ-
ment in West Virginia:
Size Number Number
(by number of employees) of Finns of Employees
0 5,393 0
1-9 22,229 74,477
10-19 3,622 48,661
20-49 2,344 70,659
50-99 724 49,653
100-1000+ 690 229,023
Data for Mar. 1991 from Labor and Economic Research, Division of Employment Security,
W. Va. Bureau of Employment Programs (unpublished) (on file with author). If there were
an even distribution of employees working in firms with between 10 and 15 and between
16 and 19, then approximately 21% of workers (but 84% of firms) would fall in the 15
and under category. Id
374. ADVISORY BOARD REPORT, supra note 336, at 10; § 23-5A-3(c)(1), HB. 4691,
supra note 352.
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jured employee was offered an appropriate job, including a light duty
job, which s/he was capable of performing, and refused the job, "the
employer's obligation to reinstate the individual shall cease."375
The employees of smaller employers (with fewer than 15 employ-
ees) would also be protected from discharge while collecting temporary
total disability benefits but would only be entitled to reemployment
when able to return to the pre-injury job if the job had not been filled
in the interim. If the job was filled, however, the injured employee
would not have rights to "bump" the new employee; instead, s/he
would "be given preference in hiring when a vacancy occurs. 3 76
The draft of the proposed legislation, which was developed by the
commissioner's staff with assistance from claimant and management
attorneys, attempted to codify the language of the Board. 377 It went
somewhat beyond the Board's proposal, however. Discussions during
the drafting resulted in concerns about collisions between these new
rights and those that might accrue to other employees, particularly
under judicial orders involving discriminatory practices of the particular
employer or under job allocation provisions contained in the seniority
clauses of collective bargaining agreements. Out of these discussions
came an added proviso, shielding employers when they refused em-
ployment to workers based upon the seniority provisions of collective
bargaining agreements.378
The Board's, and therefore the Administration's, proposal to pro-
vide job security to work-injured employees was a lightning rod for
opposition after the bill was introduced in the legislature on February
19, 1990. The final compromise regarding this particular section was
not struck until the last day of the regular legislative session. Discus-
sions on that day focused on finding a compromise between the labor
375. § 23-5A-3(d), H.B. 4691, supra note 352.
376. § 23-5A-3(c)(1), H.B. 4691, supra note 352.
377. The drafting process was undertaken with assistance from attorneys from firms
which represented both employers and claimants. Unfortunately, none of these attorneys dis-
covered the existence of Rothstein's article, supra note 283. This is a minor illustration of
the disconnection between academic writing and policy makers. In fact, Rothstein's proposal
has not (to my lmowledge) been introduced in any jurisdiction.
378. The proposed language was slightly modified and codified at W. VA. CODE § 23-
5A-3(c) (Supp. 1992).
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view that all employees should be guaranteed reemployment after an
injury and business' view that no additional statutory protection should
be extended to workers who were off work due to occupational inju-
ries. Business lobbyists argued that any guarantee of reemployment
would merely encourage injured workers to stay off work longer; their
assumption was that anyone given the opportunity to stay off work
would do so.
379
. The final compromise on this issue fell far short of the Advisory
Board's recommendation. It came even less close to meeting labor's
demand for guaranteed reemployment after an occupational injury.8 0
The new statutory language, effective July 1, 1990, makes it a discrim-
inatory practice to terminate an injured employee while that employee
is off work due to a compensable injury and is receiving or eligible to
receive temporary total disability benefits. As the initial bill (although
not the Advisory Board recommendations) suggested, terminations
would be subject to the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement and to arbitration decisions made pursuant to those provi-
sions. 31 Thus, Elizabeth Yoho herself, who was terminated as a re-
sult of the seniority provisions in her labor agreement, would not have
benefitted from the new legislation. The decision in her case had gone
much farther, however, by holding that West Virginia had no public
policy in favor of continued employment of work-injured individuals;
379. In the coal industry, in which on average workers receive only 48% of their wag-
es as benefits, it seems unlikely that workers would seek to increase the length of their
temporary benefits, at least for economic reasons. Nevertheless, coal operators took this
position during legislative discussions.
380. Rothstein's proposal, supra note 283, came much closer to the position advanced
by labor, by guaranteeing reemployment for one year and providing reemployment rights
both to fully recuperated workers and to those with permanent disabilities. In conversations
with me during the negotiation process which surrounded this legislation, industry representa-
tives characterized the elimination of the "bumping" provision as a major concession from
labor.
381. One suspects, upon reading the history of the bill, that this provision was initially
included in the legislation to address concerns regarding job allocation that arose from the
"bumping" provisions in the proposed legislation. In view of the fact that the final legisla-
tion affords replaced employees only the right to preferential reemployment, the language
protecting seniority rights under collective bargaining agreements has less importance. It
appears, on its face, however, to protect terminations which are made pursuant to seniority
provisions.
1992-93] 439
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the decision had invited wholesale development of "neutral" absence
control policies outside the seniority provisions of contracts. To the
extent that Yoho was the articulation of the public policy of the state
regarding the general application of neutral absence control policies to
work-injured people, it was without question the intent of the legisla-
ture to overrule it.
Yoho invited the development of "neutral" absence control policies
by employers which would allow the discharge of employees who
were injured. Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision3 2  rejected the
discriminatory use of such policies. The new statutory language broad-
ens the obligation of employers' to temporarily disabled workers. It
states that an employee simply may not be terminated while absent,
irrespective of the length of the absence and irrespective of the motive
of the employer, while s/he is off work and collecting, or eligible to
collect, temporary total disability benefits, unless s/he commits a "sepa-
rate dischargeable offense" (an act justifying discharge which is unre-
lated to the occupational injury and resulting absence).83
The deference to the seniority provisions in collective bargaining
agreements related directly to the concern regarding rules in particular
work places which govern the allocation of jobs.3 " There was no
382. 403 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1991).
383. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3(a) (Supp. 1992). In his commentary, Cokeley correctly
characterized the intent of this provision: "[It would appear that the intent was to erect
prophylactic barriers with respect to the workers' compensation-related absence. Evidently
fearful that employers might use violation of work rules as a pretext to discrimination
against those filing for workers' compensation benefits, the drafters just simply put those
considerations out of bounds." Cokeley, supra note 370, at 781-82. The intent was to focus
on absence itself as reason for discharge; therefore the statutory definition of separate of-
fense "shall not include absence resulting from the injury or from the inclusion or aggre-
gation of absence due to the injury with any other absence from work." W. VA. CODE
§ 23-5A-3(a) (Supp. 1992). In refusing to apply this new provision retroactively, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals recently characterized this section as conferring a substantial right
on an injured employee" that "is not purely procedural or remedial in nature." Pannell v.
Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 643, 646 (W. Va. 1992).
384. This concern echoed the judicially expressed concerns which emerged in Yoho v.
Triangle PWC, Inc. 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985), and cases under the Human Rights Act,
including Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154 (W.
Va. 1988), and Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988),
about the allocation of jobs if injured workers are placed ahead of others in the workplace.
[Vol. 95:333
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intention expressed, by any of the legislators, to 'extend this deference
to other provisions of labor agreements. Discussions in legislative
committees specifically mentioned and acknowledged that the practice
in the unionized coal industry of discharging people when off work
would have to cease under this new statutory provision.385 As is the
case under other state minimum standards legislation, the statutory
rights establish a floor of protection for all workers, irrespective of
their unionized status,"' except when seniority provisions in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement justify discharge.
The amendments also required employers to reinstate workers who
had been absent due to an occupational injury to the pre-injury job if
"the position is available and the employee is not disabled from per-
forming the duties of such position., 38 7 The amendments fell far
short of the Advisory Board proposal, however; employees of large
enterprises would not have the right to "bump" replacement workers in
order to obtain reinstatement. If the job had been filled, the injured
employee "shall be reinstated to another comparable position which is
available and which the employee is capable of performing."388 If no
385. In the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, the Attendance Control provi-
sion allows the employer to implement an attendance control policy. This provision is in-
cluded in Article XXII (Miscellaneous Provisions) and is unrelated to seniority provisions
(contained in Article XVII). Absence control plans under this agreement, although sanctioned
by the collective bargaining agreement, would not allow a defense to a discharge for ab-
sence related to workers' compensation claims, irrespective of their facial neutrality, under
the new statutory provision.
386. For example, provisions of the Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to
-19 (1990 & Supp. 1992), and provisions of the Wage Payment Collection Act, W. VA.
CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -18 (1989 & Supp. 1992), will govern, irrespective of the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement; see also Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W.
Va. 1985) (action alleging retaliatory discharge under state workers' compensation discrimi-
natory practices provision not preempted under federal labor law); Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (civil action for retaliatory discharge alleging dis-
crimination on basis of workers' compensation filing held not preempted under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)).
387. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3(b) (Supp. 1992).
388. Comparable work is defined as follows:
A comparable position for the purposes of this section shall mean a position which
is comparable as to wages, working conditions, and, to the extent reasonably prac-
ticable, duties to the position held at the time of injury. A written statement from
a duly licensed physician that the physician approves the injured employee's return
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job is available at the time the employee seeks reinstatement, s/he is
provided a right of "preferential recall" to a "comparable" position for
a period of one year.3 9 Again, seniority provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement would, if applicable, provide the employer with a
defense to an action brought by an employee who was not reinstat-
ed.390
2. 1990-1993: Implementing the 1990 Return to
Work Amendments
These three "return to work" amendments to the statute had their
roots in the view of the members of the Advisory Board that workers
who are injured on the job would, in general, prefer to continue work-
ing. The Board specifically sought to eliminate barriers or
disincentives which encourage workers to remain on compensation
benefits for longer periods of time. The legislature, to a limited extent,
accepted this view.
The administration of the Workers' Compensation Fund also en-
dorsed the idea that refocusing on the employment possibilities for
injured workers would promote the interests of the Fund, as well as of
injured workers and employers. Had this actually occurred, it would
have been a remarkable transformation for a system that had previous-
ly focused on paying claims, not managing them.39' But it has not
occurred.
Elements of the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation
Act unrelated to these return to work provisions required extensive
administrative overhaul of the agency;" the energies of the manag-
to his or her regular employment shall be prima facie evidence that the worker is
able to perform such duties.
W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3(b) (Supp. 1992).
389. Id The employee must provide to the employer a current mailing address during
this one year period.
390. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3(c) (Supp. 1992).
391. ADVISORY BOARD REPORT, supra note 336, at 13.
392. In particular, under the new Administrative Law Judge system, the adjudicative
functions of the agency were to be split: if an initial decision on a claim was disputed, the
post-hearing decision would no longer be made by the commissioner. In addition, massive
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ers of the Fund are primarily devoted to these efforts. At the same
time, the new statutory provisions for trial return to work and expand-
ed vocational rehabilitation required administrative changes for imple-
mentation. The agency has apparently been unable to make these es-
sential changes.
No communication has been sent to physicians, employers, or
claimants regarding either the trial return to work or the new partial
benefit provisions of the law . 93 Although reforms are contemplated,
no change has been made in the administrative provision of rehabilita-
tion services: claims are not evaluated more aggressively for earlier
intervention and rehabilitation services have not been expanded in
order to ensure that claimants with potentially lengthy claims are as-
sisted in combatting their disability. In fact, as late as April 1991, the
supervisor of rehabilitation services was still unaware that partial bene-
fits had become available as of July 1, 1990, in order to encourage
claimants to engage in transitional work.394
As of February 1, 1993, the commissioner had not yet issued a
final rule governing rehabilitation, despite the statutory deadline of
July 1, 1991 for the final promulgation of this rule. The proposed
rule,395 which was circulated in 1991, raised several highly controver-
sial issues, which undoubtedly have contributed to the delay in the
development of a final version. For example, the rule proposed that
"the failure of either the injured worker or the employer to fully par-
ticipate and fully cooperate shall be a factor to be considered in deter-
mining the amount of any permanent partial or permanent total dis-
administrative improvements were already underway. The new commissioner and his staff
have focused on these major administrative overhauls.
393. Interview with Wilbur Yahnke, Legal Assistant to Patrick Maroney who provides
legal assistance to AFL-CIO members on workers' compensation claims (Sept. 28, 1992).
394. In reviewing the claims in which temporary partial rehabilitation benefits were
ordered, see infra note 408, I came across this notation: "Temporary partial benefits have
not been and will not be implemented until July 1, 1991 . . . . I reviewed this matter
again and discussed it with John Farley [Division Director]. I am still convinced these bene-
fits are not yet payable." Notation by Steve White, rehabilitation supervisor, claim no.
900027787 (Mar. 22, 1991).
395. Vocational and Physical Rehabilitation Regulations, 85 W. Va. C.S.R. series 13
(draft rules). This proposal was circulated but has not been filed with the Office of the
Secretary of State and therefore has not been promulgated as a proposed or emergency rule.
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ability to which the injured worker might otherwise be entitled."3'
The use of rehabilitation as a stick, rather than a carrot has been wide-
ly litigated397 and was the target of comments submitted by both
business 9s and labor.
399
The proposed rule does appear to have been designed to assist in
the reemployment of injured workers. In addition to threatening liti-
gants with consideration of their level of cooperation when a
claimant's application for benefits was considered, it also proposed to
establish strict time limits for evaluation of injured claimants in order
to promote early intervention and rehabilitation efforts in claims which
were likely to result in lengthy periods or substantial permanent dis-
ability. °' Moreover, the proposed rule ventured into the rather murky
396. 85 W. Va. 13 C.S.R. § 2.3. (draft rule) This language was taken from the origi-
nal legislative proposal regarding rehabilitation. § 23-4-9, H.B. 4691, supra note 352.
397. 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 61.24, at 10-1027 to 10-
1038 (1992).
398. Comments submitted on behalf of the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce and
the West Virginia Self Insurers' Association by Employers' Service Corporation, signed by
Pamela M. Mowry, Director, Workers' "Compensation for Employers' Service Corporation (on
file with author). These comments proposed deletion of this language and insertion of alter-
native language:
In the event that the injured worker refuses or fails to participate in rehabilitation
services in accordance with the plan, or refuses or fails to cooperate fully, such
failure shall be a factor considered in determining the injured worker's entitlement
to a permanent total disability award or the amount of a permanent partial disabili-
ty award.
l This proposal would eliminate any consideration of an employer's failure to cooperate in
the assessment of the workers permanent disability claim.
399. Comments submitted on behalf of the United Mineworkers' of America by Grant
Crandall, Esq. (June 7, 1991) (on file with author) also expressed concern about the possi-
ble effects of failure to cooperate: "While the [proposed] rule is styled as requiring partici-
pation on both sides, it is likely to lead much more often to reduction in awards (due to
worker failure, or claimed failure, to cooperate fully) than to increase in awards (as a result
of employer failure to cooperate)." Id .
400. In every claim which was likely to result in either a permanent disability or a
temporary disability of greater than 120 days, the commissioner was to have the injured
worker evaluated for the delivery of rehabilitation services. 85 W. Va. C.S.R. 13 § 6.1
(draft rule). This evaluation was to be completed within 45 days of "the commissioner's re-
ceiving of evidence that an injured worker is reasonably suspected to have sustained a per-
manent disability or . . . of the commissioner's receiving evidence that an injured worker
has sustained an injury likely to result in temporary disability in excess of 120 days" 85
W. Va. C.S.R. 13 § 6.2 (draft rule) so that rehabilitation service could begin promptly.
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waters of the relationship of rehabilitation in workers' compensation
programs to disability discrimination law, acknowledging the potential
impact of the ADA on return to work programs. After quoting from
the purposes of the ADA, 4° the proposed rule stated:
It is the view of the commissioner that this federal act directly impacts
upon these rules and the Workers' Compensation Fund's vocational reha-
bilitation programs. The federal act prohibits discrimination in employment
against injured workers by their employers, other employers, and by the
Workers' Compensation Fund itself in the administration of the laws en-
trusted to it. Hence, the new federal law is consistent with and adds to the
obligation imposed upon employers by West Virginia Code, § 23-4-9, in
accepting previously injured workers for return to work and for new em-
ployment.'
This proposed, though somewhat vague, relationship between
employers' obligations and claimants' rights under the ADA and in the
compensation system was not welcomed by business representa-
tives.4°3 The incorporation of ADA standards with the rehabilitation
rules as proposed might, in fact, substantially change employers' incen-
tives. The proposal would, in essence, extend ADA requirements to all
cases involving on-the-job injuries, irrespective of the size of the em-
ployer or number of employees; in contrast, the ADA only governs
employers with 25 employees (effective July 26, 1992) and 15 employ-
ees (effective July 26, 1994).404 Although this extension would obvi-
ously not affect an employer's liability under the ADA, the employer's
These time limits mirror the language in the initially proposed legislation. H.B. 4691, supra
note 352. As noted previously, almost 90% of claimants return to work within 120 days of
injury. See supra note 360.
401. Two of the stated purposes of the ADA are "to provide a clear and comprehen-
sive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties" and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1990).
402. 85 W. Va. C.S.R. 13 § 2.2 (draft rule).
403. Comments submitted on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce suggested deletion
of the quoted language, suggesting that it "will place employers in a potential conflict with
the federal statute and regulations." Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 398.
404. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). Approximately 30% of employees in
West Virginia would not be covered under the current ADA provision; approximately 21%
will not be covered when covered employer size drops to 15 employees. See supra note
373.
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willingness to comply with the ADA would be a factor in the evalua-
tion of the claimant for workers' compensation benefits.')
However, despite the proposal of the new rule in April 1991, the
administrative handling of rehabilitation and transitional work has
apparently changed very little in the years since the 1990 amendments
became effective. In practice, the administrative functioning of the
Workers' Compensation Fund continues to reflect an unwillingness to
vest injured workers with any claim for continued employment. Al-
though agency representatives say that the proposed rules are guiding
their rehabilitation work until the final rules are issued, there is insuffi-
cient staff to review claims within proposed time limits." 6 As a re-
sult of the failure to adopt the aggressive program contemplated in the
statute, Fund employees can only recall two instances in which claim-
ants have returned to work on a trial basis under the statutory provi-
sions; apparently, no records at all are kept of claimants who seek or
obtain trial return to work periods. 4 7
Only seven claimants have received temporary partial rehabilitation
benefits.40 These seven cases in which claimants have returned to
transitional jobs are particularly revealing of the current administrative
approach to rehabilitation of injured workers. The proposed time limits
for performance of rehabilitation evaluations were met in only one
c ase in which a severe head injury necessitated medical rehabilitation
efforts.4° In all of these cases, although the claimants were referred
405. Assuming of course that the proposed language making employer cooperation a
factor in the granting of permanent benefits is retained. See supra note 396 and accompany-
ing text.
406. The only clear utilization of the draft rule is in setting a maximum time limit for
temporary partial rehabilitation benefits at 104 weeks, a limitation which is not included in
the statute but is included in the current draft rule.
407. However, Wilbur Yahnke reports that "about 50" AFL-CIO members have returned
to work on this basis. To his knowledge, all but one remained at work; the final remaining
person returned to temporary disability status for a brief period and then again returned to
work, this time permanently. Interview with Wilbur Yahnke, supra note 393.
408. This is the total number of claims in which benefits pursuant to W. VA. CODE
§ 23-4-9(d) were awarded through Sept. 1, 1992. Claim files of these seven claims were
provided to me, with all identifying information deleted. The discussion of these cases is
based upon review of these files.
409. In four of these cases, referral to rehabilitation services occurred over one year
[Vol. 95:333
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for rehabilitation services, the claimants appear to have made their own
arrangements to return to work through direct discussions with their
employers or, in one case, through the claimant's own successful ef-
forts to secure a position in an apprenticeship program. The rehabilita-
tion specialists who worked with the claimants were unfamiliar with
the amendments to the statute in 1990 and had not been informed
about the availability of the partial benefit to encourage the claimant to
accept transitional work.41°
These claim files are devoid of any indication that rehabilitation
specialists are using the availability of partial benefits as a tool to
encourage claimants' return to work. In fact, in every one of these
cases the claimants themselves, after securing the transitional work
made a request for the benefits.4" In every case, award of the bene-
fits occurred long after the claimants' return to work; in two cases, the
claimants contacted the Governor's office for assistance after being
unable to obtain the partial benefits through normal procedures.
after the date of injury; except in the head injury case, no claimant was even referred for
evaluation in less than seven months.
410. See supra note 394.
411. In one case, the employer pleaded for something to be done when an employee
agreed to return to work on a part-time basis:
On October 9, 1991, Mrs. A was released by her doctor to return to work
part time. The part time schedule not to exceed three hours per day.
On October 28, 1991, the doctor approved increasing the part time work
schedule for Mrs. A to five hours per day, her current schedule.
It is my understanding that, according to current regulation, the disability
benefit wages ceases once a person returns to work, either on a part time or full
time basis.
In the case of Mrs. A, she was a full time employee at the time her disabil-
ity began and, through her initiative and progress, was able to return to work,
albeit on a part time basis.
In my judgement, Mrs. A should not be penalized by the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund for returning to part time work, nor should anyone else who is not
abusing their benefits.
By not permitting a person to return to part time and/or light duty as soon
as medically practical, causes melingering [sic] on the part of some persons or can
cause slower recovery due to inactivity.
Letter from employer's Vice-President, Human Relations (name of writer deleted from file)
to Workers' Compensation Fund (Nov. 19, 1991).
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Moreover, even after the benefits have been awarded, they are not
used in a manner consistent with the legislative findings. In each of
these cases, the order awarding partial benefits limited duration of the
benefits to twenty-four months. Apparently, this limitation was drawn
from the proposed rules;412 there is no such limitation in the statuto-
ry language.413 More importantly, rehabilitation counseling services
were terminated while the claimants were pursuing their transitional
work programs and receiving partial benefits. The intent underlying the
creation of these benefits was to have them be part of a general reha-
bilitation effort to return the claimant to work as quickly and safely as
possible. The initially proposed legislation was designed to provide
continuing protection to injured workers when they returned to work
under a rehabilitation plan.4"4 Unlike a full return to pre-injury work,
the very nature of transitional work leaves open the possibility that the
claimant will be unable to continue to perform it; when claimants re-
turn to light duty or other transitional work they often express concern
that they will be assigned to duties that they are not, or not yet, capa-
ble of performing. In several of these cases, the rehabilitation specialist
assigned to the claim observed that there was a concern that the claim-
ant was not capable of performing some or all of the tasks assigned.
Nevertheless, rehabilitation services were terminated by the Fund be-
cause the claimant had returned to work, while the partial benefits
continued to be paid.
In an attempt to ensure that claimants obtain appropriate and cost
effective medical services, the Fund has now entered into a contract
with a private vendor to monitor the provision of medical and rehabili-
tative services.41 The contract calls for medical and rehabilitation
management and will require the vendor to contact claimants regularly
412. "The duration of any rehabilitation plan shall not exceed 104 weeks." 85 W. Va.
C.S.R 13 § 7.2 (draft rule).
413. The final statutory language makes no reference to time limits. The initially pro-
posed legislation limited normal rehabilitation plans to 208 weeks. § 23-4-9, H.B. 4691,
supra note 352.
414. See supra note 360.
415. Workers' Compensation Cost Management Services Agreement entered into be-
tween HCX, Inc. and West Virginia Workers' Compensation Division (Dec. 16, 1991).
[Vol. 95:333
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416to check on their progress. In the past, the failure of the Fund to
maintain communication with claimants has been a source of com-
plaints, may increase the feelings of isolation of the claimant and,
according to some, has led to increased periods of disability.417 The
commissioner sees this contract as an important mechanism for assist-
ing claimants to recover from injuries and return to work4 1 ' This ap-
proach is motivated by the need for cost and quality management of
the medical services provided to claimants. 419 The rehabilitation com-
ponent of the contract has not yet been implemented. In fact, claimants
may, as a result of increased monitoring and improved medical care,
return to work earlier. There is not, however, any evidence of this yet.
This contract is not a replacement for the direct provision of reha-
bilitation counseling, monitoring, and services. These services require a
case management approach which identifies the claimant as a worker
in need of assistance. Instead, the Fund continues to treat claimants as
insurance beneficiaries only. The administrative failure to implement
the 1990 statutory amendments is symptomatic of this view. Critics of
the amendments believe that injured workers are unlikely to want to
continue working. They will undoubtedly point to the apparent lack of
interest in the expanded return to work options as additional evidence
of the intransigence of intentional idleness. Instead, it is more likely
that the failure of the amendments is the result of a deeply rooted
problem: the historical, administrative, and judicial view that injured
workers are legally entitled to monetary benefits, not to work.
416. d
417. In West Virginia, there is only anecdotal evidence regarding this point. This phe-
nomenon is, however, also noted in the rehabilitation literature. See GARDNER, VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 302, at 57-58.
418." Interview with Andrew N. Richardson, Commissioner of Employment Programs
(May 14, 1992).
419. Quality and cost control of medical treatment of claimants is sorely needed. Anec-
dotal stories of excessive or inappropriate treatment abound; these stories are told by both
claimants and employers. The rising cost of medical care to the Fund, which reflects nation-
al trends and now exceeds $70 million per year, is also cause for some concern. See supra
note 113.
1992-931
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IV. DISCUSSION: FrrTING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
There appears to be a growing consensus that the fiscal problems
facing the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund will necessitate
significant reform of this social insurance program within the next few
years. In addressing these problems, it is essential to remember the
particular economic and political conditions which gave rise to them.
First, from 1985 to 1990 the workers' compensation program was seri-
ously underfunded. The policy of reducing and freezing premium rates
may have been adopted thoughtlessly, recklessly, or maliciously. In
any event, it resulted in a situation in which there are now inadequate
reserves to fund existing liabilities. The concurrent economic downturn,
with a continuing loss of employment in the coal mining sector, leaves
current workers and employers financially responsible for this previous-
ly incurred debt.
Second, the economic downturn in coal mining and manufacturing
continues to haunt us in the form of new and expensive claims. Many
of these awards are made against employers who are no longer in
business (at least on the books of the Fund). Again, current workers
and employers become financially responsible for these claims which
represent debt from the past.
Third, we continue to have a system of compensation that allows
the persistence of excessive rates of occupational illness and disease
and which discourages workers who want to return to work. Currently,
judicial decisions and administrative functioning combine to make the
Workers' Compensation Fund the preferred remedy for occupationally
injured workers in West Virginia. Injured workers have historically
neither been guaranteed, nor do they necessarily expect, continued
employment after a serious injury.
Somewhat remarkably, despite these problems, the current costs of
this system to employers who subscribe to the Fund are not greater
than those in other states. Thus, the financial issues facing the Fund
derive from past underfunding and the persistence of second injury life
award claims; the programmatic issues derive primarily from current
procedures and awards.
450 [Vol. 95:333
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The West Virginia model of workers' compensation, which com-
bines adequate benefit levels, liberal eligibility criteria, and lack of
significant direct intervention in the employment relationship, solves
many social dilemmas: at least in theory, it keeps the courts out of job
allocation decisions and it guarantees compensation to injured workers.
But current programmatic design, by focusing on the award of benefits
and not on the prevention of injuries and the rehabilitation of injured
workers, undoubtedly contributes to the escalation of current costs.
This is, in part, an unintended consequence of the judicial choice to
apply liberal rules to the availability of benefits and more restrictive
rules to any intervention in the employment relationship itself.
Workers' compensation is an expensive social insurance program, par-
ticularly for industries with high morbidity and mortality rates associat-
ed with occupational hazards.420 This is not at all surprising: a pro-
gram which focuses first on the provision of benefits, and only sec-
ondarily (if at all) on the prevention or accommodation of disabilities,
is inevitably expensive. Moreover, the legal tolerance for allowing
disabled workers to be displaced from their jobs, even in healthy in-
dustries, encourages workers to maximize their income-replacement
opportunities from the program which was created precisely for that
purpose.42
1
The legal rules governing the rights of injured workers are irratio-
nal and confusing. Workers who want to work are simply not reward-
ed for their efforts. Workers who are denied employment as a result of
prior work-related injuries have often not been accorded protection
under the laws outlawing discrimination against the disabled. If work-
ers have not fully recovered from an injury, courts have been reluctant
to order reassignment or significant job restructuring. Risk of reinjury
provides justification for refusal to reemploy an injured workers. Until
420. For every $100 of payroll in FY 1991, employers classified as "underground coal
mining" had to pay (on average) $20.66 for workers' 'compensation; those classified as
"timbering" paid $26.40 per $100 of payroll. In sharp contrast, employers of predominantly
clerical employees paid $0.47 per $100 of payroll for workers' compensation coverage.
421. The best example of this is the case of Dorothy Coffman, who only sought bene-
fits after she was not accommodated in a job in a large health care institution. See
Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988).
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the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, provisions
which restricted retaliation for the filing of workers' compensation
cases were not interpreted to prohibit discharge of absent workers. The
1990 amendment does not guarantee reemployment unless a job is
vacant. Recovery and a desire to work are not rewarded, unless the
employer voluntarily chooses to provide work for the employee. The
result is a system which promotes disability rather than discouraging it.
The combination of past debt and current cost escalation which
today faces the Workers' Compensation Fund contributes to a belief
that workers' compensation costs are too high.422 There is an inevita-
ble political backlash to increasing costs and expanding definitions of
disability. The greater the political polarization and the higher the
costs, the more likely that the image of the worker as abuser of a
system designed to help the "truly needy" gains popular credibility.
Increasingly, business representatives charge that the beneficiaries of
the program seek benefits in order not to work423 or, at a minimum,
in place of working when work is no longer available. Workers are ac-
cused of seeking to expand the definitions of disability beyond their
intended reaches, of fabricating underlying injuries, of lying about the
work-relatedness of their injuries, or about the extent of the resulting
impairment; they are accused of wrongfully exploiting excessive judi-
cial liberalism. There is, thus, on one hand an image of malingering
workers and, on the other, a legal system which fails to support work-
ers who want to work.
In the political debates, the condemnation of workers and the
workers' compensation system often eclipses discussions about system-
ic change. There has been a complete failure to separate concerns
about past debt from concerns about future programmatic design. The
West Virginia program currently combines premium rates which appear
to be both competitive (on an interstate basis) and sound (on a pro-
421. The notion of excessive cost is, of course, a subjective and value-laden one.
Workers' compensation continues to be only a very small portion of the social insur-
ance/social welfare burden which is currently provided to people in this country through
their employment.
423. See supra note 91-92.
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spective basis) with increasing costs and a large unfunded liability. The
political and social challenge is clear: to design a program which is
reasonably fair to both employers and employees and which provides
sufficient financial stability to guarantee adequate benefits to future
injured workers. To do this, the Fund must achieve three objectives.
First, it must identify the potential mechanisms for achieving financial
stability. Second, it must separate the problems of the past from pro-
grammatic design needs of the future. Third, it must design solutions
which are specifically geared to solve real, not rhetorical, problems.
A. Mechanisms for Creating Financial Stability for the Workers'
Compensation Fund
There are, in the end, only three ways to bring a social insurance
program into financial balance. First, revenue can be increased. In-
creased revenue has the advantage of yielding an immediate return; un-
like changes in benefits, eligibility, or general program design, there is
no delay in the collection of revenue. On the other hand, increased
employer premium rates can cause some marginally profitable busi-
nesses to contract or close and inevitably create a major political back-
lash against worker's benefits.
Second, benefit levels can be lowered or eligibility criteria tighten-
ed.424 The impact of benefit reductions on the financial solvency of
the program is far more attenuated than that produced by revenue
increases. First, it can only be recognized as claims are denied, which
occurs over time rather than immediately. Second, unless the changes
are draconian in nature, they rarely yield considerable savings in the
short run.4 5 Decreasing eligibility for benefits may have a somewhat
424. This is the approach often taken now by employers in redesigning health insurance
packages. Since workers are not considered to have any vested right to future health insur-
ance protection, redesign of the available benefits allows employers to control their financial
commitment to provision of this benefit.
425. For example, a reduction in the cap on temporary total disability/permanent total
disability benefits would yield limited savings. Some argue, however, that a decreased week-
ly benefit level will result in lowered demand for benefits, resulting in greater savings than
simply the savings in the weekly benefit amount calculated with the same number of claim-
1992-931 453
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more significant impact on financial issues, particularly if eligibility for
high cost awards, which involve lifetime benefits, is restricted. Inevita-
bly, faced with the increasing number of permanent total disability
awards, business representatives in West Virginia have been pressing
for changes in eligibility standards in order to restrict the number of
awards in this category and to change the liberal presumptions in favor
of claimants for awards in all categories.426
In this context, it is however important to remember that eligibili-
ty rules always permit approval of some claims which are not meritori-
ous and exclude some that should have been approved. No social
insurance system is perfectly accurate; a certain number of claims
always occur in a "gray" area. To the extent that benefits are currently
paid to workers because they are, in fact, disabled as a result of occu-
pational injuries and illnesses, restriction of eligibility criteria will
exclude, at least to some extent, legitimate claimants from the system.
As eligibility criteria are tightened, both the number of excluded meri-
torious claims and the number of properly excluded claims grows. This
result can only be viewed as positive when the measure of success is
only the exclusion of nonmeritorious claims. If the measure of success
is the provision of benefits to workers with legitimate claims, then
eligibility changes which exclude meritorious claims increase the fail-
ure rate of the system.
The third mechanism for reducing costs and creating financial
stability is to modify the underlying tenets of the program, in order to
reduce demand. A major empirical study of Michigan employers con-
cluded that in-state variation in employer workers' compensation pre-
mium rates was greater than variations in rates from state to state. The
intrastate variation in rates correlated most significantly with enterprise-
specific management techniques. Enterprises which had workers' com-
pensation costs that were demonstrably lower than others had the fol-
ants drawing benefits for the same period of time. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
426. In particular, they seek to eliminate the Posey/Cardwell standards for permanent
total disability and to eliminate the "rule of liberality" as expressed in the Javins case.
Javins v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 320 S.E.2d 119 (W. Va. 1984).
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lowing characteristics: they instituted aggressive safety programs, main-
tained good labor-management relations, and made significant efforts at
rehabilitation and reemployment of injured workers.427 Large numbers
of employers have discovered that changes in management practices
yield considerable workers' compensation savings.428
There is no question that this strategy works. It yields future sav-
ings, not immediate financial savings, however.429 It is not, then, a
useful mechanism for addressing the immediate financial concerns of a
program. On the other hand, it lends itself well to a long term ap-
proach to cost containment. The primary question is whether and how
to institutionalize these strategies into the legal and administrative
427. HABECK Er AL., supra note 120. This report, funded by the W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research, was based upon empirical studies of Michigan employers and
was conducted in part in response to charges by employers that Michigan workers' com-
pensation costs were higher than those in neighboring states. The researchers determined that
intrastate variation in costs was far greater than interstate variations and that, therefore,
investigation of management practices within the state could yield guidance for greater cost
savings than would be yielded from interstate program comparisons. The study therefore
focused on factors which lie within the control of employers. Among its other conclusions,
it noted:
Low claims employers were found to have significantly less agreement with nega-
tive workers' compensation attitude statements than high claims employers. Low
claims employers report significantly less agreement with the specific attitude that
one reason for the high cost of workers' compensation in Michigan is that claims
are paid that would not be compensated in other states, suggesting that they may
be more cognizant of the importance of other factors potentially within their con-
trol.
Id. ch. V, at 11. For further exploration of this approach to cost containment in workers'
compensation, see WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES FOR LOWERING COSTS AND RE-
DUCING WORKERS' SUFFERING, supra note 1.
428. See, e.g., WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES FOR LOWERING COSTS AND
REDUCING WORKERS' SUFFERING, supra note 1. Safety Program at Mennen Cuts Claims
More than 90 Percent, 3 WORKERS' COMPENSATION REPORTER 169 (BNA 1992); R. Russell
Alexander, Workers' Compensation and the ADA, West Virginia Continuing Legal Education,
Sept. 4-5, 1992, at 60-63 (reporting on the success of prevention programs in reducing
workers' compensation costs).
429. Herschiel Sims, President of Employer Service Corp., Charleston, West Virginia,
observed that rehabilitation and safety efforts would be inadequate to turn around the serious
short term funding problems facing the Fund, but may be the "long term way to solve
some of the financial problems of the fund." Bob Geiger, Cost-Cutting Through Safety to
Be Stressed, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 9, 1989, at 1C, 3C.
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system in order to design a future system which limits both human
misery and cost.
B. Fitting the Solution to the Problem
4 3
It is a truism that political hysteria rarely breeds reasoned solu-
tions to social problems. The agglomeration of the problems facing the
workers' compensation program into a single financial catastrophe
breeds such hysteria and feeds the political views that blame injured
workers for excessive costs. A more careful approach-which
disaggregates the problems, seeks their sources, and then devises solu-
tions-would better serve both employers and employees.
1. Facing the Deficit
The deficit is not the result of either excessive demands made
upon the workers' compensation program by greedy workers or the
result of wilful nonpayment by most employers. The first task is to
segregate the deficit as an issue.431 This should be done both as a
matter of financial bookkeeping by the Fund and as a political matter.
To the extent that deficits need not be fully funded, it would be ap-
propriate to carry this deficit forward.432 The current economic status
of business and employment in West Virginia does not encourage the
levying of additional, harsh payroll contributions. To the extent that
experts feel that it must be funded, however, it should be done as a
separate surcharge on payroll with a distinct revenue base.
430. It is my intention to outline an approach to the solution of these problems, not to
provide a comprehensive reform proposal. As the prior administrator of the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund who had to raise premium rates in 1989, I understand both the administra-
tive and political complexities in instituting change.
431. Although somewhat more technical, this task must include segregation of the por-
tion of the deficit which is the result of past inadequate funding of the second injury fund
by otherwise self-insured employers. If this is not done, then smaller subscribing employers
will be forced to pay the deficit resulting from larger employer "dumping" of older disabled
employees.
432. The assessment of the size of the deficit that can reasonably be carried, in view
of the current transitional economic situation in the state, I leave to experts in economics
and actuarial sciences.
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The precise mechanism for this will, of course, be a political
compromise. In designing a payroll contribution surcharge, two diffi-
cult questions will have to be confronted. First, how can equity among
employers be achieved? The debt was incurred primarily because of
claims made against certain industries and because of large numbers of
permanent total disability awards, particularly involving self-insured
employers within certain industrial classifications. The repayment of
the debt may be distributed among industries in a manner proportional
to current payroll, to current risk, or to an industry's contribution to
the debt. A failure to make the surcharge responsive to the contribu-
tion to the debt of particular industries or self-insured employers with-
in certain industries will mean that some, particularly smaller, employ-
ers will be asked to repay a disproportionate share of the debt.433
Second, should employees be expected to contribute through a
separate payroll tax? Employers have frequently proposed that any
surcharge involving debt repayment should include an employee contri-
bution. As noted earlier in this Article, workers' compensation pro-
grams are unusual in that they generate direct monetary revenue ex-
clusively from employers. Most social insurance programs have been
built on joint contributions from both beneficiaries and employers. A
special payroll tax to fund the deficit could include both employer and
employee contributions. 434 In view of the fact that employees' wages
are currently not rising and that employees were not the beneficiaries
of the 1985 rate reduction argues against an employee payroll tax.
Nevertheless, these arguments may not, in the end, shield employees
from having to contribute to refunding attempts.
The advantages of establishing a separate payroll surcharge for any
essential refunding of the deficit should be obvious. First, this ap-
proach protects future beneficiaries of the program from bearing the
primary burden of the previously incurred debt. Second, it isolates the
433. Often smaller employers who subscribe to the Fund are poorly represented by
business organizations in the political process. Perhaps not surprisingly, large self-insured
employers tend to receive more vigorous representation.
434. A prior model for this exists: the unemployment insurance trust fund debt was
repaid using just such a shared funding mechanism. W. VA. CODE § 21A-5-10a (Supp.
1992). These assessments were statutorily terminated effective Apr. 1, 1990. Ia
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deficit as an economic and political issue. Third, it provides a time-
limited mechanism for addressing what currently appears to be an
overwhelming problem.
2. Confronting the Prevalence of Permanent Total Disability
The growing number of permanent total disability awards presents
several interrelated problems. First, a large number of these awards
have been made to workers who have been out of the workforce for a
substantial period of time. The companies for whom they worked are
often no longer in business. The prior contributions of employers, par-
ticularly self-insured employers, to the second injury fund have been
inadequate. While these workers now create an enormous drain on the
available workers' compensation resources, their employers cannot
contribute to the refunding of the program.
Second, these awards are most often being granted to workers who
have no reasonable likelihood of reentering the workforce. These are
workers who have been economically displaced by the combination of
their lack of education, their age, their limited experience in hard
manual labor jobs, and the loss of jobs in the coal and manufacturing
industries. Business groups now argue that the eligibility criteria for
these awards should be changed in order to exclude these workers
from the system. In fact, the eligibility criteria established by the West
Virginia Legislature and the Supreme Court of Appeals are not sub-
stantially deviant from those established in other states. The difference
in West Virginia is the disturbing level of displacement and dislocation
that was caused by the loss of jobs in these industries, the high level
of injury and disability associated with coal mining, and the historical
failure of the state to provide adequate education and training to these
workers. The current problem, obviously, is that the workers' compen-
sation system is being asked to assume the costs of these past failures.
The solutions to this problem cannot be drawn from a future rede-
sign of the relationships of work and injured workers. The older work-
ers who have been receiving these awards are, for the most part, un-
likely candidates for successful rehabilitation. They live in areas of the
state in which little economic development is occurring. Although they
clearly meet the definitions which would entitle them to protection
458 [Vol. 95:333
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under the disability discrimination laws,435 they have limited ability
to perform work of a different nature. It would be inconsistent both
with preexisting law and with their life situations, including their age,
to expect them to relocate.
There are therefore only two alternatives: raise revenue to cover
the costs of these awards or change the structure of benefits. At a
minimum, rates paid by employers for second injury fund coverage
must be raised to adequate levels.436 Eligibility for these benefits,
and the nature of the benefits themselves, calls for wider discussion: to
what extent are these wages intended to be replacement for lost wages
and to what extent are they intended to compensate for the loss of
whole life functioning? 437 To what extent should workers who have
retired at normal retirement age, with full retirement benefits, be enti-
tled to these benefits? 438 To what extent should these benefits be re-
duced or eliminated once the disabled worker reaches retirement age,
assuming that his or her pension and other retirement benefits are fully
funded? 439 Should the right to apply for these benefits hinge upon
the ability of a worker who is no longer in the workforce to reopen an
435. As articulated in Teets v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 421 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va.
1992), and the rules under the ADA. See supra notes 211-14.
436. Since 1991, employers have a financial disincentive for utilizing the second injury
fund, because their rates for this coverage will be experience-based. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-9
(Supp. 1992). Aggregate disincentives for dumping older disabled workers should come from
charging adequate rates for this coverage, as well. This will, unfortunately, decrease the
ability of second injury fund coverage to encourage employment of disabled workers. Of
course, there is some question as to whether this purpose of the fund was ever served. See
supra note 62.
437. As discussed supra note 59-79 and accompanying text, permanent total disability
benefits under the West Virginia system are a hybrid of wage replacement and general com-
pensation benefits. To the extent that the benefits are intended to replace wages, they
should be reduced by any wages which are earned by the worker. Moreover, any worker
who has attained retirement age without loss of income would, under this analysis, not be
entitled to the wage replacement component of these benefits. Adjustments to the reduction
of benefits after retirement should take into account the loss of retirement income resulting
from a worklife shortened by occupational disability.
438. These workers might arguably be entitled to the portion of benefits which is not
based upon wage replacement.
439. This requires an analysis of the situation of workers whose work lives are short-
ened and their retirement benefits thereby reduced as a result of occupationally-induced
disability.
1992-931
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old workers' compensation claim or to file a new claim based upon a
newly discovered disability? 4 ° If not, who should be eligible to file
for these benefits? Should eligibility for these benefits be guaranteed
when a worker becomes eighty-five percent disabled?441 Should the
availability of rehabilitation and a suitable job affect the eligibility of a
worker for permanent total disability benefits?442 Should the failure
of an employer to provide a job, despite obligations under the disabili-
ty discrimination laws, be evidence that the worker is totally dis-
abled?443
Consideration of these questions will assist in designing a solution
to the cost of permanent disability awards that does not punish older
disabled and displaced workers. Any approach that would eliminate
entirely the availability of life awards to these workers would be trou-
bling. The problem with the awarding of these benefits is not that
people wrongfully seek them.4' The problem is that we failed to
charge adequate rates to cover the costs of these awards and failed to
anticipate fully the costs of economic restructuring.
3. Redesigning the System for the Future
The third, and ultimately the most important challenge, is to de-
sign a system of workers' compensation that provides- adequate benefits
440. As currently functioning, workers who can reopen an occupational pneumoconiosis
claim or open a new noise-induced hearing loss claim are able to then file for permanent
total disability benefits; 10% of permanent total disability awards are the result of the filing
of claims for compensable hearing loss. Finger & Briscoe, supra note 27. Workers who are
equally disabled, but unable to find a mechanism for opening a partial claim, cannot do so.
As a result, the most disabled workers are not always the ones with the most "luck" in
obtaining benefits.
441. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(d) (Supp. 1992). Relatively few permanent total disability
awards are in fact awarded on this basis. The beneficiaries of these awards are more often
still actively in the workforce than the beneficiaries of Posey/Cardwell awards.
442. The 1990 proposed legislation for expanded rehabilitation, and the draft rule gov-
erning rehabilitation, would both consider the refusal of a worker to participate to be ad-
missible evidence in a claim for permanent disability benefits.
443. This is, in fact, what the court held in Cardwell v. State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Comm'r, 301 S.E.2d 790 (W. Va. 1983).
444. Or pursue "idleness," as has been charged by at least one law firm representing
business interests. See supra note 92.
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to current and future workers at reasonable cost. Obviously, views of
adequacy and reasonableness may vary and there are an infinite num-
ber of ways to redesign benefit systems."45 More fundamentally,
however, as this Article demonstrates, the judicial and administrative
systems which govern injured workers in West Virginia are currently
designed to promote compensation remedies over reemployment.' 0
A fundamental reordering of judicial and administrative views may
therefore be necessary. Judicial interpretation and administrative func-
tioning can have significant impact on the effectiveness of any at-
tempts to rehabilitate and reemploy injured workers. By expanding the
definition of handicap under the Human Rights Act in 1989 and ex-
plicitly forbidding discharge and providing limited rights to reemploy-
ment for temporarily disabled workers in 1990, the West Virginia
Legislature has begun to consider the issues of reemployment. In pass-
ing these amendments and overruling narrow judicial interpretations
governing workers' rights, the legislature has also made clear that it
intends to provide these alternative remedies to injured workers. These
steps were, however, barely a beginning.
Expansion of reemployment rights and opportunities can be
achieved in two ways. First, specific legal rights for workers can be
more fully articulated and expanded. One possibility, advocated else-
where, is to expand reemployment rights through a comprehensive
reemployment statute. 7 Such a statute should, at a minimum, guar-
445. Current debates in workers' compensation circles often focus on issues of contain-
ing health care costs and mechanisms for quantifying permanent partial disability. Current
discussions in West Virginia raise both of these concerns." Other more specific issues also
merit consideration. For example, West Virginia is one of only two states that make no
provision for subrogation when the claimant recoups wage and medical losses from a third
party. The legislature has failed to address this issue adequately. See W. VA. CODE §§ 23-
2A-1 to -2 (Supp. 1992). Obviously, these more specific inquiries are not the primary focus
of this Article. They are not the focus here because they do not go to what I believe to be
the heart of the issues; changes regarding these issues would neither solve the inherited
financial problems (relating to the deficit and the displacement of workers who qualify for
second injury life awards) nor resolve any of the fundamental concerns regarding occupa-
tionally injured workers.
446. The most important single focus to reduce workers' compensation costs is un-
doubtedly the prevention of injury and illness. Unfortunately, workers' compensation pro-
grams themselves have had limited success in furthering this goal. Some effort is, however,
being made in this direction. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
447. One such model act was proposed by Professor Mark A. Rothstein. Rothstein,
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antee reemployment to workers who recover completely from occupa-
tional injuries for a specified period of time and clearly establish rights
to reemployment to those who can be accommodated through job
restructuring, retraining, or reassignment.
This approach has certain attractions: it establishes clear legal
entitlements and ground rules which are consistent for all workers and
are generally not subject to individual waiver. However, the level of
political opposition to the partial protection proposed by the Workers'
Compensation Advisory Board in 1990 makes the passage of a com-
prehensive statute in West Virginia unlikely in the immediate future.
Gradual expansion of reemployment rights can also be accom-
plished through more liberal judicial interpretation of existing discrimi-
nation statutes. In particular, both the recent amendments to the
Workers' Compensation Act and the Human Rights Act were intended
to extend additional rights to injured workers to return to work. These
statutory changes should be interpreted to discourage discharge and
encourage reemployment whenever possible. This can be accomplished
if the traditionally liberal rules of statutory interpretation are extended
to the claims made by disabled workers under the new discriminatory
practices provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act448 and the
handicap discrimination provisions of the Human Rights Act." 9 Em-
supra note 283. Similar proposals have been advanced under the Canadian workers' com-
pensation laws. Terence Ison, Rights to Employment Under the Workers' Compensation Acts
and Other Statutes, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 839 (1990).
448. In particular, discharge for absence or for any other cause that is not clearly
separable from the work-related injury or absence should be prohibited, unless specifically
permitted by the sections of a collective bargaining agreement governing seniority; rights to
reemployment should be enforced whenever possible. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3 (Supp.
1992).
449. The court's assertion of the need for strict construction of this provision was, at
least in part, derived from the restrictive definition of handicap adopted by the legislature in
1981. The legislative amendment expanding this definition in 1989 is evidence either that
the court had misinterpreted the legislature's original intent or that the legislative view had
changed. Like the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, these amendments
signal a shift in legislative intent toward promoting rights of previously injured employees.
The court's reexamination should include an attempt to establish some consistent
expectations for injured workers. The definition of handicap should be reexamined in order
to extend protection to work-injured people who have been adjudged to be permanently im-
paired by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner and who are excluded from employ-
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ployer defenses under the Human Rights Act should be subject to the
same strict analysis that is imposed on affirmative defenses in other
civil rights discrimination matters."'
While important, however, individual rights which protect employ-
ees are, in the end, only minimally protective.451 There is a funda-
mentally unequal relationship between disabled employees (who would
like to retain their jobs) and employers who control the availability of
work. Individual employees are therefore often reluctant (when the
employment relationship is continuing) and financially unable (when
the relationship has terminated) to litigate. It may therefore be the
normative power of the legal directive which leads to the most signifi-
cant change in behavior. Employees who work for employers who do
not voluntarily comply with new statutory directions may not actually
be protected.
Change in the approach to administration of claims might, in
contrast, affect all claimants and employers and have greater future
impact. There has been, however, little reason to think that the admin-
istration of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund can effec-
tively review and manage issues of reemployment. The failure of the
ment because of their resulting impairment. The 1989 amendments to the Human Rights Act
should be explicitly interpreted to include any discrimination based upon a perception that a
worker is undesirable because of prior workers' compensation claims. Length of absence
from a job should not be a significant factor in determinations of disability; this only serves
to encourage, rather than discourage, longer periods of temporary disability. Performance of
the essential functions of the job should allow for restructuring which guarantees that all of
the functions will be successfully performed by a group of employees, not by the impaired
individual alone. Reasonable accommodation should, when possible, include job restructuring
and reassignment. Reassignments to lower paying jobs should be undertaken together with
the provision of rehabilitation services by the Workers' Compensation Fund, so that the
worker will receive temporary partial benefits.
450. The defense allowing an employer to reject an applicant or terminate an employee
because of probability of harm to that individual, when the safety of others is not jeopar-
dized, should be eliminated. Although this would require amendment of the current regula-
tions of the Human Rights Commission, this change would be consistent with the statutory
language of the ADA. In evaluating claims of undue hardship, the rule of the Commission,
which is consistent with federal regulatory language, should be carefully followed.
451. "Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens
social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at
least the discovery of common ground." MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 14 (1991).
463
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commissioner to alert employers and physicians to the availability of
expanded rehabilitation opportunities under the 1990 amendments does
not bode well for expanded administrative commitment to reemploy-
ment issues. Substantial changes, as well as increases in administrative
budget allowances, would have to be made in order to reorient the
program toward issues of rehabilitation and reemployment of injured
workers.
To accomplish this, the Workers' Compensation Fund would have
to develop a comprehensive claims management system which assigns
a staff member familiar with benefit entitlement, medical care stan-
dards, and rehabilitation options to every claim in which it is likely
that the injured worker will be absent from work for a substantial
period of time. This program should encourage and monitor employer
efforts to provide rehabilitation and should aggressively utilize all
available tools, including retraining and the new partial rehabilitation
benefits, in order to assist workers to return to work quickly and safely. 2
452. Such a program might, for example, be organized in the following manner. The
staff member should follow the claim on a longitudinal basis, maintain close contact with
the claimant to determine how s/he is progressing, explore the availability of alternative job
placements with the employer, and maintain contact with the claimant's treating physician,
in order to determine the availability of transitional or light duty work which the claimant
would be capable of performing. Broader use should be made of the temporary partial bene-
fits which provide financial incentives for claimants to return to work on a transitional
basis. Employers, employees and physicians should be encouraged to utilize trial return to
work procedures pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7b (Supp. 1992). Any return to work
which involves job accommodation should be monitored closely and continuously to ensure
that the claimant is not assigned to work that s/he should not be performing; cases should
never be closed if the claimant is performing transitional work. If it does not appear that
the individual will be able to return to work for the pre-injury employer, the claim manager
should make an immediate assessment as to whether rehabilitation programs, including re-
training, would assist the claimant in returning to the work force. If not, administrative
assessment should be made of the claimant's entitlement to permanent total disability bene-
fits under current law.
These changes in the handling of claims would be far-reaching. They would also be
perceived as dangerous by both claimants' representatives and employers. Claimants quite
correctly feel that any assistance from an insurance carrier is motivated by a desire to save
money, not to help them. Mishandling of a claims management system could result in
claimant resistance to coperation and thereby exacerbate the deep feelings of animosity
toward the Fund shared by claimants and employers. Employers, on the other hand, will
charge that this system will not work unless claimants are required to participate. Mandatory
participation in vocational rehabilitation is rarely effective, however, and dramatically in-
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Second, it is important that the nature of litigation-and litigious-
ness-which surrounds workers' compensation not be extended to
issues surrounding a worker's return to work. It is time to explore al-
ternative dispute resolution mechanisms which would serve the parties'
interests in rapid resolution and the societal interest in expanding em-
ployment opportunities.453 Any employee who cannot return to work
creases claimant resistance to cooperation.
Employers will also charge that the cost of such a program outweighs its benefits.
The administrative cost ,of individual case management is, without question, higher than the
cost of the current "pay only" system. States which have expanded rehabilitation efforts
have found their costs to rise primarily as a result of excessive use of private rehabilitation
vendors, who charge high hourly rates to perform these functions. The ability of health care
or related specialists to expand their services, if there is payment available for them, is
legendary. The conversion to this alternative system of claims management for the 12% of
lost-time claims which result in temporary disability of greater than 120 days should be
accomplished with the use of expanded, better trained internal staff.
Employer-sponsored rehabilitation efforts should be encouraged but must be moni-
tored aggressively. Currently, employers also maintain that their own efforts at rehabilitation
are often rebuffed by the Fund. Unfortunately, claimants perceive that many of these pro-
grams were designed to induce them to return to work prematurely in order to reduce costs;
employer conversely perceive resistant employees to be malingerers. Under current law, the
employer has considerable leverage to pressure an injured employee: the claimant hopes for
an on-going employment relationship but under current law has only inconsistent guarantees
of reemployment. The unequal bargaining power between employees and their employers is
made less equal by the employee's disability; whatever ability the employee had to termi-
nate the relationship and go elsewhere is significantly reduced as a result of the injury.
Premature return to work has two significant results: it increases the likelihood of reinjury
and permanent disability; and it increases the hostility of other workers to the employer's
rehabilitation efforts.
Nevertheless, the encouragement of appropriate rehabilitation efforts by employers is
critical. It is precisely the willingness of employers' to reemploy injured workers and to
provide transitional work that will increase the worker's likelihood of successful continued
employment. Because of the history of distrust of these efforts, however, they can be suc-
cessfully encouraged only if the agency carefully monitors them. Claimants who need reha-
bilitation assistance must be monitored by the agency's rehabilitation specialists, even if
their employers have extensive rehabilitation programs of their own. Employers will un-
doubtedly charge that this is duplicative. It is, however, the commissioner's obligation to
provide indemnity benefits to injured' claimants when appropriate; the balancing of return to
work and indemnity payment cannot be accomplished by the employer, whose interests are
consistently adverse to the claimant.
453. Several models for this exist. For example, under some collective bargaining
agreements, when there is a difference of opinion regarding medical fitness for duty of a
returning employee, the physicians chosen by the employer and the employee agree upon a
third physician to examine the worker. The third physician is informed regarding the job
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would maintain eligibility for compensation benefits, including reha-
bilitation benefits.
Finally, despite the strong financial and policy justification for
expansion of reemployment rights of injured workers, a word of cau-
tion is nevertheless appropriate. Reemployment is not a replacement
for the provision of adequate monetary and rehabilitation benefits for
workers who are actually displaced from the work force as a result of
single or accumulated work-related disabilities;454 nor is it a replace-
ment for the primary prevention of injuries and diseases in the
workplace.
However, the negative consequences of continuing a system which
frees employers of any obligation to injured workers (other than to
provide compensation benefits and to maintain obligations under col-
lective bargaining agreements) are most troubling. Moreover, the cur-
rent lack of any serious administrative effort at rehabilitation means
duties and extent of available accommodation and makes a determination regarding whether
it is appropriate for the employee to return.
454. Terence Ison, a commentator with administrative experience with workers' com-
pensation in Canada, has argued that expansion of reemployment, if it occurs, should occur
for all disabled employees and therefore should be situated in general employment standards
legislation, not within a workers' compensation statute. Ison argues that rights to continuing
employment are fundamentally unenforceable. They serve, moreover, to divert workers and
others from considering whether retraining or other skill developments would place them in
a better position in the open labor market; if the specific job provided to accommodate the
worker disappears, s/he may then be unemployable or forced to seek work for which s/he is
not medically fit. Because those familiar with assessing the medical condition of workers
are rarely familiar with the actual demands of jobs in the work environment, they have
never done a good job of determining what constitutes suitable employment; these efforts
have, therefore, always been a cause of injustice, contention, complaint and waste. Reem-
ployment requirements may, moreover, increase the social control by employers over injured
workers and decrease the likelihood that the workers' compensation administrators will ex-
tend meaningful rehabilitation efforts. Workers' compensation should, instead, continue to do
what it does best: provide cash transfer payments to injured workers to replace their wages
and compensate them for their permanent impairments. Ison's concerns are not illegitimate.
There is strong anecdotal evidence of the misuse of rehabilitation and reemployment in
order to reduce costs by forcing injured workers back to work prematurely. Ison, supra note
447, at 843-46; see also Terence Ison, The Significance of Experience Rating, 24 OSCO;CODE
HALL LJ. 723, 733 (1986) (arguing that experience rating and self insurance, both of which
cause employer costs to rise as compensation costs rise, encourage employers to offer "pho-
ney" rehabilitation programs).
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that injured workers are often abandoned by the current system without
any mechanism for obtaining jobs.
If injured workers are consistently reemployed, the entire incentive
structure of the workers' compensation system will change. To ac-
knowledge the status of the occupationally injured as workers, we must
vest them with both the ability and the right to continue to work. If
we do not, we must be prepared to continue to pay the high costs of
workers' compensation, to endure the suffering resulting from occupa-
tional hazards, and to fight the Sysiphean455 battle over benefit costs.
455. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (1955). For eternity, Sisyphus will
struggle to roll the rock up the mountain.
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